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Recently, a number of scholars (Bilezikian, 1977; Hooker, 1991; Botha, 1993; Shiner, 
2003; Dewey, 2004; Fast, 2005; Byrskog, 2006; Holland, 2007) have alluded to, or 
highlighted, the dramatic nature of, and the performative possibilities in, the Gospel 
of Mark.   Their comments and explorations are appropriated as the basis for engaging 
in a theoretical work that seeks to establish both why and how the Gospel of Mark 
may be read as a dramatic text, and, consequently, to suggest a manner in which to 
dramatize this account of the Gospel of Mark.   The task is undertaken with Michel 
Foucault and Aristotle as the guides, and, significantly, with Foucault as the 
interpretive guide to the processes of forming Aristotle‟s treatise on drama.   It 
endeavours, first, to emphasise the physically inscriptive power of texts (why the 
Gospel of Mark may be performative); second, to demonstrate the diverse and 
complex processes which form the specific discourse of the Poetics by Aristotle, and 
to foreground some of its central interpretive protocols (how the Gospel of Mark may 
be read as a drama); and, finally, informed by the body-power of texts and employing 
certain of the Aristotelian protocols, to venture an approach to the Gospel of Mark as 




text, body, inscription, discursive formation, discourse, pra=cij, mu=qoj, a9marti/a, 
a0nagnw/risij, peripe/teia, ka/qarsij, tragedy 
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TRAGEDY AND ITS POSSIBILITIES 
 
It is a time of the end of all endings, and also the end of all beginnings.   Definitive 
stories of the human endeavour, determinate narratives of the human journey, 
denotative mappings of the human route from nativities, from fontes et origines, 
toward final destinations, places of rest and repose, the termini ad quos of the human 
itinerary are transgressed by both the modern and the post-modern interrogation of the 
boundary, the limitation, the margin.   For the modernists, the “melancholy, long, 
withdrawing roar ... [of the] ... Sea of Faith ... retreating” (Arnold, Dover Beach) 
alone is heard and no „beyond‟ awaits; for the post-modernists, the „beyond‟ is 
constituted by textual inscriptions always already – toujours déjà – questioning and 
subverting, deconstructing and disseminating the centre, itself constituted of textual 
inscriptions, which comprise a “plurality of meaning, an irreducible plurality” 
(Barthes, 1979: 76), and which themselves, perennially, are under erasure – sous 
rature.   Whilst a doleful sadness and a disconsolate loneliness intermittently may 
afflict the modernist project, the conflictual disarray and aberrant discord of post-
modernity terminates linearity, inexorable progress, and the constructions of political 
kingdoms on earth or eternal kingdoms in the heavens.   It is an end to the insertion of 
the “documents” of the present into the inexorable serialization of the human epic, 
“les équilibres stables et difficiles à rompre, les processus irréversibles, les régulations 
constantes” (Foucault, 1969: 9), which have, until now, formed the recorded account 
of the unfolding of history.   “Le modèle enigmatique de la ligne est ... le refoulement 
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de la pensée symbolique pluri-dimensionelle” (Derrida, 1967b: 128), a repression, or 
even expulsion, that upholds “la formation de l‟idéologie par la classe de ceux qui 
écrivent ou plutôt qui disposent des scribes” (Derrida, 1967b: 129).   But “la fin de 
l‟écriture linéaire” rebels against the writers, or, more exactly, against those who 
instruct and order the scribes, and as “nous commençons ... à écrire autrement,” so 
also, and more pertinently, “nous devons relire autrement” (Derrida, 1967b: 130).   
And whilst “different kinds of text call for different kinds of reading,” Lash‟s (1986: 
38 & 45) assertion “that the fundamental form of the Christian interpretation of 
scripture is the life, activity and organization of the Christian community, constructed 
as performance of the biblical text,” is proximate to our task.                                         
 
Shiner‟s (2003) insightful and long overdue book on the “Performance of Mark,” 
draws more readily on Aristotle‟s Rhetoric than on his Poetics, and on the first or 
second-century manuscript attributed to Longinus, De sublimitate, Quintilian‟s (c. 35 
– 95 CE) Institutio oratoria, and the works of Cicero (106 – 43 BCE) and Lucian (c. 
115 – 200 CE), in order to display the performative quality of the Gospel of Mark.   
His approach, examples, and conclusions are illuminating, and he demonstrates more 
than adequately that reading the Gospel of Mark in a wider, and yet defined, literary 
context is rewarding.   In Shiner‟s (2003) literary arena, the Gospel of Mark indeed 
performs, but perhaps his performative reading is too readily informed by the 
protocols of rhetoric, and the text itself, quite probably, demands various excisions, in 
order to transform it into a dramatic work. 
 
The task here is less ambitious, more introductory.   First, it is to observe the 
performative and inscriptive nature of texts, and of New Testament texts in particular.   
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This is undertaken in Chapter Two, with the assistance of Michel Foucault‟s (1967; 
1973; 1975; 1978; 1985) perspicacious observations concerning the rhetorization of 
bodies, and the constitution of acceptable and apposite behavioural norms of conduct 
and social interaction through codified and physically inscriptive protocols.   Texts 
write bodies: bodies dramatize textuality.   This is the performance of the body-text, 
or, more exactly, the textualized body, and, with a certain depth and gravity, religious 
texts score and engrave their adherents intimately, and generate a religious anatomy, 
and, more specifically, a confessional disposition, which is ostended in its verbal, 
gestural, and interactive comportment. 
 
Second, it is this performative du/namij of texts, and of religious texts in particular, 
that invokes the narrower focus of Chapter Three.   The plethora of multiple readings 
of the New Testament texts undertaken by scholars seems to create a disjunction 
between their textual positivity and their physical serration; and their epigraphic 
nature is restricted either to prescriptive liturgical information or ethical injunctions, 
rather than their more ubiquitous and embracing textual branding.   But the dramatic 
quality of the gospels in particular, in which their instructive „writing‟ materializes 
corporeally in and on the lives of the Christian faithful, and, indeed, both positively 
and adversely upon the unfaithful, engenders a more deliberate and concentrated 
endeavour, namely, to foreground certain features of a gospel construed as a dramatic 
work.   But never far from desire are the obstacles to its fulfilment.   And here, the 
desire to read a New Testament text as a drama is confronted by the problem of how 
to proceed.   Which protocols?   What poetic structures?   Which principles of 
playwriting?   Which theorist?   Which theory?    
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For a student of both the Theory of Literature and of the New Testament, two classics 
present themselves without being asked.   The first is the Poetics by Aristotle, the 
„inaugural‟ text of Literary Theory; the second is the Gospel of Mark, the 
„foundational‟ gospel, and one that immediately is dramatically captivating.   The 
Gospel of Mark is without genealogies or reflective philosophy.   It is concise in 
action, short in duration, and, arguably, tragic.   But the Poetics occupies centre stage 
in Chapter Three, that is, in as far as it is able to present itself.   For once on the 
o0rxh/stra, Aristotle‟s Poetics dances, as indeed it should, and its „lines‟ and 
„actions‟ reside in the agonistic milieu of discursive „production,‟ of the formation of 
a discursive regularity, and one almost as fractured in its inspissation as it is, for the 
interpreter, perhaps even for its inaugurator, in its formulation.   Thus, the task is a 
hermeneutic one, and, once again, Michel Foucault (1969) provides the possibility of 
viewing the Poetics as a discourse formed from various emergent surfaces, with the 
subsequent endeavours of reification through the attendant rites and rituals of 
hegemony.   But the Poetics retains its own dramatic quality and continues to „mask‟ 
itself, leading, at best, to momentary sta/sij – indeed, both as a discursive „site‟ and 
as a „revolt‟ – at worst, to ossification; but, more often, to unbounded analytical 
scrutiny in the lives of revolving interpreters.   Here, closure is denied, even when 
momentary and corrigible protocols of reading a tragic drama are adopted; and hence, 
this text almost invokes a fidelity to it of a reader, who returns again and again, only 
to find it speaking new words.   Notwithstanding its semantic abundance, the siting of 
the Poetics as a discursive formation does, at least, permit the generation of „a 
reading‟ of this treatise, and the consequent suggestion of „faithfully unfaithful‟ 
postulates of the elements of a tragic drama. 
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Thus, by appropriating specific elements within the uncertain hermeneutic of the 
Poetics, this selection of particular features, which are suggested to be central to an 
Aristotelian dramatic work of the tragic genre, subsequently in Chapter Four, become 
the ba/sanoj of the presence of tragic dramatic features in a toujours déjà 
overdetermined Gospel of Mark.   Edward Norman (2007: 24) has observed that  
 
[i]t is now generally assumed, as part of modern intellectual culture, that the 
Bible was always interpreted literally until scientific knowledge and historical 
relativism began to dispel its authority.   Then people of reason, and Biblical 
scholars themselves, began to subject the sacred texts to the same kind of 
critical analysis as other repositories of traditional knowledge received in the 
Age of Enlightenment.   In fact, a „fundamentalist‟ reading of the Bible, and 
the concept of verbal inerrancy, are largely modern: a fruit, indeed, of mass 
literacy and populist choice ... [since] ... the Bible texts were interpreted 
allegorically, not only by Philo and Origen and the Alexandrian school of the 
second and third centuries, but by probably a significant majority of Jewish 
and Christian scholars until the end of the Middle Ages.   Allegory is now so 
out of fashion as an interpretative tool that it has virtually passed from the 
scene ... but it is as well to remember that such a method accepted the diversity 
inseparable from human agency in the composition of texts, and allowed a 
single verbal construction to convey multiple meanings – a correct pointer to 
the complexity of things. 
 
Whilst this work similarly rejects closure upon conclusive interpretations and, more 
emphatically, upon a single definitive account, and concurs with Turner (1995: 24) 
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that “[t]heological adequacy ... requires the maximization of our discourses about 
God,” perhaps it endeavours less to add a „meaning‟ to the “multiple meanings” of a 
sacred story, than to sketch – a suitable dramatic image – an approach to the Gospel 
of Mark as a performative work of an Aristotelian and tragic nature.   It does so, 
however, at considerable historical distance from its target text, and even further from 
its theoretical lens.   Thus, accompanying this essay, in its reading of the assigned 
tragic lineaments in this sacred text, are the innovative academic gestures in the 
thought of Michel Foucault,
1
 primarily those about the body and the formation of 
discourses.   Foucault‟s corpus, it is suggested, renders the distant and the archaic, 
and, somewhat paradoxically with regard to the perennially recited biblical stories, the 
distantly and archaically familiar, now contemporary.   The manner in which words 
and bodies are entwined through an etched and embedded procedure, and the way in 
which discourses structure themselves, define their boundaries, and „voice‟ their 
participants, contribute to generate, inform, and construct – to subject as a subject – 
the subsequent enactive processes of the formation and compaction of the activity of 
being human.   Through appropriating aspects of Foucault‟s work, not only may 
human physicality and its verbally informed gestures be read as scripted drama, but 
also the protocols of tragedy, as conceived by Aristotle, may be sited in their own 
agonistic environment.   Whilst the latter inquiry generates a reading of the Poetics – 
always corrigible, always partial – it does, at least, license the foregrounding for our 
purpose of a pra=cij, a mu=qoj observed through that human a9marti/a, which 
engenders an a0nagnw/risij and peripe/teia, and leads to an exploration of the 
function of ka/qarsij.   Moreover, and not without import, it is suggested that if a 
ka/qarsij succeeds effectively, then a pra=cij is conceived – even if that is simply to 
                                                 
1
 Foucault was appointed to the Chair of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France in 
1970. 
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accept the meaningless of meaning – and the emotional serration of perceiving a 
pra=cij through the experience of ka/qarsij writes that tragic meaning upon the 
human self.   But Foucault‟s observations exceed their boundaries.   Indeed, the 
borders of discourses, of specialities, of areas of expertise, are discursive 
constructions which are defended with rigour, perhaps in no more an unseemly 
fashion than in the academy, perhaps in no more a violent manner than when the 
limits of sacred creeds are challenged.   Although  
 
les systèmes punitifs sont à replacer dans une certain „économie politique‟ du 
corps: même s‟ils ne font pas appel à des châtiments violents ou sanglants, 
même losqu‟ils utilisent les méthodes „douces‟ qui enferment ou corrigent  
(Foucault, 1975: 30), 
 
the formation of politically, socially, economically ordered and circumscribed 
subjects is undertaken by the prevailing codes of discipline and conformity in the 
wider societal arena, because “le corps ne devient force utile que s‟il est à la fois 
corps productif et corps assujetti” (Foucault, 1975: 30 – 31).    
 
Tragedy, it is proposed, emerges as that resistance to the dominant discourses, the 
inherited inscriptions, the body formed.   Tragedy is present where there is conflict.   
Tragedy employs, arguably, those unique human categories of possibility, of 
alternative, and of hope by employing the language capacities of the subjunctive and 
optative moods, as well as their conditional facility, and, perhaps definitively, of the 
future tense, in order to create dreams of unrealized scenes and other worlds.   These 
visions exert their pressure upon current worlds and worldviews, and they challenge 
 12 
the eternal and temporal powers – their presence, their absence, their rule, their 
methods.   Ironically, the companionship of Foucault evokes a sadness, a sense that 
those dreamed of visions remain dreamed of.   The powerful, the respected and 
revered – both sacred and secular – resist agitation and disturbance.   Tragedy, as plot, 
as mu=qoj, evinces a human spirit which questions, dissents, and defies.   But, 
simultaneously, tragedy, as action, as pra=cij, resists these interrogative and defiant 
challenges, and, generates a self-defeating ka/qarsij, which, nevertheless, impels and 
revisits ethical and intellectual questions, and documents a perennially dissent.   This 
tragic disposition may witness, or, more boldly, constitute the beingness of being 
contemporarily human. 
 
In Goldhill‟s (1986: 222 – 243) useful demonstration of the congruities between the 
sophist and the tragedian in fifth-century Athens, his comments may be appropriated 
to emphasize the promise in revisioning a text such as the Gospel of Mark as an 
Aristotelian tragedy, since both sophist and tragedian are “parallel investigators of the 
position of man [sic] in language and in society” (Goldhill, 1986: 229).   And tragedy, 
as one suggests in the case of the Gospel of Mark, which probes the adequacy both of 
sacred and secular words and also of extant religious and political constructs and 
systems, exemplifies the skill of brinkpersonship in pursuing these pressing matters, 
but returns, through „pity‟ and „fear,‟ to kathartic equilibrium.   “Tragic drama,” 
(Goldhill, 1986: 242) asserts,  
 
again and again dramatizes the social world of the city at risk from the force of 
man‟s [sic] behaviour as it approaches the extremes of wild transgression and 
desire for law and order; again and again, tragic texts ... return to the 
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vocabulary of civic relations, to the terminology of norm, error, punishment; 
again and again ... the tragedians depict concern with the definition of a human 
and his behaviour, 
 
 and the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy extends these tragic tensions and, 
as will be suggested, and in conformity with the tragic dénouement, both plays, and 























Classic texts invite readers.
2
   Far from being passive cultural artefacts of a dim and 
dusky tradition, they call out to auditors.   These texts, which both have claimed the 
status of „classic,‟ and upon which the status of „classic‟ has been bestowed, 
constitute a corpus of literature by no means static or closed.   Nor are they read, but 
rather they read and write us with an authenticity that portrays a perennial, perhaps 
often only a sensed, veracity about the human condition.   Thus, classic texts always 
are contemporary.   They are active participants in the various socio-political, 
economic, cultural, and religious milieux within nation states, and many succeed in 
overarching communal localities with their epics, which demarcate national 
actualities, and, indeed, some transcend national boundaries.   In their presence at 
intra-national, national, and international levels, they inform human lives and infuse 
public affairs with the „truths‟ of human existence.   In speaking our condition, they 
                                                 
2
 For the same diligent reader and inquirer of the classics, these upostatic works invoke an „eternal 
return;‟ and a perennial journey to them is undertaken through different lenses and theories, since they 
constitute one‟s constant informative companions.   Following upon research which read the 
Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus within both the Aristotelian and Semiotic frame (M.A. UNISA, 
2006), the present project returns to some of those texts and arguments, both in order to revisit them 
and refine them; but also, and more significantly in the present case, to expand the limits of inquiry 
and, in particular, to understand the Poetics as it emerges from a burgeoning and contested 
classification of the te/xnh of dramatic art, and to perceive its „formation‟ as a „discourse‟ in a 
rigorously Foucauldian sense.   Here one does not simply join “[m]odern occidental philosophy, 
[which] for all its historical turns, is still working through Aristotelian linguistic categories and 
distinctions” (Goldhill, 1986: 1), but, as is emphasized in this study, one enjoins post-modern and post-
structuralist perspectives of the dynamic shifts in, and slides and slippage of, textual semantic promise.      
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speak to our condition.   Distance and time seldom sequesters their accurate recording 
of the human state.  
 
But that accuracy is part of their secret: they possess a precision that eludes us.   For, 
classic texts reveal a light that is angled and refractive, that deflects and glancingly 
reflects and, therefore, consistently challenges our vision.   Thus, these narratives of 
human truths defy definitive renditions.   Such sagas and epics, such upostatic stories 
 
are open-ended in that they provoke inexhaustible multiplicities and 
potentialities of interpretation.   They keep the human spirit off-balance.   
They elide our paraphrase and understanding even as we seem to grasp them 
… The hunger of the soul, of the intellect, for meaning, compels the disciple 





In the endeavour to gain new insights into these foundational narratives, to tease out 
their interpretive knots, to provide answers to their aporiai, to make visible their 
palimpsests, and to extract and elucidate their messages anew, classic texts are 
subjected to multiple readings from behind, alongside, and in front of themselves.   
Thus, MacIntyre‟s (1990) Gifford Lectures trace Aquinas‟s thought to a dialogue 
between Aristotle and St. Augustine, viewing Thomas‟s systematization as a sequel to 
the fusion of the ethics and theology of these two primary thinkers.   Those who have 
cited the classics as “monuments,” rather than as “documents,” in their own “spaces 
                                                 
3
 Coetzee (2007: 190), in his (quite possibly) autobiographical palimpsest, Diary of a Bad Year, 
includes the following entry:   “Another meaning of „the classic:‟ to be on the shelf waiting to be taken 
down for the thousandth, the millionth time.   The classic: the perduring.   No wonder publishers are so 
eager to claim classic status for their authors!” 
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of dispersion” (Foucault, 1969), include Robbins (1984; 1992), whose socio-rhetorical 
reading of Mark draws on comparative examples, in order to foreground the rhetorical 
strategies adopted in the social interaction between Jesus and his followers.
4
   But, 
whilst there may be a minority of dissenting voices, the heirs of the Enlightenment, 
with their unremitting faith in human progress, remain convinced of the validity of 
current hermeneutical reseaux.   Thus, it is fashionable to appropriate more recent 
theoretical models, and to impose their frameworks upon the ancient, and yet ever-
concurrent, classics – whether structuralist (Patte, 1976; 1990), post-structuralist 
(Moore, 1994), and deconstructive mappings (Derrida, 1967a; 1967b; 1972a; 1972b) 
or Marxist (Gutiérrez, 1973), feminist (Fiorenza, 1983), and queer
5
 (Bozorth, 2001) 
excavations. 
 
But it is, at once, both an historical and a post-modern strategy of reading to 
investigate a classic text from behind by employing yet another classic, of which, like 
those later programmes, the target classic itself is unaware.   Ironically, the ignorance 
of the classic subjected to such a meditation, paradoxically, contains both our 
knowledge and its own, since it declares our actuality from out of its own 
encyclopaedic wisdom.    
 
To examine a classic text as a discursive regularity is not dissimilar from applying to 
it the most neoteric of hermeneutic plans.   Like all strategic attempts at disclosure 
and comprehension of the classic, the view partially is obscured by the interpretive 
                                                 
4
 Snyman (2006) provides an important reminder that the imposition of external theoretical models and 
frameworks ought not to deny the generation of sophisticated and apposite rhetorical strategies which 
are internal to the structure and argument of a text.  
5
 Although Bozorth‟s (2001) scholarly examination of the poetry of Auden, undoubtedly, is aided by 
the declared sexual orientation of the poet, the possibility of undertaking a serious „queer reading‟ of 
the Gospels ought not to be dismissed.   In fact, since this issue currently threatens to cause schism 
within the Anglican Communion, such an academic inquiry may be somewhat urgent.    
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pillars that have been constructed in the succeeding centuries,
6
 and partially hidden by 
the archaeological fragments that have contributed to its initial accretion as a 
representative discourse (see Foucault, 1969: passim).    In this wider context, the 
return to a classic unveils a reading that simultaneously is opaque and transparent, 
analogous to standing before stained-glass as magnificent as that of the thirteenth 
century north-transept rose window in Chartres Cathedral, both seen – as “presence” – 
and also seen through – as “absent-presence.”   And the dappled light offered by this 
opaque transparency, or transparent opacity, refuses to yield “une présence pleine,” 
but “c‟est ce qu‟on peut appeler espacement, devenir-espace du temps ou devenir-
temps de l‟espace (temporalisation)” (Derrida, 1972a: 14). 
 
Merely a trace of meaning is proffered as “différance,” meaning which is momentary, 
because it differs from, and defers to, its surroundings, all of which, toujours déjà, 
constitute signifiants (Derrida, 1972a: 1 – 29).
7
   But la trace is neither a past, nor a 
future as a modified present,
8
 but, of its own provenance, an i1xnoj, a track to follow, 
                                                 
6
 As Calvino (1999: 5) notes: “The Classics are those books which come to us bearing the aura of 
previous interpretations, and trailing behind them the traces they have left in the culture or cultures (or 
just in the languages and customs) through which they have passed.” 
7
 The choice of stained glass and of that in Chartres Cathedral is not without purpose: “Stained glass by 
its nature does not benefit from surface light – light shining directly upon its face – which makes the 
glass appear flat and dull.   Stained glass needs lighting from behind so that it can transmit the light, or 
be illumined by it, allowing maximum visual impact of the glass.   In Chartres Cathedral the internal 
illumination was, and still is, potentially quite low ... The ability of the human eye to focus on a given 
colour at low light levels is defined as the colour‟s acuity rating ... At the lower end of the acuity scale 
are the colours of blue-greens, deep reds and blues, with the blues having the lowest acuity rating of all 
... As a result of the use of these colours in the cathedral‟s glass, combined with the intentionally dim 
lighting environment, our eyes enter into a mildly myopic state and are unable to focus clearly on the 
coloured glass.   The eye continues to seek the correct focal length by shifting it back and forth in the 
dim surroundings.   As a result the images appear to float off the plane of the glass, seemingly stepping 
off the window and hovering in front of the observer‟s eyes.   This is a conscious twelfth-century trick 
of colour and lighting which has had a profound mystical impact on tens of thousands of visitors to the 
cathedral over the last eight hundred years” (Brady, 2006: 64 – 65).  
8
 Derrida (1972a: 13): “La différance, c‟est qui fait que le mouvement de la signification n‟est possible 
que si chaque élément dit „présent,‟ apparaissant sur la scène de la présence, se rapporte à autre chose 
que lui-même, gardant en lui la marque de l‟élément passé et se laissant déjà creuser par la marque de 
son rapport à l‟élément futur, la trace ne se rapportant pas moins à ce qu‟on appelle le futur qu‟à ce 
qu‟on appelle le passé, et constituant ce qu‟on appelle le présent par ce rapport même à ce qui n‟est pas 
lui: absolument pas lui, c‟est-à-dire pas même un passé ou un futur comme présents modifiés.” 
 18 
or, metaphorically, a clue of meaning.   This converts the perspective of the viewer 
from „seeing‟ into „seeming,‟ in a vision that, unattainably, reaches both behind and 
before, and that may proffer semantic import, but “sans aucun centre d‟ancrage 
absolu” (Derrida, 1972a: 381).   The experience of the viewer is one of participatory 
agitation, of movement.   In an industrious and purposeful application, the beholder is 
“solicited,”
9
 and negotiates a view, which, perennially, is transformative, and that 
alters, and then, alters again.   As Thiselton (2006: 346) notes: 
 
If an active engagement between the horizons of the interpreter and those of 
the text takes place, this process will become formative in terms of the 
reshaping [of] the interpreter‟s horizons of understanding.   The interpreter‟s 
understanding of the text will undergo re-formation, but in the very process of 
expansion and enlargement the interpreter‟s horizons of understanding will 
also become re-configured or transformed in terms of understanding his or her 
own conceptual world afresh and more deeply.   The interpreter acquires an 
enlarged understanding of his or her own world. 
 
But the „eternal return‟ to classic texts, in the repeated readings and re-readings by 
their suppliants, does more than express and change, in a creative and innovative 
manner, the human experience of individuals and societies within countries or 
regions, or even globally.   Nostalgic journeys to the past are also journeys to the 
future, and not simply with respect to the modification of consciousness and intellect.   
Rather, the contours, which facilitate the migration of the preterite into the preterite- 
                                                 
9
 Scholes (1989) identifies “solicitation” as one of Derrida‟s “protocols of reading.”  
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present, are serrated tracks, i1xnh, that score, or even lacerate, the terrain.   And here, 




Classic texts embed themselves in human form and, then, „body forth‟ human activity.   
Their du/namij empowers them to pierce the bodies of human persons, and reveal 
themselves in the somatic gestural actions of their hosts.   In this sense, they are 
performative texts.   The Poetics by Aristotle is one such text; the Gospel of Mark is 
another. 
 
Therefore, the Poetics is not only a treatise about the superiority of tragic drama over 
epic, or merely an endeavour to establish the principles and protocols of writing a fine 
tragedy.   It also informs the tradition of playwriting down through the centuries, with 
more or less influence, and writes its text upon the Euripidean / Freudian text of 
Racine‟s Phèdre (1677) (see Goodkin, 1991: 153ff.), Beckett‟s Waiting for Godot 
(1953), or, as an adversative other, of Shakespeare‟s Hamlet (1601).   But, as 
intimated above, the influence of the Poetics extends beyond that of writing practice.   
Its presence in the construction of the speeches and the dialogue in the script of a 
play, and in the imaginative actions of the textual characters in the creative act of 
writing, is, concomitantly, „lived‟ in performance, in the ostensive act of mi/mhsij, of 
representation. 
 
Likewise, and yet more acutely, the Gospel of Mark, arguably, is less about the 
Incarnation, than itself incarnational.   Sections from it are not simply read as part of 
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the lectionary cycle of the Church.   Rather, the Gospel of Mark is enacted in the 
liturgy, where it is somatically instructive, as it informs the communal actions of the 
sacred rites of the Church, and not only when, as a tangible text, it is raised aloft in 
the Gospel Procession, and then, kissed and venerated, but, more specifically, in the 
representation, the a0na/mnhsij, of the Last Supper in the central Eucharistic rite of the 
Church.    
 
Here, the distant body – both in its singular and in its communal form – is embedded 
in the current body – both as the individual celebrant and adherent, and also as the 
gathered assembly.   Thus, the old actions are remembered, and, simultaneously, 
become „member-ed‟ actions, physically ostended actions.   This sacred text is an 
iterative ecclesiastical drama, repeatedly performed with vestimentary accretions, and 
sonic and scenic codifications.   Through its daily dramatic enactment, the Gospel of 
Mark names, defines, orders, and produces subjects, who, having subscribed to the 
attendant rites of entry, subsequently adopt the prevailing discourse, and themselves 
are enabled to name, define and refine, order and control, the discourse to which they 




                                                 
10
 Shapiro (2005: 170 – 171), writing of 1599.   A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare, suggests the 
manner in which theatre replaced the enactment of liturgical rituals: “While the Elizabethans didn‟t 
suffer the bloody religious wars that wracked much of the Continent, its reformations meant, among 
other things, a stripping away of altars, paintings, ceremonies, vestments, sacramental rituals and 
beloved holidays … In such a climate, new cultural forms – especially those that offered „goodly 
sights‟ – prospered, including public theatre.   In retrospect, it seems natural enough for the stage to fill 
a need once met by Catholic ritual, for English theatre emerged out of the liturgical plays of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries and, in the three hundred years of mystery, miracle and morality drama that 
followed, continued to be deeply suffused with religious ritual and subject matter.” 
In somewhat more amusing fashion, Pieter-Dirk Uys (Time Magazine, 5
th
 March, 2007), speaking of 
his theatre, Evita se Perron, in Darling, in the Western Cape, stated: “I live next to the Dutch Reformed 
Church dominee … He always embraces Evita [Bezuidenhout, Uys‟s alter ego,] whenever she meets 
him.   We respect each other‟s theatres.”   
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When Foucault (2000a: 326) stated that “the goal of my work during the last twenty 
years … has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects,” he was referring to the production of the self 
through bodily inscriptions by means of discursive taxonomies.   Foucault (1975) 
analysed the disciplinary techniques that were employed in prisons, military 
institutions, factories, and schools, in order to subjugate the body, and inscribe upon it 
normative and socially prescribed modes of action and ways of behaviour.   These 
procedures of rigorous training, the infliction of penalties, and the determination of 
acceptable, normalized conduct through interrogation and examination, are a product 
of the prevailing political and ideological hegemony, which purposefully assists in 
servicing and maintaining these strategies, and are „embodiments‟ of “action-
orientated” ideologies, which “extend from an elaborated system of thought to the 
minutiae of everyday life, from a scholarly treatise to a shout in the street” (Eagleton, 
1991: 48).   Thus, systems of governing, that is, of the physical enactment of 
government, are not merely documented in statute books: laws are not noetic and 
conceptual; rather, their pervasive power is accomplished through their inscription 
upon the bodies of their subjects, and  
 
Cet assujetissement n‟est pas obtenu par les seuls instruments soit de la 
violence soit de l‟idéologie; il peut très bien être direct, physique, jouer de la 
force contra la force, porter sur de éléments matériels, et pourtant ne pas être 
violent; il peut être calculé, organisé, techniquement réfléchi, il peut être 
subtil, ne faire usage ni des armes ni de la terreur, et pourtant rester de l‟ordre 
physique (Foucault, 1975: 31). 
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This is a process of writing the body and, consequently, of producing a physically 
seared political anatomy, so that “it is compelled to adopt a position within 
hierarchies, the structures and loci of powers that are already present in a community” 
(Vorster, 2000: 11).   And this compelled participation in the existing socio-economic 
and political network which frames a society is assumed by appropriating a position 
as an “enunciative modality” (Foucault, 1969: 68 – 74), by becoming a subject and 
adopting a modal existence within the defined and constituted arena of a particular 
structural sphere.   By means of this process, the “body becomes „enlanguaged‟ and 
language becomes embodied” (Vorster, 1997: 397) as a specifically defined “text,” 
informed and inscribed by, and dependent upon, the existing rhetorical strategies of 
hierarchical prescription, and of order, domination, and control, and, subsequently, 
itself, informing, inscribing, hierarchizing, and controlling the discursive formation of 




Thus, rhetorized bodies initially are disciplined and docile bodies, and religious 
discourse and practice somatically brands its members in a rarefied ritual atmosphere, 
in the same manner in which juridical or medical discourse and practice engraves its 
subscribers with its own conventions of domestication, obedience, and duty.   Brown 
(1988: 31) highlights the place of the body, and the different conceptions thereof, 
amongst Christians and non-Christians in the second century of the Common Era, 
when he maintains that 
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 The assertion that the „modern individual‟ possesses a freedom that overcomes such prescriptivism is 
problematic, as noted by Derrida (1995: 36): “The individualism of technological civilization relies 
precisely on a misunderstanding of the unique self.   It is an individualism relating to a role and not a 
person.   In other words it might be called the individualism of a masque or persona, a character 
[personage] and not a person  … modern individualism, as it has developed since the Renaissance, 
concerns itself with the role that is played rather than with this unique person whose secret remains 
hidden behind the social mask.” 
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[w]here second-century pagans differed most profoundly from the views that 
had already begun to circulate in Christian circles was in their estimate of the 
possibility for the body itself.   Potentially formless and eternal matter, the 
body was barely held together, for a short lifetime, by the vivid soul of the 
well-bred man.   Its solid matter could change as little as the crystalline marble 
of a sharply cut and exquisitely polished statue might blossom magically in its 
depths, into a more refined and malleable substance.   Like society, the body 
was there to be administered, not to be changed.   Others had begun to 
disagree with this view.   Writing at the end of the second century, Clement of 
Alexandria, a Christian who knew his pagan authors well, summed up with 
admirable clarity and fairness the essence of the expectations of the body that 
we have described.   Pagan philosophers, he knew, subscribed to an austere 
image of the person: 
The human ideal of continence, I mean that which is set forth by the Greek 
philosophers, teaches one to resist passion, so as not to be made subservient 
to it, and to train the instincts to pursue rational goals. 
 
But, even the “administration” of bodies requires training, in accordance with the 
extant social, economic, cultural, political, and religious e0pisth=mai.   Thus, the 
paidagwgei=on, the gumna/sion, the boulh/, and the nao/j are studios and locations of 
iterative rehearsal, where the physical ostension, which is congruent with the 
acceptable rituals and norms, may be practised.   And a compliant body, 
commensurate with a suitably restrained and ordered disposition, serves both to 
confirm membership, and also, repeatedly, to call to mind acceptable bodily 
behaviour.   But temperate dispositions, which adhere to the rules of comportment and 
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demeanour, engender a somatic dispersion that extends far beyond the formal and 
institutional locations and the sacred precincts where the political and cultural rituals 
and holy rites are enacted and celebrated. 
 
Brown‟s (1988: xvii) generous words, so unfamiliar in the academy, at once draw us 
back to Foucault‟s “humbling serenity and unaffected craftsmanship,”
12
 but this time 
to his exploration of regimens of interpersonal sexual relations and conduct amongst 
the ancient Greeks.   The body as the locus of engagement may be compared to a 
sacrament in the teaching of the Church.   Whilst, traditionally, the sacraments are 
“outward signs or sacred actions, instituted by Christ, through which grace is 
channelled or communicated for inward sanctification of the soul” (Lang, 1989: 561), 
somatic deictics reveal outward and visible evidence of the body inscribed by the 
codes and norms of a prevailing morality.   As Foucault (1985: 27 – 28) asserts, “an 
action is not only moral in itself, in its singularity; it is also moral in its circumstantial 
integration and by virtue of the place it occupies in a pattern of conduct.”  
 
Such subjective coherence and objective conformity is engendered by an informative 
ascetics, an assiduous and practised rigour in the construction of the self, through the 
shaping of character.   Interpersonal, social, and political relationships and allegiances 
are possible if the self is mastered through an intra-personal a1skhsij.   Without 
deliberately writing the body with the codes of the prevailing and accepted moral 
behavioural indices, that is, without codifying the body with the prescribed rules of 
social, political, and cultural engagement, the subject is excluded from participation 
in, and membership of, the various discourses of human selfhood.   And the 
                                                 
12
 Perhaps, however, as Pericles (Thucydides, Historiae II. 45) notes: to\n ga\r ou0k o1nta a3paj ei1wqen 
e0painei=n. 
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measurement, the me/trhsij, of belonging to, participation in, and conversation 
possibilities of, a formative discourse is evident in a wounded body, one etched and 
branded with the marks of subjectivity.   Returning to the New Testament, Brown 
(1988: 51) notes that  
 
In the communities that Paul had founded, the body – and most especially the 
body of the young male – was to enjoy none of the carefree moments of 
indeterminacy allowed to it by pagans.   The body was not a neutral thing, 
placed between nature and the city.   Paul set it firmly in place as a „temple of 
the Holy Spirit.‟   It was a clearly visible locus of order, subject to limits that it 
was sacrilegious to overstep. 
 
The penalties for ignoring or refusing the subjecthood offered to neophytes ranges 
from forms of discipline and punishment that include verbal persuasion or constrictive 
re-education to physical banishment or mortal exclusion.   Here, from the standpoint 
of Paul‟s adversaries, and in its obvious extremity, the image of crucifixion is 
appropriate, where the refusal to wound the self, to “care for the self,” e0pimelei=sqai, 
by educating it according to the rules of human selfhood pertaining to the accepted 
norms, results in society inflicting the fatal wounds of the threshold and, thereby, 
neutralizing the malcontent. 
 
At a visible level, the architectural and cultural artefacts of an associative, communal, 
societal, national, or international aggregation, whether of wider or narrower 
constitution, are the monuments that witness to the architectonics of its adherents, and 
constitute the “fabric” that services the continual exercise of the prevailing 
 26 
conventions.   They also permit, inform, and sanction both the ritualized formalities in 
the political, social, or religious arenae, and also the quotidian exchanges practised in 
the domestic and extended oi0konomi/ai. 
 
But, the calibration and evaluation of human comportment on the spectrum of 
conformity and deviation, the evolving assessment of the liminal possibilities, as well 
as the agonistic demarcation, of the frontiers of social conduct, are not merely 
documented in texts.   Rather, texts themselves both codify and prescribe the forms, 
and circumscribe the boundaries, of interpersonal manners by denoting the indices for 
the self-inscription of permission and restraint, enactment and restriction.   No more 
authoritative, empowering, and instructive instruments exist than the classics. 
 
The classic is sanctioned by time.   Its enduring presence induces commitment, a 
ceding of the body, a yielding of an inchoate and undefined separateness, for a degree 
of conformity, and, paradoxically, an individuality, for, without such participation, 
there is neither a concept nor a quantification of the individual self.   Apprehending 
the classic (the present participle is used advisedly) is not exclusively an intellectual 
assent, but rather, a betrothal, a whole person assent to the existing „truths.‟ 
 
The interpersonal, physical evidence of such an espousal is evident in the 
relationships with other persons, in the iterated actions of social intercourse and 
exchange.   But, this dedication also is an intra-personal undertaking, and involves a 
relationship with the self, who assents to the classic intellectually, and practises its 
prescriptions physically.   Thus, the body is en-textualized, and the extent of the 
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authority of the classic over an individual or a society is evident in the depths of its 
marks of inscription, which is evident in intra-personal and interpersonal conduct. 
But here, appropriately, this exploration deepens.   Ideological texts differ in their 
inscriptive weight from, for example, a classic novel, which upholds, rather than 
inaugurates, socio-political and cultural mores.   An ideological text, like a religious 
text, presents a total mapping of the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the human 
journey in its utmost context.   Such “a worldview has this comprehensive, totalizing 
capacity to organize every aspect of human belief, action, and experience in terms of a 
system of symbolic classification and a sense of symbolic orientation” (Chidester, 
1988: 48).   It defines and delimits the borders of permissible thought and action, and 
intellectually and physically impresses its protocols upon its subscribers, who 
endeavour to incarnate a performance adequacy. 
 
Thus, classic texts are performative texts, ostended by their „readers,‟ who return to 
them, in order that they may declare the readers‟ own condition and status, which, in 
turn, they write somatically, behaviourally, in their own enactive existence.   The 
burden of impress of the classic varies according to its position as a contributor and 
participant in the subsequent ontological and epistemological traditions that map the 
human experiment.    
 
Therefore, those classics which are recognized and appropriated as secular or sacred 
„theologies‟ impact as much upon the beingness, the ou0si/a, of being, as upon the 
meaning, the e0pisth/mh, of being.   Karl Marx‟s tomes are as physically prescriptive 
as the liberation theologians find the impetus in the Gospels for revolutionary action, 
Plato‟s dualism is as corporeally instructive as the ascetic teaching of the Jains is 
 28 
displayed graphically upon their bodies, and Aristotle‟s cultivation of a disposition of 
virtuous living in the Nicomachean Ethics is as materially extended as are the moral 
injunctions enacted by the People of the Book. 
 
And it is this performative aspect that is evident in a classic text such as the Gospel of 
Mark.   Thus, the Gospel of Mark proffers meaning in the face of anomie.   It maps 
human lives, establishes intellectual grids, prescribes and proscribes human 
behaviour, and defines and locates the self and the other – sub-human, human, and 
divine – in a total and ultimate sphere.   It extends roles to human persons as actors in 
a script already written.   The recital of its stories, the performance of its narrative in 
ritualized and ethical conduct – through its own inherent justice and rationality – are 
appropriated and enacted in a dramatic design and structure by its adherents, or, 
perhaps better, by its cast.   Here, indeed, an essential aspect of the major instructive 
texts is exhibited. 
   
As a consequence, these more general observations about the nature of the classic and 
its corporeal impress and seal, extend to the reader a second, a „meta-,‟ invitation.   If 
the classic is of such expressive significance that the impact of its weight is visible in 
human activity, and, moreover, tangible on human bodies, then, arguably, its dramatic 
qualities demand closer scrutiny.   Amongst the paths of inquiry that the above review 
recommends is to observe the dramatic power of classic texts, texts as lasting as 
Aeschylus‟ Oresteia, but, a fortiori, their intellectual and physical „writing,‟ because 
the classic is ontologically and epistemologically constructive so as to change lives. 
Whilst this essay is premised upon the above reflection on the somatic and, thus, 
palpable impact of formative texts, it is engendered, more narrowly, by the conviction 
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that the performative nature of classic writings more than suggests the fertile 
possibility of examining them as dramatic works.   And, as indeed is appropriate to 
the theatre, the present writer is aware that this is an imaginative undertaking, a 
creative production, with the caveat that finally 
 
… these our actors, 
As I foretold you, were all spirits, and 
Are melted into air, into thin air; 
 
and yet, as Prospero reminds us, the “real world” and the “dramatic world” are not so 
different, because 
 
… like the baseless fabric of this vision, 
The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
And like this insubstantial pageant faded 
Leave not a rack behind. 
 
Thus, perhaps, the ensuing poetic and fictional fantasy may be permitted, since 
 
… We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on; and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep (Shakespeare, The Tempest, IV. 1). 
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Human beliefs, and the veracity of human convictions, those verities that inform, 
shape, and direct the lives of men and women both rationally and materially, are 
expectant and anticipatory explorations of “foundational truths,” which, it is 
suggested, perennially retain their dreamlike elusiveness.   In this corrigible proposal, 
the cue of the prompter is heard, proffering a dramatic licence to foreground some 
tragic lineaments of a text, by whose notional “foundational truths” men and women 
live. 
 
MARK AS DRAMA: RETURNING TO THE POETICS 
 
As noted above, one of the central texts in this work is the Gospel of Mark.   Rather 
than read this gospel as a somewhat distanced work of non-fiction, as a sequential 
saga of once „real‟ historical people speaking their inner thoughts and conveying their 
beliefs in substantive actions, this creative pilgrimage seeks to appropriate the Gospel 
of Mark as a dramatic text, and, quite specifically, as a tragedy, which is “serious” 
enough so as to engender “pity and fear” in the audience, and cause a “kathartic” 
experience. 
 
Perceptible in the use of such terminology, is the other central text in this work, 
namely, the Poetics by Aristotle.   For, if dramatic features may be observed in the 
Gospel of Mark, and they are to generate a beneficial and productive reading, the 
presence of the principles upon which a dramatic work is structured must be 
demonstrated and articulated.   Ironically, in this age of the explosion of theoretical 
inquiry, the search for these poetic protocols appears to point more readily to 
Aristotle‟s Poetics than to any other treatise.   Thus, Carlson‟s (1984; 1993: 15) 
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capacious survey of the theories that inform the theatre from the ancients until the 
present day begins unequivocally: 
 
The primacy of Aristotle‟s Poetics in theatrical theory as well as in literary 
theory is unchallenged.   Not only is the Poetics the first significant work in 
the tradition, but its major concepts and lines of argument have continually 
influenced the development of theory throughout the centuries. 
 
Although the authoritative status of the Poetics primarily resides in its availability as 
the earliest extant work exclusively devoted to literary criticism; nevertheless, it is 
possible that Aristotle‟s text is adumbrated in the theatrical works of the Roman 
period.   Scholars disagree as to whether the tenth-century version of Tractatus 
coislinianus is of classical origin, and, in fact, some suggest that its provenance may 
reside in Aristotle‟s missing treatise on comedy (for alternative views, see Bywater 
(1909) & Janko (1984)).   Furthermore, whilst no evidence may be established of 
Horace‟s (68 – 65 BCE) direct cognizance of the Poetics in the Ars Poetica, “there is 
evidence to suggest that Horace was reworking the writing of one Neoptolemus, a 
Hellenistic critic who was in turn working under the influence of the Aristotelian 
tradition” (Carlson, 1984; 1993: 24), and who, Halliwell (1986: 288) suggests, 
conveyed Aristotelian ideas on poetry.   But Horace almost was alone in his 
concentrated focus on drama during this period.   During the Hellenistic period, the art 
of rhetoric dominated literary concerns (Halliwell, 1986: 289).   For Cicero (106 – 43 
BCE), Quintilian (c. 40 – 118 CE), and Plutarch (c. 50 – 125 CE), poetry was less a 
defined area of study and practice, than it was a means of developing oratorical skills.   
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It was incorporated into the formal grammatical section of the mediaeval trivium, as a 
te/xnh that would contribute to writing correctly and speaking persuasively. 
Those texts that did deal with drama, and with tragic drama in particular, display their 
indebtedness to, development and, perhaps, criticism of, Aristotle‟s thought.   
Evanthius, in the De Fabula of the fourth century CE, distinguished comedy from 
tragedy in forthright terms.   Comedy is presented as the mirror image of tragedy, 
although, arguably, the distinction between the two genres appears less nuanced than 
that which Aristotle may have raised.   Nevertheless, this stark disjunction between 
tragedy and comedy informed the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance periods: 
 
In comedy the fortunes of men are middle-class, the dangers are slight, and the 
ends of the action are happy; but in tragedy everything is the opposite – the 
characters are great men, the fears are intense, and the ends disastrous.   In 
comedy the beginning is troubled, the end tranquil; in tragedy the events 
follow the reverse order.   And in tragedy the kind of life is shown that is to be 
shunned; while in comedy the kind is shown that is to be sought after.   
Finally, in comedy the story is always fictitious; while tragedy is often based 
on historical truth (cited in Carlson, 1984; 1993: 26). 
 
Matters such as the nature of representation, the constituent parts of a dramatic work, 
or the emotional effects of plays, witness to an Aristotelian tradition, even when these 
matters are present only as appended remarks or commentary, such as in the writings 
of Proclus (c. 410 – 485), Aelius Donatus (4
th
 Century), or in the third or fourth 
century De mysteriis, which, possibly, was written by Iamblichus (Carlson, 1984; 
1993: 26 – 27).   Even the conflict between the theorists and the practitioners of 
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drama, on the one hand, and the Neoplatonists, on the other hand, during the early 
centuries of the common era, appears to rehearse the earlier, and oft-noted, Platonic / 
Aristotelian divide over the effects of mi/mhsij.   Either the deleterious impact of 
poetry was highlighted and condemned, or the issues of genre demarcation, structural 
aspects, and compositional techniques were examined. 
 
During the Christian centuries, the Church Fathers quickly appropriate the 
condemnation by the Neoplatonists of the emotional impact of the theatre.   The 
opinions of the Roman literary theorists were in conflict with those of the Church 
Fathers who, from Tertullian (c.160 – 250 CE) onward, condemned the pagan 
imaginings of the Classical poets – their myths, their display or verbal imaging of 
sensual expression on the stage, and their encouragement of an emotional response 
from the audience.   Chrysostom stated that “to go to the theatres ... introduces into 
our life an infinite host of miseries.   For spending time in the theatres produces 
fornication, intemperance, and every kind of impurity” (Homily XV).       
 
Brown (1988: 374) ameliorates too harsh a judgement on John Chrysostom in this 
matter, by emphasizing both his oratorical te/xnh and his purpose: “With his unfailing 
rhetor’s talent for finding an adversary, John sensed in the theatre the perfect rival to 
the sense of community that he himself propounded so frequently in the Great Church 
[of Antioch].” 
 
But the parallels were closer for Gregory of Nazianzus, since the life and actions, the 
words and cries of Jesus were “like a drama whose plot was devised on our behalf” 
(Fourth Theological Oration, VII); and Gregory of Nyssa, when praising virginity, 
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deflects the gaze from “those old stories which have furnished subjects to dramatic 
poets” and are ostended in “shocking extravagance,” to the “tragedies that are being 




The division of the empire resulted in the Greek East returning to the classical 
tradition, with observations, like those of John Tzetzes (c. 1100 – 1180 CE), on the 
differences between comedy and tragedy; whilst, in the Latin West, Christian writings 
demanded attention, and drama seldom was scrutinized.   The commentary that did 
emerge during the Carolingian period, such as the Scholia Vindobonensia, usually 
was devoid of an appreciation of performance.   Even when interest returned to poetic 
theory during the twelfth century CE, it concentrated on stylistic issues and the 
devices that would embellish works, thus, once again, foregrounding its contribution 
to oratorical flourish.    
 
During the thirteenth century, and just prior to Dante‟s Epistle to Can Grande della 
Scala (c. 1315 CE), which reverted to the frequently examined differences between 
tragedy and comedy (Reynolds, 2006: 336),
14
 a translation of Aristotle‟s Poetics 
emerged from Arabic texts and commentaries.   Instrumental in the reappearance of 
the Poetics was the commentary by Averroës (1126 – 1198 CE), but its sources are 
the subject of conjecture: 
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 Thus Pelikan‟s (1993: 23 – 24), at least, alludes to the appropriation of Classical theatre and dramatic 
forms by the Church Fathers, and, in particular, the Cappadocian Theologians, for rhetorical effect and 
evangelical purpose, although he states that this “should not be permitted to obscure their attacks on the 
dramatic posts of Classical literature for retelling the shocking stories of ancient Greek mythology.”   
14
 Dante, in explaining why he called his magisterial poem, Commedia, “begins by explaining the title 
of the whole work.   Relying on a dictionary of etymology in use at the time, he derives the word 
comoedia from comus, a village, and oda, a song: „whence comedy is, as it were, a rustic song.‟   The 
word tragoedia is derived, he says, from tragos, a goat, and oda, a song, and is therefore fetid, like a 
goat, „as may be seen in the tragedies of Seneca.‟   A tragedy begins tranquilly but its end is foul and 
terrible; a comedy begins with adverse conditions but ends happily” (Reynolds, 2006: 336).   Scott 
(2004: 171), after citing this passage from the Epistle to Can Grande (13.10.28) does note that the 
authenticity of the letter is questioned by some scholars.  
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Probably toward the end of the ninth century a translation was made into 
Syriac, a small portion of which remains, and from 
940) made an Arabic version which we have almost complete … On the basis 
of the Arabic version, the great commentator Averroës produced in Cordova in 
AD 1174 a commentary on the Poetics, which was known in Latin translations 
down to the Renaissance (Hutton, 1982: 27).    
 
Some knowledge of the commentary by Averroës appears evident in Roger Bacon‟s 
thirteenth-century edition of the Latin translation by Hermannus Alemannus, which 
was made in 1256 CE.   In an unfortunate quirk of history, William of Moerbeke, who 
added a Latin edition of the Poetics to his Aristotelian corpus in 1278, and which was 
translated “from the Greek by one of the very few Europeans with knowledge of the 
language” (Halliwell, 1986: 291), was only discovered by 
Hutton, 1982: 28).   In his preface, Alemannus, who initially repeated many of the 
weakness of the translation by Averroës, which were compounded in the 1481 and 
sixteenth century versions (Halliwell, 1986: 291), noted that Aristotle‟s approach to 
poetry was philosophical, in contrast to the rhetorical reading by Cicero, or the 
concentration on grammar and style in Horace.  
 
Since this re-emergence, more recently Carson (1997) has averred that “Aristotle‟s 
Poetics, the first major text of Western drama theory, defined the terms of much 
subsequent discussion,” and, more especially, in the centuries immediately following 
this rediscovery.   The Poetics achieved its canonical interpretive status during the 
16
th
 Century, when, following upon the initial commentary by Robertello in 1548 
(Too, 1998: 95 – 96, n. 28), Italian scholars appropriated its teaching, and insisted 
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upon the employment of its principles in the construction of dramatic works 
(Halliwell, 1995 [1999]: 4).   Thus, the theatre criticism that was practised during the 
Italian Renaissance was now related directly to the Poetics, and issues of katharsis, 
appropriate characters for specific genres and their characterization, and the 
instructive nature of dramatic works, were investigated and pronounced upon.   
Deviations from Aristotle were evident, and, often deliberately, were undertaken as a 
critique of the Poetics.   As Coetzee (2001: 19) notes, “rather than being the foe of the 
classic, criticism, and indeed criticism of the most sceptical kind, may be what the 
classic uses to define itself and ensure its survival.” 
 
However, as stated above, the quest for clarity in the review and criticism of the 
classic results in a contumaciously impeded view, and the desire for direct access, 
toujours déjà, is denied.   Thus, on occasions, a degree of editorial licence of some 
magnitude, erroneously attributed to Aristotle some unlikely principles; perhaps, 
initially, less by the scholars than by the commentators and critics, but, subsequently, 
some of these became firmly established in the minds of journalists and theatre-goers 
as Aristotelian protocols.   In fact, the number of critics who actually read the Poetics 
during the Renaissance and beyond is questionable.   Todorov (1981: xxiv) states that 
when 
 
Aristotle‟s Poetics is exhumed … [it is] … made to play a role comparable to 
that of holy writ: works of poetics will now be nothing more, so to speak, than 
commentaries on the Poetics!   But in truth this book is rather betrayed by its 
glory, which functions as no more than a screen between itself and its readers: 
the text is so celebrated that no one dares contest or even, finally, read it at all.   
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Instead it is reduced to a few formulas quickly transformed into clichés that, 
removed from their context, betray their author‟s thought altogether. 
    
Notorious amongst these solicitations was the concept of “the three unities,” which 
was taught by Scaliger (c. 1484 – 1558 CE) and Castelvetro (1505 – 1571 CE) in 
Italy, where the latter went “even further by actually subordinating unity of action to 
the others” (Halliwell, 1986: 298), and by Chapelain (1595 – 1674 CE)  and Boileau 
(Bilezikian, 1977: 103) in France, where, for example, the Académie Française, 
instead of altering the classical, or, more exactly, the neo-classical rules, rather 
criticized Corneille (1606 – 1684 CE) for penning works with too much activity to 
incorporate into the “twenty-four hours” prescribed by the principle of the “unity of 
time.”   Corneille, in his Trois Discours, which were published in 1660, accepted the 
primacy of Aristotle and, indeed, many of his proposals, but differed with respect to 
the character of the prwtagwnisth/j, and, more importantly, proposed the 
expansion of time and the multiplication of locations,
15
 whilst Racine “was probably 




 centuries who read the Poetics with a view 
to assimilating its ideas ... [but] ... the pervasive moralism” (Halliwell, 1986: 308; on 
the problematics of dramatic art and morals, see Goodkin, 1991) remained an 
influence upon him. 
 
The concentration upon the Poetics in the immediate aftermath of its more general 
dissemination, and, under an “anxiety of influence” (Bloom, 1973: 5 – 16; 1994: 7 - 
12), the subsequent attempt to pursue its teaching more literally, inevitably waned as 
                                                 
15
 Corneille‟s observations on the Unity of Action are not without import when attempting to translate 
and interpret Aristotle‟s concept of pra=cij.    
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its principles were discussed and digested.
16
   Not only did the centrality and 
otherness of Shakespeare, “who ignores the „unities‟ as described by Aristotle and 
other classical sources, in favour of a „mixed‟ or „mungrell‟ mode inherited directly 
from the medieval drama” (Ackroyd, 2002: 226),
17
 result in a somewhat different path 
being pursued in the development of theatre in England, in spite of Lessing‟s view 
that “the Oresteia and Hamlet belonged together, in the same sphere of tragedy” 
(Steiner, 1961: 189); on the Continent, the significance and influence of Aristotle‟s 
principles, some of dubious attribution, were disputed.   In England, 
 
Literary theorists of the time urged strict adherence to the rules of decorum 
that derived from Aristotle: they vehemently opposed what Sir Philip Sidney 
called the mingling of kings and clowns … The stage, they argued, should 
always represent but one place; the time represented should at most be a single 
day; and exalted emotions aroused by tragedy should never be tainted with the 
„scornful tickling‟ and lewd laughter of comedy.   These are strictures, derived 
from Aristotle, that Shakespeare, along with his fellow professional 
playwrights, routinely flouted (Greenblatt, 2004: 297). 
 
In France, the contributors to “the project that occupied one of the chief places in the 
eighteenth century‟s progress of mind, the Encyclopédie of Diderot and D‟Alembert” 
(Grayling, 2003: 115) were less restrictive in their approach to theatre than their 
predecessors, and the ensuing responses to these thinkers expanded the debate.   Thus, 
                                                 
16
 Bloom‟s (1994: 8) concept is worth noting: “The anxiety of influence is not an anxiety about the 
father, real or literary, but an anxiety achieved by and in the poem, novel, or play.   Any strong literary 
work creatively misreads and therefore misrepresents a precursor text or texts.   An authentic canonical 
writer may or may not internalize his or her work‟s anxiety, but that scarcely matters: the strongly 
achieved work is the anxiety.”  
17
 As Hodgson (1992: 213) notes: “Polonius‟s words about Players expert in „tragical, comical, 
historical, pastoral‟ drama point ironically to Shakespeare‟s own procedures.” 
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“Diderot‟s famous treatise on the genre sérieux ... pleads for a form of play which 
shall not set out to be either funny or sad, but just to illustrate truly and interestingly 
the serious facts of life” (Murray, 1927: 72), allowing Mercier (1740 – 1814 CE) to 
extend Diderot‟s pronouncements and approve of both Shakespeare and Aristotle: the 
former, in respect of his innovative uniqueness; the latter, in his emphasis on the 
unfolding of a single and united action. 
 
But the focus on the genius of the artist, the inspirational and creative capacity of 
writers, engendered the rise of Romanticism, and the rules and principles of poetic 
composition were relegated to a secondary status.   Although Halliwell (1995 [1999]: 
4) notes that the influence of the Poetics declined in the late 18
th
 Century, 
nevertheless, he states that it remains “a valuable point of reference,” and Jones 
(1962: 21), in his detailed and forthright study of Aristotle‟s treatise, avers: “The 
Poetics is a textbook for dramatists and aspiring dramatists, designed to teach them 
how to write good tragedies; and it is also a work of high theory, a Defence of 
Poetry,” a claim appropriated by Halliwell (1986: 1) in the opening to his careful 
quarrying of the Poetics; whilst Barthes (1972: 37), writing of the advent of the 
theatre of Brecht, and in the context of a somewhat questionable distinction between 
Brecht‟s “Epic Theatre,” which estranges, causes reflection, and inspires action in the 
spectator – a matter to which we shall return – as against Aristotle‟s “Dramatic 
Theatre,” which absorbs and immobilizes the spectator in the stage action (Williams, 
[1952] 1968: 277 – 278; Hodgson, 1992: 194), asserts, with respect to this dichotomy, 
that “for twenty-four centuries, in Europe, the theatre has been Aristotelian.”    
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Appropriating the remarks of Jones (1962) and Halliwell (1986) noted above, it is 
suggested that the Poetics remains foundational for, if not definitive to, any inquiry 
into the structures that inform the creation and production of dramatic works, that 
inner ordering of the parts that contribute to the complete drama, which is an 
emphasis of the Chicago critics (Corman, 1997; Halliwell, 1986: 317); even if, in 
contrast, Ford (2002: 266) states that Aristotle‟s treatise “is for readers and critics 
rather than for writers of poems.”   But, for an abrupt and transient instant in Prague 
in the 1930s (see Perron, 1997; Carlson, 1997; Elam, 1980; 2002), a passing moment 
which Barthes and Eco then rejuvenated in the late 1960s (see Carlson, 1997), the 
communicative patterns in, and the employment and power of the significatory 
functions of, dramatic works became a more enduring subject of dramatic inquiry. 
 
But, whilst an approach that analysed the semiotics of dramatic works and theatre 
performance initially attracted theorists, this extruded upon the wider, and 
implicatory, functions of signification, and scholars began to transfer their academic 
pursuits to these attendant areas, such as the productive licence of dramatic works 
(Pavis, 1982), and reversing the social influence upon dramatic creation, to examine 
their power and influence in the social arena (Alter, 1981), or, more agonistically, the 
privileging of theatre as a phenomenon (States, 1985).   The semiotic perspective, 
which foregrounded the sophisticated codes of communication employed in 
communicating performance and performance interaction, arguably, received the 
more profound attention of the academy (see Serpieri et al 1981; Elam 1980; 2002), 
but Carlson (1990: xii – xiii) emphasized those disregarded aspects:  
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… I gradually became more and more troubled by important aspects of the 
theatre experience that it largely neglected … first … the contribution of the 
audience … [secondly] … the semiotics of the entire theatre experience … 
[and] … the third area … looks to one of the most ancient concerns of 
theatrical theory, but one that has not so far inspired extended speculation 
among theatre semioticians, and that is the relation of theatre to the life of 
which it is an imitation … the relationship between the signs and the codes of 
theatre and those of everyday life. 
 
Carlson‟s (1990) concerns endeavour to intrude upon the problematic area of the 
impact of dramatic works upon individuals and society (see Bennett, 1997), concerns 
that are engendered by the influence and impress of a dramatic work that is structured 
in such a way so as to cause fo/boj kai\ e1leoj, and the resultant ka/qarsij.   Indeed, 
over the shoulder of these later theorists, peers the ghost of Aristotle.    
 
The successful impact of drama, and one that will respond to the issues raised by 
Carlson (1990) and Bennett (1997) – not simply of surplus meaning, but of the 
appropriation and practical use of that surplus meaning – nevertheless, cannot resist 
the necessity of employing structural principles in the creative act of writing, of 
constructing a dramatic work.   Thus, the able dramatist, whose work endeavours to 
relate to an audience both intellectually and emotionally, employs the architectonics 
of dramatic composition, the tried and tested protocols, such as those to which that the 
tradition of dramatic theory has deferred, and from which it has differed, in an 
unceasing i1xnoj of différance, in respect to Aristotle‟s treatise.   In this regard, like 
all classics, the Poetics chooses itself as the source text of inquiry, as it „reads‟ its way 
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through the tradition of dramatic writing, in times of both felicity and adversity, 
inscribing its body-text upon the textual bodies of its successors. 
 
But a return to the Poetics, as the foremost extant text of dramatic theory, is not 
without its difficulties.    Situating the Poetics in its own historical location is both 
problematical and useful.   It is problematical because of the scarcity of the attendant 
resources, the paucity of assistance from the results of archaeological excavations in a 
dusty landscape of scattered fragments, the absence of many of the originals of works 
that are cited by the ancient authors, and the lacunae within existing texts.   But siting 
the Poetics as a textual interlocutor with the texts of its own period is useful in the 
corrigible practice of drawing closer to the meanings of the meaning, or, perhaps 
more accurately, in the effort to disclose and interpret the central concepts.   Thus, 
even though the results of such an undertaking are provisional and tentative, the task 
is itself necessary with respect to disclosing the interpretative possibilities of the 
Poetics, and it also adumbrates the manner in which both this text and, indeed, others, 
like the Gospel of Mark, accrete into discourses through processes of selection and 
delimitation. 
 
More specifically, the student of the Poetics is confronted by seemingly 
insurmountable difficulties of interpretive accuracy.   First, the Poetics exhibits the 
features of an unedited work, and, most probably, comprises the lecture notes on 
Poetry, which were employed by Aristotle between about 337 – 322 BCE.
18
   In its 
draft form, McLeish (1998: vii) states that “[i]t is repetitive, stylistically inconsistent 
and veers between passages which are fully written out and others where complex 
                                                 
18
 Halliwell (1986: 330) suggest that “as it stands, [the Poetics] represent[s] the first book of a treatise 
used for instruction … during the last decade and a half of Aristotle‟s life.” 
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arguments are compressed into single sentences or phrases,” but its incompleteness 
does not imply that Aristotle‟s concepts of what constitutes a good tragedy, nor his 
understanding of tragedy in relation to epic (and, also, to a degree, to comedy), were 
not clearly conceived.   Noticeable are  
 
features [that] make it almost certain that it represents a part of Aristotle‟s 
programme of instruction, and [it] is in fact a major portion of his lectures on 
poetry, which doubling as a treatise would also probably be available for 
consultation by his students (Hutton 1982: 5 – 6). 
 
And if the original work is a set of “lectures or lecture notes or records of discussion 
... not intended for general reading ... [in a] ... style [that] is plain, practical, compact” 
(Hamilton Fyfe, 1940: xii), the text that the student employs today is separated from 
the students of the Lyceum by some fourteen-hundred years, since  
 
from the tenth or eleventh centuries comes the best and by far the oldest 
manuscript we have (Parisinus 1741) … [whilst] … the second-best and 
second-oldest manuscript (Riccardianus 46, in Florence) is from [the 
fourteenth century] (Hutton, 1982: 27). 
 
Second, even if the Poetics is established as a monumental, rather than a 
documentary, work, and is scrutinized in its distal locus, the interpretive angle is not 
obvious.   Whether the Poetics is to be examined exclusively within the tradition of 
literary criticism, that is, as a technical treatise endeavouring both to foreground the 
„literariness‟ of poetry, and, consequently, to seal it from contamination; or whether 
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this work is an application of Aristotle‟s existing philosophical concepts to a specific 
area of aesthetics, is debatable.   Was Aristotle, like the Russian Formalists in the 
twentieth century, demarcating a particular sphere of specialization, and proposing 
protocols that were sui generis to poetry, or not?
19
   Third, in our late and dusky hour, 
the central terms of the Poetics, and, in particular, that of pra=cij and mu=qoj, terms, 
one suggests, that are focal to the comprehension of Aristotle‟s understanding of the 
successful tragedy, are not uniformly apprehended by scholars.
20
   Fourth, the notion 
of o1yij, whilst misunderstood by Averroës,21 may be employed by Aristotle in 
diverse ways, one of which may be germane to the very act of composition.   Fifth, 
the importance of song (to\ me/loj; ta\ me/lh), the various kinds, the diverse metres 
employed, and its function of reinforcing communal solidarity appears to have 
flourished in the period immediately prior to the rise of Attic tragedy and comedy 
(Kurke, 2000: 40, 42, 67), and is a role, perhaps, appropriated by the xoro/j, but most 
of the information with respect to their songs and dances – the “Molpê” (Murray, 
1927: 28ff.) – is lost to us.   Sixth, ka/qarsij, one of the central crux interpretationis 
of the Poetics, or, more boldly, in Halliwell‟s (1995 [1999]: 17) words, the “most 
                                                 
19
 Todorov (1981: xxvi) notes that theorists who have endeavoured to examine literature on its own 
terms are the heirs of Aristotle: “Academic literary theory is born, then, only with the twentieth 
century, in several countries, one after the other.   In the first two decades of this century, the country 
of renewal is Russia, where a current of ideas known as Formalism is constituted … In the thirties and 
forties, various currents of formal criticism and literary theory develop in England and the United 
States, of which the most celebrated is the so-called New Criticism.   All these groups have their 
common point of departure in romantic aesthetics, which leads them to assert the autonomy of 
literature and consequently of its theory; but unlike the romantics, these theoreticians concern 
themselves with an analysis of the literary work, thereby linking up with the Aristotelian tradition 
which … was concerned to distinguish the pertinent levels and segments of works.”    
20
 Jones (1962) and Halliwell (1986; 1995 [1999]) translate and interpret these terms in different ways, 
a matter which will be examined in Chapter Three, and will impact significantly upon the analysis of 
the Gospel of Mark in Chapter Four. 
21
 Eco (2003: 85 – 86) adverts to the limitations that the context, education, and cultural practices of 
the translator/ reader impose upon a text: “One of the most blatant examples of cultural 
misunderstanding, which has produced for at least some centuries a chain of further misconceptions, is 
that of Averroës‟ translation of Aristotle‟s Poetics.   Averroës did not know Greek and hardly knew 
Syriac, and therefore read Aristotle through a tenth-century Arabic translation of a Syriac translation of 
the Greek original … The real drama comes with the fifth component [of a tragedy], .   Averroës 
cannot think of staged actions and defines  … as an argument which demonstrates the moral 
validity of the represented beliefs.” 
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vexed term in the whole work,” requests a contextual examination, at once vital, in 
order to re-imagine Aristotle‟s concept of the term, but a request that Aristotle himself 
denies us, and so the term remains, in its inherent vitality, elusive and, toujours déjà, 
conjectural.
22
        
 
The theoretical rigour of the Poetics, and its foundational status in the tradition of 
tragedy,
23
 commands the attention of the student who wishes to test the effectiveness 
of dramatic writing, and, a fortiori, who endeavours to detect tragic dramatic features 
in a text more widely perceived as non-dramatic.   The lapidary concision of the 
Poetics spotlights the te/xnh involved in the construction of a dramatic work, and the 
principles of this art or craft are themselves the standards employed in assessing the 
quality of a drama.   Its influence, perhaps somewhat attenuated, nevertheless refuses 
to recede and, comparatively recently, Umberto Eco (2004: 238) highlighted the 
impact of the Poetics upon his own writing, when he recalled its presence in the work 
of Poe:  
 
… I underwent my most decisive Aristotelian experience reading Edgar Allan 
Poe‟s Philosophy of Composition, where he analyses, word by word, structure 
by structure, the birth, technique, and raison d’être of his poem “The Raven.”   
In this text Aristotle is never named, but his model is ever present, even in the 
use of some key terms.    
 
                                                 
22
 De Kock and Cilliers (1991: 124) state that “die woord in die vierde eeu v.C. ŉ wye spektrum van 
betekenisse gehad het … en dat daar nie met sekerheid vasgestel kan word watter konnotasie 
Aristoteles aan die woord geheg het nie.   Geen dogmatiese uitspraak kan dus oor die interpretasie van 
katarsis gemaak word nie” (emphasis added). 
23
 Hutton (1982: 7): “… we can be fairly sure that the Poetics had no important predecessor as a 
systematic study of the art.”   In the light of Halliwell (1986), and, indeed, Harriot (1969) before him, 
perhaps Hutton (1982) is rather too bold in this assertion.  
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Poe‟s project consisted in showing how the effect of “an intense and pure 
elevation of soul” (Beauty) is achieved by careful organization of structures, 
and in showing how “the work proceeded step by step, to its completion with 
the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem,” while still 
keeping track of a unity of impression … of place, and of emotional tone. 
The extraordinary thing about this text is that its author explains the rule 
whereby he managed to convey the impression of spontaneity, and this 
message, which goes against any aesthetics of ineffability, is the same as that 
transmitted by the Poetics. 
  
Amongst the theoretical impositions upon the gospels in the New Testament, perhaps 
– and here is our suggestion – this work of enduring consequence and solicitation 
ought not to be overlooked.   By reading the Gospel of Mark through the vision of the 
contemporary-ancient perspicacity of Aristotle‟s lecture notes, a pra=cij of the 
Gospel of Mark may be foregrounded, and one that may contain a contemporary 
relevance, and, by means of necessary excisions to this eu0agge/lion, an unfolding 
mu=qoj, via an a0nagnw/risij and peripe/teia, may engender an Aristotelian 
ka/qarsij for the participants and audience alike, e0fobou=nto ga/r (Mark 16: 8). 
 
Although the greater conviction amongst scholars of the twentieth century has been 
that the Gospels were written for, about, and, perhaps, by particular communities, this 
is an hypothesis which is beginning to receive new criticism.   Commenting on the 
Gospel of Mark, Bird (2006: 477), questions the postulation of a Markan Community, 
emphasising both the lack of any compelling internal evidence, as well as the need of 
scholars, who support such a proposal, to demonstrate its relevance and significance 
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to the structure and intention of, and response to, the message of the life and death of 
Jesus, which is portrayed in the text.   In fact, casting a modicum of doubt upon either 
the authorial or receptive existence of a Markan Community, Bird (2006: 486) 
provides some impetus to this marginal note, since he avers that it “may pave the way 
for future studies on the Gospels, especially Mark, with a view to it being written as 
an exhortation for Christians in the Greco-Roman world, as Missionsschrift, or even 
as a composite of both,” or, indeed, as a drama, or a series of dramatic re-enactments, 
of the a0gw/n of the life and death of Jesus, both as the demonstration of its continuing 
significance, and also as exhortation and proclamation.   The controversial notion that 
this is tragic drama is suggested by the presence of conflict throughout the work, the 
one over-arching category identified by Burian (1997: 181), paradoxically, as constant 
and stable in the variety of tragic mu=qoi; conflict that is, at once, severe and extreme, 
controlled and determined, socially and politically pungent, and ostended within the 
limitations of a fateful arena.    
 
In the Gospel of Mark, the oral tradition which lies (the word is used advisedly) 
behind the canonical text, arguably, extrudes and permits a theatricality that is lacking 
in the other Synoptic Gospels.   Not only are the lengthy genealogies omitted here, but 
even the birth narrative itself as well as any reference to the adolescence of Jesus are 
also absent.   Rather, immediately after, what one suggests is, a condensed 
para/basij, and which, one proposes, ironizes the pra=cij, theatre irrupts in the 
image of a liminal figure transporting the baptized across the threshold to a place of 
freedom, to an arena of dramatic ostension, where events continue eu0qu/j, in a 
succession of rapidly unfolding episodes of healing and teaching, which conclude 
 48 
with a pilgrimage in fo/boj kai\ e1leoj to the death of the central character, and a 
ka/qarsij for the spectators. 
 
In fact, the performative possibilities of the Gospel of Mark highlight the physical 
impact of events at which e0ce/sthsan … e0ksta/sei mega/lh| (Mark 5: 42).   The 
possibility that core clusters of oral material were dramatically enacted, and also 
extended through processes of improvisation, is attractive.   Somatic participation in 
the generation of physical theatre, in the material embellishment of central mythoic 
units and images, is itself transformative, and excludes 
 
an automatic response … because they [physical images] „defamiliarize‟ or 
make strange the world so that one has to stop and think about what one saw, 
thus shifting the creativity off the stage and into the audience as they are 
forced to make an active and individual interpretation of what they 
experienced (Francis, 2006: 115). 
 
This participatory extension aligns itself with Byrskog‟s (2006) recent emphasis upon 
the manner in which oral traditions establish and confirm the identities of their 
respective communities and the individuals of which they are comprised, who 
remember and act out the past, in order to understand and locate themselves with a 
sense of coherence and order in the present.   The common memory of key sayings 
and the events that constitute identity formation constitute a mnemonic reservoir, 
which may be drawn upon during circumstances of danger, identity confirmation, or 
communal celebration.   Citing the work of Shiner (2003), referred to earlier, Byrskog 
(2006: 329) states that “[a]lthough it is difficult to estimate the possibility that the 
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Gospel of Mark is itself based on repeated oral performances, it seems likely that after 
its textualization it developed by being performed from memory again and again.” 
 
This alludes to the more structured nature of a suggested Markan dramatic text, and, 
whilst such a project neither denies nor rejects the improvisory scope in the 
performance of the Gospel of Mark, but welcomes it, it does propose, as does this 
marginal adjunct, the fecundity of foregrounding some of the key dramatic features in 
this Gospel, as provided by the inaugural work on the theory of drama.   As a 
performative work of a pra=cij, a pra=cij of socio-political import, it lends meaning 
to those participating in it as actors, as it does to those viewing it in performance; or, 
at least, in its initial instauration, the first actors are viewing themselves in their 
portrayal of a proximate memory of events close to themselves and their 
communities.   The words and gestures of these ostensions are inscriptive: they are 
generating, in these iterative dramatic actions, “une anatomie politique” (Foucault, 
1975: 33).    And in repeated instaurative acts, of diverse manner and interpretation, in 
ritual, in ethics, in social intercourse, at personal, familial, political, and socio-
economic levels, they draw their contours on human minds and bodies with increasing 
pressure, they gain traction, that „grip‟ of being human in a particular way; and an 
inscriptive tradition is inaugurated, one that claims to be faithful to the original 
performance. 
 
The initial historical performance of the gospel events may have constituted resistance 
to the prevailing concepts of God and to the existing manners, the patterns, of human 
living in one locative environment, and, consequently, resulted in a „disciplined and 
punished‟ body.   Thus, the governing forces employed their power, which “can 
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flagrantly and without reserve disfigure the fragility of the body, lacerating, marking, 
and branding it as a publicly legible object” (Schuld, 2003: 68), but, here, it became 
an object off which has been read a performative tradition, and some would want to 
assert, a resistant tradition.   Therefore, it may be argued that whilst it is the 
conviction of those in authority that “mangled bodies are essential elements in a social 
and political ritual that needs the vanquished to instantiate visibly the overwhelming 
power and majesty of the victor” (Schuld, 2003: 188), it is the marks of the Crucified 
that subsequently appropriated power.   But this is a confessional assertion, and one 
that may be contested both in its degree of „faithfulness‟ to that lisible corps, and in 
the possibility of attendant and multivalent readings.   As Marcan drama, however, the 
resistant body finally is crushed, and the deception in the prooi/mion is disclosed.   As 
the mu=qoj ends, so reflection on the pra=cij returns.    For Aristotle, a well-
constructed and successful tragedy also repeated the common tradition of the stories 
of the po/lij, and engendered a participatory response which confirmed that tradition.   
It sought players who physically endowed their characters with an appropriate 
intentionality, so as to affect the audience by dramatic performances which reached 
out to them and reached after them, constructing, informing, and re-creating their 
community, and reconstituting their individual places within it.   When the Gospel of 
Mark is perceived both as a Foucauldian body inscribed by the marks of the powerful, 
and also as exhibiting Aristotelian dramatic features, which replay and uphold the 
corpus of stories that confirm an existing tradition, then that pra=cij of the Gospel of 
Mark may be kathartic in its prosaic, resigned, and contemporary realism.     
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CHAPTER THREE 




There are no longer any inaugural texts.   Every text is a woven texture of inter-
textual citations and of variously discordant authorial voices which compete in an 
agonistic environment for the power to persuade and convince, an endeavour that 
itself requires adversarial textual presences.   Even palimpsests, which attempt, more 
deliberately, to occlude their predecessors, first, by erasing the past in a sortie to 
destroy and eradicate, and then, by writing the past anew in a biblical act of 
inauguration, of creatio ex nihilo, are self-beguiling.   For that which is erased is the 
„other‟ without which, paradoxically, „newness‟ is not new.   Even innovation invites 
comparison.   Thus, the deliberate and wilful attempts by authors to delineate and 
define with precision, to demarcate the boundaries of meaning and impose semantic 
limits, in any and every act of writing, fails in the endeavour at stasis, in the bid to 
express a definitive position, since sta/sij, like fa/rmakon,24 enacts its own 
revolution, both as the static position marked by the sentry post at the border, and as 
the party of faction, sedition, and discord already advancing and in view on the 
horizon. 
 
                                                 
24
 Derrida (1972b: 111): “Quand un mot s‟inscrit comme la citation d‟un autre sens de ce même mot, 
quand l‟avant-scène textuelle du mot pharmakon, tout en signifiant remède, cite, ré-cite et donne à lire 
ce qui dans le même mot signifie, en un autre lieu et à une autre profondeur de la scène, poison … le 
choix d‟un seul de ces mots français par le traducteur a pour premier effet de neutraliser le jeu 
citationnel, l‟ „anagramme,‟ et à la limite tout simplement la textualité du texte traduit.” 
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Therefore, closure is an honorary member of the subjunctive mood.   For whilst the 
Poetics is proclaimed as the first text exclusively dedicated to the theory of literature, 
its borders are porous, and its fortunate status is based upon its survival.   Within it 
reside various antecedent attitudes to poetry, many of which uphold poetry as an 
inspirational practice, as a window into the divine mysteries.   Here, poetry was 
perceived as the purveyor of truth, and its claim to an accurate orthodoxy rested upon 
the assumption that its intermediaries were able to articulate the factuality of 
existence, both human and divine, and, if not influence, then, at least, specify the 
relationship between the gods and human beings.   In the Homeric tradition, poets 
were not commentators, since, for both speaker and auditor “poetry conveys truths 
whose meanings require no interpretation to grasp.   Receiving truth and 
understanding it are one and the same process” (Ledbetter, 2003: 77).   As the 
consequence of their insight into the divine realm, the poets were empowered to 
pronounce on moral affairs (Nettleship, 1897: 20 – 21; 82).   Thus, the vestiges of the 
unity of truth and knowledge, and the sacred status of the bard, remain evident at the 
beginning of the Republic, when Polemarchus invokes Simonides on justice with a 
saying about which, although Socrates says, e0gw\ de\ a0gnow=, (Republic, 331e7 – 8), 
he also states that Simonides, as a poet, is ou0 r9a|/dion a0pistei=n – sofo\j ga\r kai\ 
qei=oj a0nh/r, (Republic, 331e5 – 6)     
 
In fact, an observation of Simonides‟ that painting and poetry are contrasted by their 
voiced or unvoiced quality is held to be “one of the earliest self-conscious poetic 
statements and one conventionally described as literary criticism, [since it] treats 
voice as the defining feature of poetry by its presence, and by corollary, of painting by 
its absence” (Too, 1998: 22), which is not dissimilar to the comparison that Pindar 
 53 
(518 – 438 BCE) draws between the disseminating quality of speech, and the rigid 
and immobile quality of material constructions like statues: 
 
Ou0k a0ndriantopoio/j ei0m‟, w3st‟ e0linu/sonta e0rga/- 
 zesqai a0galmat‟ e0p‟ au0ta=j baqmi/doj 
e0stao/t‟ a0ll‟ e0pi\ pa/saj 
 o9lka/doj e1n t‟ a0ka/tw|, glukei=‟ a0oida/, 
stei=x‟ a0p‟ Ai0gi/naj, diagge/llois‟ o3ti 
La/mpwnoj ui9oj Puqe/aj eu0rusqenh\j 
ni/kh Nemei/oij pagkrati/ou ste/fanon, 
ou1pw ge/nusi fai/nwn terei/naj 
mate/r‟ oi0na/nqaj o0pw/ran   (Nemea V: For Pytheas of Aigina, winner, 
youths‟ pancratium). 
 
It is this “sweet song that goes from Aigina in proclamation” to “Speak the speech ... 
trippingly on the tongue” (Shakespeare, Hamlet, III. 2); this voiced story-telling and 
articulation of a narrative, that, for Gorgias, possesses an hallucinatory power 
comparable to that of the effects of drug-taking:  
 
to\n au0to\n de\ lo/gon e1xei h3 te tou= lo/gou du/namij pro\j th\n th=j yuxh=j 
ta/cin h3 te tw=n farma/kwn ta/cij pro\j th\n tw=n swma/twn fu/sin.   
w3sper ga\r tw=n farma/kwn a1llouj a1lla xumou\j e0k tou= sw/matoj 
e0ca/gei, kai\ ta\ me\n no/sou ta\ de\ bi/ou pau/ei, ou3tw kai\ tw=n lo/gwn oi9 me\n 
e0lu/phsan, oi9 de\ e1teryan, oi9 de\ e0fo/bhsan, oi9 de\ ei0j qa/rsoj kate/sthsan 
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tou\j a0kou/ontaj, oi9 de\ peiqoi= tini kakh=i th\n yuxh\n e0farma/keusan kai\ 
ecegoh/teusan   (D.-K. Gorgias: Encomium to Helen, 82.11.14). 
 
Possibly, perceptible here is Aristotle‟s belief in the compelling and charged ability of 
language to cause pity and fear, and to engender a ka/qarsij.25   But as effective as 
these words were upon the emotional lives of their auditors, and, perhaps, resulted in 
action, action which, in the case of Helen, Gorgias defends, reservations about the 
exalted and oracular status of poetic utterances were in evidence somewhat earlier.   
Thus, Solon (640 – 560 BCE) states:  
 
 Polla\ yeu/dontai a0oidoi/   (PLG II. fr. 29). 
 
The mantic ability of the poets was further, and more acutely, qualified by the 
Sophists during the fifth century BCE.   The latter sought both to theorize about, and 
to teach, the art of oratorical proficiency, “the practical techniques of persuasive 
speech and intellectual exercises in „praising and blaming‟” (Dover, 1980: 125), 
exercising their “great understanding of what words would entertain or impress or 
persuade an audience” (Denyer, 2008: 1), and it in this practice, one suspects, that 
Aristotle, the literary theorist, follows as an e0pi/gonoj, but “as well as teaching and 
demonstrating the arts of political science, [they] also took an active part in the affairs 
of state and not only as advisers to leaders such as Pericles (Goldhill, 1986: 229).   
However, for the unknown sophistic author of the fifth-century text, the Dissoi Logoi, 
efforts at truth were not to be found within the remit of the poets:  
                                                 
25
 Harriott (1969: 120) is forthright: “His [Gorgias‟] remarks about panic, pity and longing are plainly a 
source of Aristotelian „pity and fear,‟” but Ford (2002: 175) is more hesitant since Gorgias writes of 
lo/goj rather than poi/hsij.  
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kai\ toi\ poihtai\ ou0 [to] poti\ a0la/qeian, a0lla\ poti\ ta\j a9dona\j tw=n 
a0nqrw/pwn ta\ poih/mata poie/onti   (D.-K. 90.3.17), 
 
and these pleasures often were viewed with suspicion, but were also enjoyed by a 
dramatically attuned public and, for Aristotle, engendered an identification that was 
agreeable. 
 
Harriott (1969: 139 – 140) cites the growth of an adjectival literary lexicon of critical 
terms during the fifth century, terms such as o0rqo/j, a0stei=oj, komyo/j, stroggu/loj, 
and glafuro/j, and also suggests that “some quasi-technical terms must have been 
needed for arranging a performance or commissioning a particular type of song …”   
The reference here to “song” is deliberate, because the dramatic tradition seems to 
have evolved from an embedded culture of song performance, which, during the 
developmental period of the Athenian po/lij between the eighth and sixth centuries 
BCE, was also an innovative period in the experiment of various song-forms (Kurke, 
2000: 43).   Ford (2002: 13 & 19) finds the recurring denotation of songs as 
“appropriate,” pre/pei, and “timely” or “opportune,” kairo/j, as early as the seventh 
century BCE, terms which were gradually transferred to a technical index, rather than 
merely remain within the general public remit: 
 
The pattern in which evaluative terms that had had a moral and social force 
took on additional technical meanings in the fifth century was extensive.   
Kairos, for example, continued to be praised by poets as the ultimate, if 
elusive, standard for all forms of excellence, and this commonplace can be 
found among sophistically influenced writers who speak of the importance of 
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kairos in speech.   The concept was secularized under the influence of fifth 
century science, especially Hippocratic medicine, which adopted the term for 
the critical turning-point in the progress of a disease.   As a critical “right 
place” or “right time” for action, kairos would be used by the end of the 
century among rhetoricians for the “opportune” or effective moment in which 
to deploy a certain style or topos in speech.   Fifth century uses of prepon vary 
similarly … (Ford 2002: 19).  
 
But “for the Greeks, the emotions generated by, and reflected in, musical media were 
intimately related to matters moral and political” (Wilson, 2005: 187 – 188), and, 
inevitably, both political and educational change, more particularly during the fifth 
century, engendered questions concerning the divine and unmediated status of art and 
the moral worth of peremptory pronouncements.   Therefore, from the musical 
accompaniment to words, words of inspiration appropriate to various occasions – 
whether elegiac, humorous, or religious – to a more critical and positive sophistic 
climate, when the words themselves demanded attention, words and music began to 
part,
26
 because the “sophists and other philosophers and teachers of eloquence 
                                                 
26
 Unsurprisingly, John Betjeman puts this poetically, when a BBC radio interview with his wife, 
Penelope, was imminent owing to the publication of her book on her journeying in Andalusia in 
September, 1963.   One evening, just prior to the interview, John and Penelope conducted a practice 
session in the company of some friends at the home of Bart and Jessie Sharley, which, knowingly, was 
recorded.   One of the Sharley daughters, Diana, inquires of Betjeman his manner of composing a 
poem, and then asks:  
 
Do you read it to yourself, do you read it out aloud? 
JB: I recite it out to myself, out loud … I‟m sure that poetry is meant to be read out loud and I 
think its words out loud, on their own, without music.   I think it‟s probably a later 
development than music.   I think that obviously what first started must have been the bards 
saying things to these airs, and then the airs departed and the words were left (Hillier, 2004: 
18 – 19). 
 
One could also conjecture that the expense of employing musicians contributed to the paring down of 
musical accompaniment, which would not be without its modern examples.   
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increasingly focused attention on the formal, measurable properties of speech” (Ford, 
2002: 18). 
    
The music that accompanied the ancient tragedies is “utterly gone” (Murray, 1927: 
80), and, more exactly, with respect to its “melodic structures, timbre, performance 
styles, and even rhythms, the music of tragedy is largely a lost world” (Wilson, 2005: 
186),
27
 although it is evident that it “was provided by a flute player (auletes) on a sort 
of double flute with reeds, the aulos” (Baldock, 1989: 8), or, perhaps more accurately, 
on an instrument somewhat closer to a  “double oboe ... [with] ... a great range of 
sound and ... hugely expressive (unlike the modern flute)” (Goldhill, 2007: 46).
28
   
Nevertheless, what does remain is metre (Kitto, 1951: 250).   Extending Murray‟s 
(1927: 80) eloquent statement that the words in performance were tied to actions, and 
thus measured in the stepping actions of the chorus – “the words themselves were 
supposed to dance” (Murray 1927: 80) – David (2006: 8 – 9) traces the metrical dance 
to the Homeric genre:    
 
The hexameter line, or a lyric period, are, literally, „feet,‟ or steps whose 
rhythm can be properly actualized by the movement of human legs.   The 
distinctive isochrony of the dactyl itself – the time equality of the strong and 
weak elements of the foot, as against the typically contrastive pulses of speech 
rhythms – as well as the isometry of hexameter lines, together recall the 
isometry and isochrony of dance patterns. 
    
                                                 
27
 Wilson (2005: 186) notes that the modes which were employed in ancient music could be viewed as 
close to musical scales, that they were known by ethnic names, and carried moral associations. 
28
 This clarification is necessary, since, too often, the aulos summarily is equated with a flute, although 
Lucas (1968: 55) states that the aulos is “something akin to the clarinet.”  
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During the latter part of the fifth century BCE, innovative musical forms and 
improvisation in song was evident (Kurke, 2000: 68), and poetic creation increasingly 
was viewed through the metaphors of the crafts, the consequences of disenchantment 
and sophistic influence.   The metaphorical use of terms from the various trades was 
employed by writers both in the shaping of their work and in the articulation of that 
process.   Poets, as Aristophanes evinces in Frogs, were subjected to a critique if their 
works revealed that they were less than attentive to their craft, since their plays 
reflected their ability as poihtai/; in the same way in which the quality of a cabinet 
was a reflection of the careful, intensive, and concentrated labour of a carpenter, as a 
poihth/j, as a craftsman.   Thus, even if, or perhaps because, Old Comedy used these 
terms in a wry and derisive fashion (Harriott, 1969: 96), it might be suggested that a 
lexicon of critical literary terms already was identifiable, and, probably, widely 
known and evident to the critic and the public alike by the latter half of the fifth 
century BCE.   Halliwell (1986: 10) cautiously considers it “likely that the craft-
conception of poetry did gain ground in the 5
th
 century, under the influence of the 
general increase in systematic theorizing, particularly by the sophists.”  
 
However, unsurprisingly, since the southern Greek mainland and the Peloponnesus 
was an arena of war, the purpose of poetry and its cultural function within the po/lij 
also received attention as the fifth century progresses.   Thus, Thucydides (c. 460 – 
400 BCE), in Book I of his Historiae of the Peloponnesian War, draws a distinction 
between his own presentation of the past, and those of the poet or chronicler.   Stating 




ta\ d‟ e1rga tw=n praxqe/ntwn e0n tw=| pole/mw| ou0k e0k tou= paratuxo/ntoj 
punqano/menoj h0ci/wsa gra/fein, ou0d‟ w9j e0moi\ e0do/kei, a0ll‟ oi3j te au0to\j 
parh=n kai\ para\ tw=n a1llwn o3son dunato\n a0kribei/a| peri\ e9ka/stou 
e0pecelqw/n. 
 
Thucydides proceeds to contrast his own rigour with common opinion and with the 
practice of the bard, who embellishes a past that is lost in mythical time, and he avers 
that the poet‟s attachment to facts and events is tenuous.   Thus, the poet, unlike the 
historian, is less than reliable:  
 
… kai\ ou1te w9j poihtai\ u9mnh/kasi peri\ au0tw=n e0pi\ to\ mei=zon kosmou=ntej 
ma=llon pisteu/wn, ou1te w9j logogra/foi cune/qesin e0pi\ to\ 
prosagwgo/teron th=| a0kroa/sei h2 a0lhqe/steron (II. 21). 
 
Later in the Historiae, Pericles, in his Funeral Oration, during the winter of 431 BCE, 
compares the durability of the lasting deeds of the Athenian warriors to the transient 
words of Homer and his fellow poets, who may delight and please, if only for a 
moment:   ou1te 9Omh/rou e0paine/tou ou1te o3stij e1pesi me\n to\ au0ti/ka te/ryei (II. 
41). 
 
This contrast between “history” and “poetry” foregrounds not simply Thucydides‟ 
prejudice, but also emphasizes that the purposes and, more significantly, the 
techniques, no matter how incipient, of the two genres were different.   Thus, the 
paucity of physical evidence relating to the perceptions of the role and work, to\ 
e1rgon, of poetry in the period before the early fifth century BCE, does, nevertheless, 
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indicate that, in spite of its sacred status, critical energy had been applied to it.   If, for 
some, poetry was a divinely inspired oracular gift, an unmediated experience, which 
bestowed a type of immediate knowledge upon its speaker and listeners (Ledbetter, 
2003: 3 & 34 – 39); for others, it was comparable to the crafts, and, like other trades, 
was subject to scrutiny, and could be evaluated to the extent that it followed the 
established principles of its own craft.    And if, for some, poetry provided fleeting 
pleasure and delight; for others, it influenced the character of the citizens of the 
po/lij, and thus, it required examination with respect to its persuasive ability and to 




Frogs by Aristophanes, more than suggests that these often opposing and 
contradictory views on the generation, purpose, critical power, function, and 
hegemonic status of poetry were of familiar currency in the exchange of Athenian life 
during the fifth century BCE.
29
   But, more specifically, the play reveals an 
“understanding of the poet as a practical, purposive poihth/j, a „maker,‟ in full 
rational control of his material, standing on the same footing as other craftsmen” 
(Halliwell, 1986: 10).     Not only is Frogs a “satire on sophistic / intellectual 
techniques of disputation,” it is also a “parody of contemporary traits of poetic 
criticism, including the „close reading‟ of texts” (Halliwell, 2005: 398).   
 
                                                 
29
 “Aristophanes‟ pervasive commentary on the rival genre [that is, tragedy], to which literary critics 
like Aristotle owe so much” is returned to by Janko (2009: 270 – 271) in an attractive conjecture 
concerning two lines in a quotation of Olympiodorus, which possibly belong to Aristophanes. 
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The play was performed at the Lenaean Festival in 405 BCE during the final days of 
the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE – 404 BCE).
30
   In this context, the authorial 
para/basij31 appeals to Demeter kai\ polla\ me\n ge/loia/ m‟ ei0pei=n, polla\ de\ 
spoudai=a (ll. 389 – 390).32   In the play, Aristophanes expresses views about the 
dramatic arts and the responsibility of the dramatist in a climate of war, a milieu that 
is less than certain with respect to religion and morality.
33
   The plot follows the 
search of Dionysos for a skilled dramatist (de/omai pohtou= deciou=.   oi9 me\n ga\r 
ou0ke/t‟ ei0si/n, oi9 d‟ o1ntej kakoi/, ll. 72-73), since the contemporary dramatists lack 
proficiency in their craft.   Thus, with his servant, Xanthias, Dionysos proceeds to 
Hades in order to retrieve Euripides.   The commotion that greets their arrival at the 
dwelling of Pluto concerns the chair of tragedy (e0kei=noj ei]xe to\n tragw|diko\n 
qro/non, l. 768), which Aeschylus (d. 456/5 BCE) occupies and Euripides covets.   
Euripides is hailed as u9perema/nhsan ka0no/misan sofw/taton (l. 776), and his 
audience in Hades is impressed with his scintillating texts.   The high regard that 
Sophocles (d. 406 BCE) has for Aeschylus is cited as the reason why he does not 
desire the position of professor of tragedy (u9pexw/rhsen au0tw|= tou= qro/nou, l. 790) 
                                                 
30
 For details of the two main dramatic festivals held in Athens in the fifth century BCE and the various 
plays required for each, see inter alia, Davidson (2005: 196), Green (1994: 7 – 9 & 14 – 15), Baldock 
(1989: 13 – 17). 
31
 An address made in the dramatist‟s name to the audience by the Chorus. 
32
 Sheppard (1963: 82 – 83) states that the play “pleads, in the last crisis of the war, for the forgiveness 
of old grudges, a closing of the ranks for the salvation of the state.   Recall, says Aristophanes, the 
spirit of Aeschylus, who fought at Marathon, and showed us the Thebans manfully defending their city, 
the Persians overthrown, Agamemnon leading united Greece to Troy, Orestes home from exile, 
Achilles wrathful in his tent, but coming to the rescue after all.   Take the lesson.   Recall your exiles, 
even Alcibiades, if he will help.   Remember how the Oresteia ended in a festival of reconciliation.   So 
today, by the light of mystic torches, with hymns that echo the old triumph of Athena, let Dionysus 
bring the spirit of Aeschylus back to the earth.”  
33
 Sir Kenneth Dover (1994: 209) was invited to address the Beijing Academy of the Social Sciences in 
1982, and writes: “My lectures in Beijing were (at their request) on Aristophanes and the 
Peloponnesian War.   An abstruse subject, one might think, in a country where there were, I believe, 
only four old men who could read Greek; but understandable at a time when many Chinese were 
addressing themselves seriously to the question, „What limits, if any, should be set to open criticism of 
public policy?‟   I was asked earnestly if I thought that Aristophanes „went too far‟ … Six years had 
passed since the death of Mao and the repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, and now there was an 
uncomfortable oscillation between dogma and pragmatism.”  
 62 
for the length of the tenure of Aeschylus.   But, if in Dionysos‟ judgement Euripides 
defeats Aeschylus in the competition for the post, Sophocles will enter the contest 
(diagwniei=sq‟ e1faske pro/j g‟ Eu0ripi/dhn, l. 794).34              
 
When Heracles challenges Dionysos‟ intention of fetching Euripides from Hades, by 
mentioning that there are many other living dramatists, who could out-chatter 
Euripides (Eu0ripi/dou plei=n h2 stadi/w| lali/stera; l. 91), Dionysos replies that 
these are gossiping small-fry, who occupy the place of twittering birds (e0pifulli/dej 
tau=t‟ e0sti\ kai\ stwmu/lmata, xelido/nwn mousei=a, ll. 92 – 93), but, more 
significantly, that they are a disgrace to their trade (lwbhtai\ te/xnhj, l. 93).   
Similarly, the presence of familiar, possibly now established, protocols of the trade, or 
craft, of dramatic poetry is emphasized immediately prior to the debate between 
Aeschylus and Euripides, when Xanthias is told of the custom of an award for the arts 
(no/moj tij e0nqa/d‟ e0sti\ kei/menoj a0po\ tw=n texnw=n, ll. 761 – 762), in which the best 
practitioner of his craft (to\n a1riston o1nta tw=n e9autou= sunte/xnwn, l. 763) takes 
the seat of honour next to Pluto and dines in the Prytaneion.   Aeschylus alone 
occupies the position until someone may arrive who is more skilled than he is in the 
craft of dramatic writing (e3wj a0fi/koito th\n te/xnhn sofw/teroj e3teroj tij 
au0tou=, ll. 766 – 767).       
 
This emphasis on the te/xnh of poetry is more specifically noted, and, possibly, 
derided, by Aristophanes – whether owing to the political context or his own 
reservations about the art of poetry –  in the final section of the play (ll. 1365ff.), 
                                                 
34
 The relative absence of Sophocles from Frogs is usually explained by the conjecture that 
Aristophanes began to write Frogs immediately after the death of Euripides in 406 BCE, when 
Sophocles, who died later that year, was still alive (Dover, 1993: 7 – 8).   But a more suggestive reason 
may be that the contrast between Aeschylus and Sophocles would be less evident and vivid in 
comparison to that between Aeschylus and Euripides. 
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when Aeschylus calls for a pair of scales to be brought out, in order that the weight, 
and thus the worth, of words may be measured (e0pi\ to\n staqmo\n ga\r au0to\n 
a0gagei=n bou/lomai, o3per e0cele/gcei th\n po/hsin nw=|n mo/non: to\ ga\r ba/roj nw\ 
basaniei= tw=n r9hma/twn, ll. 1365 – 1367).35   This latter section has been preceded 
by a critique of the metre employed by Aeschylus and Euripides respectively, when 
Aeschylus chants lhku/qion a0pw/lesen as the repetitious metrical ending to the lines 
of Euripides,
36
 and Euripides i0h\ ko/pon ou0 pela/qeij e0p‟ a0rwga/n to those of 
Aeschylus (ll. 1198 – 1364a).
37
    
 
In addition to these internal features of the craft of dramatic writing, the structural 
form of tragedies receives the attention of Aristophanes, when, for example, Frogs 
highlights inaugural devices.   Thus, Euripides criticizes Aeschylus about his regular 
openings, which portray a sullen and silent prwtagwnisth/j – a delaying tactic, 
which, he avers, detracts from the content of the dramatic work by focusing upon the 
character (ll. 911 – 920).   In contrast, Euripides states that ei]t‟ ou0k e0lh/roun o3 ti 
tu/xoim‟ ou0d‟ e0mpesw\n e1furon, a0ll‟ ou9ciw\n prw/tista me/n moi to\ ge/noj ei]p‟ a2n 
eu0qu\j tou= dra/matoj (ll. 945 – 946).  
 
                                                 
35
 It may be relevant that Aeschylus, as the more technically skilled artist, requests the scales, thus 
suggesting that the notion of the craft of poetry may recede somewhat further back, since the 
documentation of terms precedes their usage.  
36
 The contemporary novelist, Tom Holt, whose familiarity with original classical Greek texts is 
evident in his novel, The Walled Orchard (1990), creates a fictional setting for the genesis of Frogs, 
when the first-person narrator and central character, Eupolis of Pallene and Aristophanes, the son of 
Philip, are attempting to return to Athens following the disastrous campaign against Syracuse.   Eupolis 
claims authorial ownership of the play: “The finale, like the rest of it, was my idea; Aeschylus would 
have it that Euripides‟ iambics are so lazily composed that you could fit any old phrase, like „lost his 
oil-bottle,‟ into them at any point.   Euripides is furious, and starts firing off his best-known quotable 
lines, the sort of lines that people fire at you in support of the thesis that they don‟t‟ write ‟em like that 
any more.   I was Euripides and Aristophanes was Aeschylus, so all he had to do was fit in „lost his oil-
bottle‟ at the appropriate point.   My job was to find immortal lines from Euripides that could be 
subjected to this indignity, and this was not easy, since the charge of sloppy versifying was – is – 
totally unfounded” (Holt, 1990: 370 – 371).             
37
 Whilst metre may not be exclusively, nor, perhaps, primarily, the focus of Aristophanes‟ humour 
here, it ought not to be overlooked (see Stanford, 1958: 174 & 177; Harriott, 1969: 152).  
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The two aspects of the craft dimension of the dramatist and that of his public duty – 
the former, the result of the changes in education and the influence of the sophists; the 
latter, more urgent owing to the political situation – run concurrently throughout the 
play.   Whilst these two dimensions demonstrate the later emphasis on te/xnh in a 
socio-political context of battles and military campaigns, of the promise of conquest 
and victory and the fear of subjugation and defeat, the role of the playwright in the 
public square also may allude to the earlier and less temporal understanding of the 
poetic genre, and, indeed, to the didactic role of classical tragedy, since “throughout 
antiquity poets were seen as purveyors not only of entertainment but also of wisdom” 
(Croally, 2005: 56), and “through the chorus, the poet taught the city the myths and 
values that bound them together and connected them to the gods” (Ford, 2002: 197; 
see also Green, 1994: 2 & Rutherford, 1995: 228).   In addition, however, this role 
indicates something of the te/xnh of dramatic characterization, because of the 
influence that certain types of characters, as opposed to other types of characters, 
impress upon their society.       
 
Thus, when Aeschylus asks Euripides why the writer is honoured (ti/noj ou3neka xrh\ 
qauma/zein a1ndra pohth/n;, l. 1008), Euripides replies that it is because of both his 
creative dexterity, and also the reproaches and censure directed at the citizenry, which 
encourages them to contribute and to participate in their dutiful service to their cities 
(decio/thtoj kai\ nouqesi/aj, o3ti belti/ouj te poiou=men tou\j a0nqrw/pouj e0n tai=j 
po/lesin, l. 1009).   Poets of the time were convinced of their morally educative 
function, and believed that a politically and morally relevant message (nouqesi/a), 
formed with imaginative and technical skill and intelligence (decio/thj), encourages 
the populace to reinforce and strengthen the life of the po/lij.   And death (teqna/nai, 
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l. 1012), says Dionysos, should be the penalty for a poet who betrays this vocation 
(tau=t‟ ou]n ei0 mh\ pepo/hkaj … ti/ paqei=n fh/seij a1cioj ei]nai, ll. 1010 – 1012).   
But, unlike the characters of Aeschylus, the characters of Euripides are idle market-
place gossipers (par‟ e0mou= parede/cato prw=ton, ei0 gennai/ouj kai\ tetraph/xeij, 
kai\ mh\ diadrasipoli/taj, mhd‟ a0gorai/ouj mhde\ koba/louj, w3sper nu=n, mhde\ 
panou/rgouj, ll. 1013 – 1015; lalia\n … stwmuli/an, l. 1069).   The latter do little 
to encourage virtue (xrhsta/, l. 1056), which is the role of the poets, who instruct the 
youth just as the teachers instruct the children (toi=j me\n ga\r paidari/oisin e0sti\ 
dida/skaloj o3stij fra/zei, toi=sin d‟ h9bw=si pohtai/, ll. 1054 -1055).   The 
characters of Euripides are ones that oi0kei=a pra/gmat‟ ei0sa/gwn, oi[j xrw/meq‟, oi[j 
cu/nesmen (l. 959), in contrast to the gennai/ouj kai\ tetraph/xeij (l. 1014) characters 
of Aeschylus.   The impact upon the audience is noted by Aeschylus, who declares 
that Euripides has au] lalia\n e0pithdeu=sai kai\ stwmuli/an e0di/dacaj (l. 1069). 
 
Not only does it appear probable that the populace perceived of dramatic art as a craft 
which had employed and, arguably, developed the erstwhile metrical features of 
dance and song, but playwrights also were subject to scrutiny with respect to the 
structure of their works.   Halliwell (1986: 19) notes that Frogs “provides us with our 
most vivid evidence on the subject” of Greek attitudes to literature in the fifth century 
BCE, and that, without this play, “mere scraps and glimpses of sophistic thinking” are 
all that remain.   Yet,        
 
as original and influential as these thinkers [that is, the major dramatists] may 
have been, there is no Aeschylean nor even Aristophanean position in ancient 
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criticism.   But the positions expressed in Aeschylus and Aristophanes tell us 
much about the intellectual currents of the times (Ford: 2002: 189). 
 
The attempt to fill cette lacune, which, rather like the oft-imputed nostalgia of 
Aristotle for the acme of dramatic creation of the former century may have 
contributed to the inception of his treatise on poetry, may reside in the disparate, 
agonistic, inchoate field of an incipient discourse of poetry, which becomes evident in 
the Poetics in all of its absent and present otherness.   Even if Frogs concedes no 
more than an ichnography of the poetic controversies during the fifth century BCE, 
both the political and social conventions surrounding the practice of poetry, as well as 
the more restrictive and hermetic literary dimensions of dramatic purpose and 
creativity, are evident.   In the midst of war, conflict, famine, and disease, the 
performances of dramatic works continued.   Attendant upon this climate are earlier 
ideas, conversations, and disputes about literature, its function and impact.   The 
evidence reveals an informed public, a critical milieu, and, quite probably, expanding 
technical developments, and more widespread knowledge and criticism. 
    
But why, and, indeed, how does a more formal discourse accrue in the following 
century, a discursive regularity at the centre of which lies (again, the double entendre 
is used advisedly) the Poetics?   The adversative and the assentive, the conflictual and 
the committed discourses about poetry – about its sacrality, its profanity, its 
profundity and its ribaldry – evident in the political, social, religious, cultural, 
oikonomic, and familial discourses of the time, disclose the incipient accretion of a 
more detailed discursive formation on poetry.   But, before pursuing more rigorously 
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the theoretical mapping of this discourse, one final, partly hesitant, partly pugnacious, 
critique is delivered, which develops into a powerful adversative discourse about art.    
 
Here is Aristotle‟s most immediate „influential anxiety,‟ his teacher, Plato, whose 
views (or those of Socrates) are hardly uniform.   Like other Athenians, Plato‟s 
 
upbringing steeped him in the traditions of tragic theatre.   Yet his relationship 
to those traditions became both unsettling and complex: unsettling, because 
his own work developed a conspicuously anti-tragic perspective on life; but 
complex, because anti-tragic voices heard in his dialogues are articulated 
through disparate elements … which afford no definitive authorial judgement 
on the genre.   The idea of tragedy formed a constant presence in the shadows 
of Plato‟s thinking (Halliwell, 2005: 399), 
 
which, in turn, adumbrated its long pall across the thought of Aristotle about poetry.   
Halliwell (2005: 400 – 410), however, lays out the views of Plato in a fairly 
traditional manner, more especially by foregrounding Plato‟s belief in Book X of the 
Republic that tragedy “pulls the mind down from higher truth to lower falsehood” 
(Halliwell, 2005: 401) and by citing the comparison between political poihtai/ and 
tragic poihtai/ and the prestige of the former, in the Laws (817b).38   As has been 
suggested of Aristotle‟s conviction that tragic drama was inferior to its former 
achievements when he wrote, likewise Nettleship (1897: 105) states that “Plato felt 
                                                 
38
 Laws 817b 6 – 817c 1: poihtai\ me\n ou]n u9mei=j, poihtai\ de\ kai\ h9mei=j e0sme\n tw=n au0tw=n, u9mi=n 
a0ntitexnoi/ te kai\ a0ntagwnistai\ tou= kalli/stou dra/matoj, o4 dh\ no/moj a0lhqh\j mo/noj 
a0potelei=n pe/fuken, w9j h9 par‟ h9mw=n e0stin e0lpi/j. 
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strongly that Greek literature and music were declining; literature, he thought was 
becoming a mere provider of stimulants to a rather morbid imagination.”  
 
However, as intimated by Halliwell (1986) in his earlier text, it is too simplistic to 
view the ancient dramas as works that unequivocally present and reinforce social 
values and norms.   At an institutional level, the theatre, like the boulh/ and the 
e0kklhsi/a, following the reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 BCE, was a feature of the 
cohesive self-identity of Athens; but, within this cultural form, within the plays, 
within the action and speeches, opposing views were declared, or, at least, were 
palpable.   In the Athens of the fifth century BCE, debate, conflict, and adversative 
argument were not absent from the clamour of voices that Socrates appears to have 
found distasteful.
39
   Whilst “poetry is never treated as a subject in itself” (Murray: 
1996: 2) by Plato, the singularity of vision in the Republic with regard to dikaiosu/nh 
and the governance of the po/lij, is suggestive of the accretion of views and 
objections that Plato increasingly entertained and considered when driving his quest 
for the ideal city and its just governance.   The vocation of the philosopher in the 
pursuit of wisdom requires the craftsmen to present an account of their te/xnai, and to 
display an understanding of the tasks and truths which they pursue, but Socrates 
discovers that the poets, like the politicians, are unable to explain their utterances, “for 
they say many fine things, but they know nothing of what they say” (ga\r ou[toi 
le/gousi me\n polla\ kai\ kala/, i1sasin de\ ou0de\n w[n le/gousi, Apology 22c2 – 3).   
Similarly, implicit within Socrates dismissal of the rhapsode Ion‟s art as a te/xnh is 
                                                 
39
 The exclusionary nature of the Athenian democracy, which so often is emphasized, has been 
questioned recently: “ … the political space of the agora was not restricted to Athenian citizens: it was 
open to women, metics, slaves, and foreigners.   They were all present in the agora, working, crafting, 
selling and buying, talking.   It is difficult to see how a political discussion that took place in the agora 
involving poor citizen artisans, shopkeepers, labourers, would exclude all those other people present: 
metics, slaves, women” (Vlassopoulos, 2007: 42). 
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his dismissal of the poet as a craftsman, since rather than possessing knowledge “the 
poet is a nimble thing, winged and holy, and is not able to produce a work before he 
has become possessed and frenzied, and his mind no longer in his own control” 
(kou=fon ga\r xrh=ma poihth/j e0stin kai\ pthno\n kai\ i9ero/n, kai\ ou0 pro/teron oi[o/j 
te poiei=n pri\n e1nqeo/j te ge/nhtai kai\ e1kfrwn kai\ o9 nou=j mhke/ti e0n au0tw| e0nh|, Ion 
534b3 – 6).   Likewise, in the latter part of the Phaedrus (274c5ff.), which exalts 
speech over writing
40
 – a text to which Derrida‟s (1972b) applies an invasive and 
transformative fa/rmakon, even whilst it simultaneously denies its textual status – 
poets are condemned to an outer circle of the a0retai/ of human beings (shades, 
possibly, of Dante‟s Inferno?).   They have failed to follow after a god and to see the 
truth (de\ a0dunath/sasa e0pispe/sqai mh\ i1dh|, Phaedrus, 248c5 – 6), unlike the lovers 
of wisdom, the rulers, the civic minded.   Their vision is more limited than most and 
they trade in derivatives, since they are concerned with imitation (tw=n peri\ mi/mhsi/n, 
Phaedrus, 248e1 – 2), and they are placed in the sixth circle or circuit of human 
existence (peri/odoj, cf. Phaedrus, 248c4), just before the dhmiourgiko\j, 
gewrgiko/j, sofistiko\j, dhmotiko/j, and the turanniko/j (Phaedrus, 248e2 – 3). 
   
The shifting views of Plato‟s Socrates harden, and the banishment of the poets and 
poetry from the city in Book X of the Republic, whilst approving of them and their 
craft in the education of the young in Book II and Book III, has puzzled scholars, who 
have proposed, inter alia, interpolation (Else, 1972; cited by Too, 1998: 52), 
aestheticizing-incarnational (Popper, 1962: 165), or authorial development (Nehemas, 
1982; cited by Too, 1998: 52) – bildung – theories.   But, by retaining the focus of the 
                                                 
40
 Commenting on this work, Rutherford (1995: 268) states: “… written words … cannot defend 
themselves, nor can they choose to whom they speak.   Whereas the true rhetorician will suit his 
discourse to the personality of the listener, the written speech is frozen and lifeless.   It is the spoken 
word that has value, and that can „write in the soul.‟” 
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Republic on dikaiosu/nh in the state and, by extension, in the life of the individual, 
commentators may be discouraged from extracting the views of poetry from the 
argument of the work, in which, “on the analogy of a fine animal, Socrates defines the 
city as one in which every part has been assigned its proper place” (Too, 1998: 55).   
Dedication to one‟s craft engenders an authentic, authorial, propriate proficiency.   It 
is a mastery that is limited, but one that results in a0reth/:   “each art strictly is 
complete in what it is … (and) … it is not fitting for any art to seek the advantage of 
that outside its field, since, rightly, each craft is innocent and pure” (e9ka/sth a0kribh\j 
o3lh h3per e0stin …[kai\] … ou0de\ prosh/kei te/xnh| a1llw| to\ sumfe/ron zhtei=n h2 
e0kei/nw| ou[ te/xnh e0sti/n, au0th\ de\ a0blabh\j kai\ a0ke/raio/j e0stin o0rqh\ ou]sa, 
Republic, 342b4 – 6). 
 
Multiple roles and activities engender a kind of profligacy, a desultory and an 
interfering polupragmosu/nh, which contradicts the dikaiosu/nh appropriate to each 
individual te/xnh (Nettleship, 1897: 151 – 152; 93) – h9mw=n fu/etai e3kastoj ou0 pa/nu 
o3moioj e9ka/stw|, a0lla\ diafe/rwn th\n fu/sin, a1lloj e0p‟ a1llou e1rgou pra/cei, 
(Republic, 370a8 – 370b2) – and causes a solicitation of that singular aim of 
achieving excellence in an art.   This, as Adam (1902: 95) notes, is “the cardinal 
principle of the Republic, reiterated also with great emphasis in Laws 846d – 847b – 
[and] is deduced by Plato from fu/sij, whose rule is specialization.”   It is the 
founding principle of the nature of human beings; and both oligarchies and 
democracies controvert this me/trhsij of appropriateness or commensurability, since 
either too many roles are undertaken by too few, which denies the possibility of 
developing expertise, or too many roles are accessible to too many, which results in 
an appropriation of roles beyond the individual suitability and expertise of a citizen.   
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The variety of choice and opportunity without direction to, and education for, the 
most able and pertinent individual, encourages dilettantism.   And, by failing to obtain 
the requisite proficiency in matters of discrimination and judgement, so an inability to 
discern to\ di/kaion from to\ a1dikon results.   Dikaiosu/nh is a relative concept in a 
democracy, as is a0diki/a.   Whilst neither the Protagoras (325e4 – 326a2)41 nor the 
Laws (659d1 – 660a8)
42
 suggest that poetry and choral verse are adverse influences 
on the po/lij, although the latter text constricts and controls poetic expression, whilst 
the former text considers vital the development of a critical judgement of poetry 
(Protagoras 338e7 – 339a3),
43
 the poets remain unprofessional, because they are said 
 
pa/saj me\n te/xnaj e0pi/stantai, pa/nta de\ ta\ a0nqrw/peia ta\ pro\j 
a0reth\n kai\ kaki/an, kai\ ta/ ge qei=a:   a0na/gkh ga\r to\n a0gaqo\n poihth/n, ei0 
me/llei peri\ w[n a2n poih=| kalw=j poih/sein, ei0do/ta a1ra poiei=n, h2 mh\ oi[o/n te 
ei]nai poiei=n (Republic, 598e1 – 5). 
 
Such variegated skills Socrates finds too numerous and non-propriate.   But, more 
pressingly, a legion of characters and voices created by the poet interposes 
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 When children are able to read, they turn to the poets where they encounter the e1painoi kai\ 
e0gkw/mia palaiw=n a0ndrw=n a0gaqw=n, i3na o9 pai=j zhlw=n mimh=tai kai\ o0re/ghtai toiou=toj 
gene/sqai (Protagoras 326a2 – 4). 
42
 At 659d in the Laws, the Athenian summarises the discussion by stating that education accords with 
the drawing and leading of children towards that discourse which has been pronounced as correct by 
the law: paidei/a me/n e0sq‟ h9 pai/dwn o9lkh/ te kai\ a0gwgh\ pro\j to\n u9po\ tou= no/mou lo/gon o0rqo\n 
ei0rhme/non (Laws 659d1 – 3), and that the lawgiver may need to compel the poet to employ his art in 
ta\ tw=n swfro/nwn te kai\ a0ndrei/wn kai\ pa/ntwj a0gaqw=n a0ndrw=n e1n te r9uqmoi=j sxh/mata kai\ 
e0n a9rmoni/aisin me/lh poiou=nta o0rqw=j poiei=n (Laws, 660a5 – 8).   Then the Athenian asks Cleinias 
whether he agrees that the poet must record that the good man, being prudent and just, is happy and 
blessed, and that the poet would refuse to recall or mention the man, who practises and acquires all the 
things that would be called good, but does so without justice: tou\j poihta\j a0nagka/zete le/gein w9j 
o9 me\n a0gaqo\j a0nh\r sw/frwn w2n kai\ di/kaioj eu0dai/mwn e0sti‟ kai\ maka/rioj … kai\ “Ou1t‟ a2n 
mnhsai/mhn,” fhsi\n u9mi=n o9 poihth/j, ei1per o0rqw=j le/gei, “ou1t‟ e0n lo/gw| a1ndra tiqei/mhn,” o4j mh\ 
pa/nta ta\ lego/mena kala\ meta\ dikaiosu/nhj pra/ttoi kai\ ktw=|to (Laws 660e2 – 660e9).    
43
  h9gou=mai … a0ndri\ paidei/aj me/giston me/roj ei]nai peri\ e0pw=n deino\n ei]nai:   e1stin de\ tou=to ta\ 
u9po\ tw=n poihtw=n lego/mena oi[on t‟ ei]nai sunie/nai a3 te o0rqw=j pepoi/htai kai\ a4 mh/, kai\ 
e0pi/stasqai dielei=n te kai\ e0rwtw/menon lo/gon dou=nai (Protagoras 338e7 – 339a3). 
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representations, imitations, mimh/seij, between the self and the ideal, through the 
various literary incarnations of the composer in the characters.   This „theatrical‟ space 
– the locus of characterization – deconstructs and disperses coherent and singular self-
presence, and obscures and occludes, darkens, the human quest of approximating the 
i0de/ai.   Thus Socrates imposes limits upon speech, its style and its range, since 
latitude in this area is diffusive and causes a lack of singularity, which is not 
conducive to the construction of a citizen who is kalo\j ka0gaqo/j, but he makes the 
concession that  
 
e0a\n de\ mimw=ntai [tou\j fu/lakaj], mimei=sqai ta\ tou/toij prosh/konta 
eu0qu\j e0k pai/dwn, a0ndrei/ouj, sw/fronaj, o9si/ouj, e0leuqe/rouj, kai\ ta\ 
toiau=ta pa/nta, ta\ de\ a0neleu/qera mh/te poiei=n mh/te deinou\j ei]nai 
mimh/sasqai, mhde\ a1llo mhde\n tw=n ai0sxrw=n, i3na mh\ e0k th=j mimh/sewj tou= 
ei]nai a0polau/swsin (Republic, 395c3 – d1). 
 
Plato‟s appropriation of mimesis as a concept with which to challenge the poets 
appears to rest upon the tradition of metrically structured dance that reaches back to 
Homer and the wandering bards.   The feet that compose a line of poetry are the steps 
taken by the members of the dancing circle (David, 2006: 8 – 9), who, in one type of 
dance, are imitators of the speech (le/cij) of the Muse and ensure magnificence with 
freedom (Laws 795e1 – 3).
44
   The arts of the Muses were those of dance, music, and 
song, and Plato associated their imitative quality with the other productive arts of both 
physical artefacts and words (Ford, 2002: 94).   These too were representative 
activities in certain respects.   But, whilst mi/mhsij may be a constituent feature of 
                                                 
44
 th=j o0pxh/sewj de\ a1llh me\n Mou/shj le/cin mimoume/nwn, to/ te megaloprepe\j fula/ttontaj 
a3ma e0leu/qeron (Laws 795e1 – 3). 
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cultural activity, of dance, painting, sculpture, and of the poetic arts, for Plato the craft 
of the poets is not quite like that of other craftsmen, when practising their te/xnai.   
The artefact, which the craftsman makes, is a representation of the form, h9  i0de/a, the 
object, perfect and complete within itself, without fault or wax, but the craft of the 
dramatist is further removed from ai9 i0de/ai than that of other craftsmen, because the 
poet creates characters who, in turn, undertake mimetic activity.   The “poetic arts, 
beginning with Homer” (a0po\  9Omh/rou a0rcame/nouj pa/ntaj tou\j poihtikou/j), no 
matter how skilfully these crafts are practised, “do not seek to lay hold of the truth” 
(th=j de\ a0lhqei/aj ou0x a3ptesqai, Republic 600e4 – 6), because the poets are 
imitators of imitators, tellers of the tales of those striving to approximate the perfect 
i0de/ai.   The quest for knowledge about the truths of human existence is absent:   
“Thus indeed, I think that we shall say that the poet paints some colourful 
embellishments … with nouns and verbs, but he merely represents his subjects 
without knowing them” (Ou3tw dh\ oi]mai kai\ to\n poihtiko\n fh/somen xrw/mata … 
toi=j o0no/masi kai\ r9h/masin e0pixrwmati/zein au0to\n ou0k e0pai5onta a0ll‟ h2 
mimei=sqai, Republic 601a4 – 6). 
 
Whilst Socrates‟ and, indeed, Plato‟s exact conception of ai9 i0de/ai remains 
unresolved, observation of, and inferences drawn from, the phenomenal world are 
inadequate to true knowledge.
45
   For them,    
 
there is something more, something which „really exists,‟ unchanging, 
independent of our indefinitely adjustable generalizations and pragmatic 
                                                 
45
 Writing of the Timaeus, Catherine Osborne (1996: 210) states: “… Plato reaffirms an attitude found 
in the Republic [527d – 530c]: a description has validity, not in virtue of its faithfulness to empirical 
aspects of our familiar world, but in virtue of its aspirations to an ideal.” 
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definitions … [and] … the human soul is able to attain firm and certain 
knowledge of real unchanging entities (ei1dh, i0de/ai „ideas‟ or „forms‟) by 





Gill (1996: 284) labels Plato‟s dialogic search for knowledge “objectivist-participant,” 
in the sense that whilst knowledge remains objective, it is through participation in 
areas of specialization that it is partially incarnated.   But what kind of knowledge 
were the poets producing, since they did not endeavour to reach after the stable and 
immutable truths of human existence?   Poets as educators, who did not understand 
their own subject matter (Apology, 22b8 – c6), who told untruths about the gods, 
which a0podekte/on ou1te 9Omh/rou ou1t‟ a1llou poihtou= (Republic 379c9 – d1), and 
who were thrice removed from their mimetic concept
47
 surely proved inadequate to 
the task of providing ethical instruction (Murray, 1996: 18).   The familiar “Myth of 
the Cave,” in Book VII of the Republic, asserts that education progresses towards 
truth, and that truth can be appropriated in all its simplicity and fulness. 
 
For Plato, the appeal to the highest part of the soul, the reason, in its quest for truth 
and wisdom, is occluded by the poets, who exalt and indulge the emotional faculty of 
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 In his autobiography, Dover (1994: 116) refers to his conception of Plato‟s thought when preparing 
to write his commentary on the Symposium (1980):   “It seemed to me that his [Plato‟s] metaphysical 
arguments make sense only if one adopts, with the fervent faith patently characteristic of his Socrates, 
three axioms.   First, that since what we perceive of the world is subject to change and decay, there 
must be something which is eternal and immutable.   Secondly, that since opinions and inferences 
founded on our experience of the world are corrigible, there must be something which is 
understandable by incorrigible reasoning.   And thirdly, that if we follow the path of reason to the end, 
we must perceive that ultimate reality is good, and since love is necessarily our reaction to good, reason 
and love converge and fuse in the experience of that perception” (the emphasis is in the original).  
47
 Drawing on the analogy of a bed – its form, its production, and its representation – Zwgra/foj dh/, 
klinopoio/j, qeo/j, trei=j ou[toi e0pista/tai trisi\n ei1desi klinw=n (Republic 597b13 – 14), Socrates 
then notes with respect to the tragedian: Tou=t‟ a1ra e1stai kai\ o9 tragw|dopoio/j, ei1per mimhth/j 
e0sti, tri/toj tij a0po\ basile/wj kai\ th=j a0lhqei/aj pefukw/j, kai\ pa/ntej oi9 a1lloi mimhtai/ 
(Republic 597e6 – 8).  
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human nature.   A man in grief, who “partakes of a good and moral character, whether 
having lost a son or anything else of great value … will bear it, anyway, more easily 
and calmly than others in the same circumstances” ( 0Anh/r … e0pieikh\j toia=sde 
tu/xhj metasxw/n, u9o\n a0pole/saj h1 ti a1llo w[n peri\ plei/stou poiei=tai, 
e0le/gome/n pou kai\ to/te o3ti r9a|=sta oi1sei tw=n a1llwn, Republic 603e3 – 5).   Thus, 
whilst “the emotional experience encourages the loss of control to his griefs” (to\ de\ 
e3lkon e0pi\ ta\j lu/paj au0to\ to\ pa/qoj, Republic 604b1), since the “excess of 
emotion reacts upon the character and weakens it” (Nettleship, 1897: 97), the 
sensations would be disciplined by reason.   Socrates asks rhetorically: “Shall we not 
say that what leads to the recollection of sufferings and causes grief, and is insatiable 
for these things, is unreasonable and idle and cowardly?” (To\ de\ pro\j ta\j 
a0namnh/seij te tou= pa/qouj kai\ pro\j tou\j o0durmou\j a1gon kai\ a0plh/stwj e1xon 
au0tw=n a]r‟ ou0k a0lo/gisto/n te fh/somen ei]nai kai\ a0rgo\n kai\ deili/aj fi/lon;, 
Republic 604d8 – 10).    This, for Plato, precisely, is the representation undertaken by 
the poet for his diverse auditors, since “the sensible and controlled character is … 
neither easy to understand, nor, when represented, easily understood, especially by the 
motley crowd gathered in the theatre” (to\ de\ fro/nimo/n te kai\ h9su/xion h]qoj … ou1te 
r9a/|dion mimh/sasqai ou1te mimoume/nou eu0pete\j katamaqei=n, a1llwj te kai\ 
panhgu/rei kai\ pantodapoi=j a0nqrw/poij ei0j qe/atra sullegome/noij, Republic 
604e2 – 5).   The poet who “intends to be popular and famous amongst the mob 
presents characters who are in thrall to their emotions and unstable” (me/llei 
eu0dokimh/sein e0n toi=j polloi=j, a0lla\ pro\j to\ a0ganakthtiko/n te kai\ poiki/lon 
h]qoj, Republic 605a4 – 5).   Thus, the poet is banished from the city “because such a 
man encourages and nourishes this part of the soul, making it strong, whilst 
obliterating the reasoning faculty, which is like handing over the city and empowering 
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the rascals, and thus destroying the educated and refined” (o3ti tou=to e0gei/rei th=j 
yuxh=j kai\ tre/fei kai\ i0sxuro\n poiw=n a0po/llusi to\ logistiko/n, w3sper e0n po/lei 
o3tan tij moxqhrou\j e0gkratei=j poiw=n paradidw=| th\n po/lin, tou\j de\ 
xarieste/rouj fqei/rh|, Republic 605b3 – 6).   The emotional faculty of human 
nature, and the public portrayal of these emotions by the poets, engenders sedition in 
the soul, since it dethrones reason, and threatens the stability of the orderly city.    
Plato‟s concession severely is circumscribed, in that “one must only admit into the 
city the kind of poetic works which offer praise to the gods and encomia to good 
men” (o3son mo/non u3mnouj qeoi=j kai\ e0gkw/mia toi=j a0gaqoi=j poih/sewj 
paradekte/on ei0j po/lin, Republic 607a3 – 5). 
 
In view of “the many roles that Socrates plays in Plato‟s dialogues,” Dorothea Frede 
(1996: 222) asks, “Who is Socrates?”   She answers her question by proffering 
character portraits: 
 
There is the gadfly of the Apology who intends to sting the Athenians into 
soul-searching.   There is the sting-ray of the Meno, who numbs others to 
make them admit their ignorance as a first step towards a recollection of truths 
once seen and then forgotten.   There is also the Socrates with a programme of 
his own who rises to Glaucon‟s and Adeimantus‟ challenge of explaining the 
real benefit of justice in the Republic in a long monologue.   And there is 




In addition to the “dramatic roles” of Socrates are the various opinions and 
changeable views on poets, their role, status, and their craft.   Furthermore, the 
relationship between the writer of, and speaker in, the Platonic corpus toujours déjà is 
sous rature, since “Socrates‟ voice lives in the death of Plato‟s voice, which lives in 
the death of Socrates‟ voice.   Whichever voice one hears, the other man is speaking” 
(Neel, 1988: 17), and thus, Socrates is no less multiple than is his Plato, nor Plato any 
less multiple than is his Socrates.  
 
It is this multiplicity, this fragmentary dispersion, that provides the fertile soil of 
Aristotle‟s poetic vineyard.   Poets, as inspired prophets, as conduits of the sacred 
voices of the gods, as guardians of the common civic life, and as the teachers and 
educationalists of the young, were the practitioners of an art, increasingly, perhaps 
momentarily, technical.   As creators of dramatic works, they extended the tradition of 
metrical song and dance by employing the arses and theses in the beat of the dramatic 
line, as surely as the iambic pentameter pulses in all of Shakespeare‟s drama (see 
Hall, 2003: 26).   They transmogrified song forms into monodies for actors and 
antiphons for choruses.   Alternatively, their stories were fakes and forgeries, remote 
from “the truth;” or “Attic tragedy of the fifth-century was political; it was primarily a 
discourse of the polis” (Croally, 2005: 67),
48
 and “it helped cement a sense of civic 
identity and belonging in the Athenian consciousness” (Panoussi, 2005: 413).   In 
their thousands, the citizens of Athens gathered in the Theatre of Dionysos, and their 
pleasures boosted the esteem of the participants and the sponsors – the xorhgi/a was 
one of the ordinary leitourgi/ai of Athenian society.   But the Attic soil is rocky, and 
                                                 
48
 made the following, fairly common, but not entirely accurate, assertion in 
his Inaugural Lecture at Rhodes University, Grahamstown:   “In traditional tragedy we are offered the 
Chorus as an intermediary between our world and that of the play: it keeps us „in touch,‟ it prevents the 
play-world from hurtling off into a space so remote that we can no longer follow it.   The Chorus is the 
literal, physical „representative‟ of our world in that of the play.” 
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the scattered fragments are the “monuments” which remain of a dispersed site of the 
adversarial views on poetry and its te/xnh. 
 
THE FORMATION OF A DISCOURSE 
 
In one sense, it is at the end of a series of cycles of debate and accruing consensus, of 
contention and cumulative agreement, that the gifted mind of synthesis resides: an 
Augustine to nucleate the thought of Paul, Clement of Alexandria, and Jerome (see 
Brown, 1988: 386); a Thomas Aquinas to compress the principles of Aristotle and 
Augustine (see MacIntyre, 1990: 127 & 141; & passim).   Their contextual and 
meditative reflection, their ensuing ratiocination, compacts the tradition – the traditio 
– handed over to them.   In another sense, it is in the rules of formation that generate a 
discursive regularity, that inspissate a discourse with its attendant rites of entry, its 
technical vocabulary, and available subject positions (see Foucault, 1969).   In both 
instances, the place in which the unitary voice or the accretional discourse lies – as 
“resides” – is a deceptive one.  It lies – as “mendacity” – in its choices, since 
syntheses occlude, marginalize, and exclude a practice upon which demarcation and 
definition rely. 
    
In the latter sense, the Poetics of Aristotle constitutes a “discursive formation” 
(Foucault, 1969: 53), which appropriates terms and concepts from other discourses, 
whether specialized or quotidian, and infuses them with a technical sophistication, 
and lends them a temporary stasis, a „position,‟ which is pertinent to the momentary 
locus as a “monument;” rather than a serial position as a “document,” which is 
perceived only in relation to the advance of linear history.   These ideas and notions, 
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in their centripetal dynamic, are employed transformatively, in order to structure the 
“objects” of its own discourse, and engender the possibility of enunciating this 
discourse, of being a subject, a speaker, which requires a more exact and precise 
technical proficiency, a knowledge of the science of poetry – h9 e0pisth/mh – as well as 
an awareness of the integration of knowledge in its realms of practice.
49
   To view an 
influential discourse about poetry, and, more specifically, about tragic drama, in this 
manner, lightens the burden of animus between Aristotle and his informants and 
predecessors, and suggests that disjunctive uses of the same terms are less concerns of 
conflictual retardation or development, and rather are matters of discursive licence or 
specificity.   But, such an approach does more, since it reduces the weight of the 
tradition perhaps to a mere wry and mocking spectre peering over shoulders of its 




    
Thus, if the Poetics is accredited with a pre-eminent status in the theory of drama, it 
appropriates its prestige from its accretional du/namij.   The fractional and partial 
sources less than argue, but more than suggest, that Aristotle‟s reflections on poetry 
and, more especially, on the art of tragedy, are the produce both of a pullulating field 
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 MacIntyre‟s (1990: 52) comment on L’archéologie du savoir is insightful, since it involved “a 
movement towards the preconceptual, the presystematic, and the prediscursive which itself necessarily 
cannot but be comprehended in terms that are conceptual, systematic, and discursive.   So very 
different and heterogeneous regularities and levels of discourse are disclosed, through which are 
generated a variety of incommensurable bodies of claims assigned in their assemblage the status of a 
science.   To the set of relations which in any given time and place unify the discursive practices 
underlying any one such body of claims Foucault gave the name „episteme,‟ mocking Plato‟s and 
Aristotle‟s uses of that word in so doing” (emphasis added).    
50
 Similarly, Derrida (1972b: 148 – 149, & passim) foregrounds the associative and wandering path of 
words and their meanings: “Comme tout texte, celui de „Platon‟ ne pouvait pas ne pas être en rapport, 
de manière au moins virtuelle, dyamique, latérale, avec tous les mots composant le système de la 
langue grecque.   Des forces d‟association unissent, à des distances, avec une force et selon des voies 
diverses, les mots „effectivement présents‟ dans un discours à tout les autres mots du système lexical, 
qu‟ils apparaissent ou non comme „mots,‟ c‟est-à-dire comme unités verbales relatives dans un tel 
discours.   Elles communiquent avec la totalité du lexique par le jeu syntaxique et au moins par les 
sous-unités qui composent ce qu‟on appelle un mot.”    
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of literary criticism, and of the use of poetic terminology in proximate and distal 
discursive spheres.   The maturity of the field of literary criticism is difficult to 
determine with great accuracy, but the provenance of a more detailed, specific, and 
considered discourse on poetry and its protocols was generated in a context of 
divergent, colloquial, heterogeneous, and disparate views and opinions about the 
contribution of poetry to human well-being or its diminishment, and influenced by the 
employment of an inchoate literary vocabulary in various discursive sites.    
 
The various uses of mimh/sij, and the a0gw/n between Plato and Aristotle about this 
term and its poetic appropriation (see Halliwell, 1986: 120 – 131), belie that mimesis 
is, after all, “the brute appeal of poetry” (Ford, 2002: 270).   Drama is the 
performative imitative representation of words in gesture and speech.   Actors 
represent characters and actions.   Halliwell‟s (1986: 121) list of ten “uses of 
mimeticist terminology in the dialogues” of Plato, from “linguistic” to 
“choreographic,” demonstrate the variety of discourses to which the term belongs.   
The specific accusation against poetic representation by Plato concerns the distance it 
places between the quest for the true forms and the mimeticist.   Too (1998: 6) notes 
that “Plato‟s Republic, which to all intents and purposes has become the fons et origo 
for the discourse on art as „imitation,‟ is a work whose concern explicitly is the 
construction of the ideal state” (original emphasis). 
 
Thus, the significantly perspicacious texts of inquiry, critique, and proposal often are 
as much about projected futures, as about their pasts or presents.   Plato‟s 
marginalization of mimesis is the other which Aristotle returns to the centre and 
places in the footlights of a discourse on poetry, since, for him, “poetry, like painting, 
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sculpture, instrumental music, and dance, is an art of „representing‟ human characters 
and actions” (Ford, 2002: 95).  
 
To view texts as “monuments” permits an insight into their attractive power – their 
ability to lure concepts, ensnare them in its own incipient web, and then bestow upon 
them a technical sophistication appropriate to itself, which hierarchizes them in the 
new discursive order.   And precisely because terms and concepts previously 
employed in other discursive sites also become members of the new discourse, an 
instability remains within the new discourse, as, indeed, within the other discourses in 
which they function.   Thus, there are “espaces de dissension” (Foucault, 1969: 200) 
not only between discursive formations, but also within them, and, although the desire 




From this perspective, Aristotle‟s positive use of mimesis is less a matter of 
challenging his tutor, Plato, which is where critics often locate its contrary genesis, 
but, perhaps initially, the appropriation of a term for a description of the visual 
experience of theatre, merely as the starting-point for reflecting upon the dramatic art 
of tragedy, and to which greater definitional clarity and power later accrues.   
Foucault (1969: 200) does not seek to explain away different usages of discursive 
terminology, and  
 
renonce donc à traiter la contradiction comme une fonction générale 
s‟exerçant, de la même façon, à tous les niveaux du discours, et que l‟analyse 
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 Continuing the thought in note 49, Derrida (1972b: 149) states: “Mais à déborder ce lexique, nous 
voulons moins dépasser, à tort ou à raison, certaines limites, qu‟appeler la suspicion sur le droit à poser 
de telles limites.   En un mot, nous ne croyons pas qu‟il existe en toute rigueur un texte platonicien, 
clos sur lui-même, avec son dedans et son dehors.” 
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devrait ou supprimer entièrement ou reconduire à une forme première et 
constitutive: au grand jeu de la contradiction – présente sous mille visages, 
puis supprimée, enfin restituée dans le conflit majeur où elle culmine – 
(emphasis added). 
   
Arguably, Ford (2002) may be right in emphasizing that Aristotle is indebted to Plato 
less for an adversative other to critique, than for the notion of developing a coherence 
in systematic argument, which lends a singular dedication rather than the 
polupragmosu/nh which Plato shunned.   This desire, rather than one for hegemonic 
ownership of a term, Ford (2002: 270 – 271) suggests, is the  
 
founding move in treating poetry as literature, as fiction that, while indeed 
capable of having educational and moral influence in society, is made in 
accordance with an art that is not the art of politics, not of the sciences, nor of 
history, but the art of poetry … [There is] a postulate about poetry that has 
remained central to academic criticism to the present day: all its elements, 
though not directly answerable to the world of politics or philosophy, or to the 
real world, must answer at least to each other, and poetics best knows how to 
discern form and function in its artistic composition. 
 
Within Ford‟s (2002: 271) phrase “not directly answerable,” the notion of the 
employment of the same terminology in other discursive formations is perceptible; 
and, for Aristotle, internal coherent argumentation and construction undergirds his 
reflections on a particular mimetic art, and, ultimately, generates a treatise of anabatic 
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discursive sophistication, of internal interlocutors, who, to advert again to Ford (2002: 
271), “answer at least to each other.”    
 
The relegation of the psychological experience of theatrical attendance in Halliwell‟s 





Because the Poetics is equivocal about theatrical production, claiming that the 
essential effect of tragedy is available through reading (meaning, probably, 
expressive recitation) as well as in performance (1450b 16 – 20, 1453b 1 – 11, 
1462a 11 – 18), it is frequently supposed that Aristotle had scant knowledge of 
tragedy in the theatre.   The inference is mistaken.   At Rhetoric 1404b 21 – 
24, Aristotle praised the brilliant artistry of Theodorus, the most successful 
tragic actor of the 370s and 360s (cf. Politics 1336b 28); and his comparative 
formulation (Theorodus‟ voice always “seems to belong to the character 
speaking,” while those of other actors sound artificially “alien” to them) 
demonstrates that he drew on extensive theatrical experience.   Aperçus in the 
Poetics itself reinforce this point: the famous reference to Euripides as “the 
most tragic” of the poets (1453a 29 – 30), for instance, is couched in language 
that implies direct observation of theatrical audiences.   Aristotle‟s conception 
of tragedy was shaped by a combination of watching and reading plays – in 
what proportion, we will never know (Halliwell, 2005: 401 – 402). 
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 Although, on occasions in the earlier work, Halliwell (1986: 131) does raise the following 
qualification: “Performance, the actor‟s art, certainly has its own claims to mimetic status … and we 
should not rule out the possibility that this fact exercised a latent influence on Aristotle‟s thinking” 
(emphasis added).  
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Perhaps distance from the ancient sites and academic contortions have generated a 
less visual-centred reading of the Poetics.
53
   In contrast, modern theorists, without 
apology, cite the raison d’être of a dramatic work to be its performance,
54
 and, 
recently, English (2007: 199 – 200) emphasized that 
 
Aristophanes‟ visual creativity … played an enormous role in the success of 
his comedies … We need only consider the passage from Plato‟s Apology (19c 
2 – 5) where Socrates categorizes his visual characterization in Clouds … as 
one of the primary reasons that public opinion turned against him. 
 
Together with stage props, the gestural, vestimentary, sonic, and scenic aspects of the 
theatrical experience propagate the words,
55
 which, in tragedy, as a unit produce a 
katharsis through pity and fear. 
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 In the “Introduction” to Frogs, Stanford (1958: liii) notes that “Since the seventeenth century many 
eminent scholars have worked on the text and interpretation of Aristophanes: Casaubon, Bentley, 
Porson (who, it is said, wept with joy to find that some of his emendations in Aristophanes had been 
anticipated by Bentley) …”   In Book IV of The Dunciad, Alexander Pope (1963: 777 – 778) criticizes 
the atomization of the classical texts by the scholars, and Bentley receives special mention: 
 
… Bentley late tempestuous wont to sport 
In troubled waters, but now sleeps in Port 
… 
Roman and Greek Grammarians! …  
While tow‟ring o‟er your Alphabet, like Saul, 
Stands our Digamma, and o‟er-tops them all (ll. 201 – 202; 215; 217 – 218). 
 
However, throwing off the stricture and exactitude of Bentley‟s methods, when a student embarks on 
the Grand Tour, he 
 
Spoil‟d his own language, and acquir‟d no more; 
All Classic learning lost on Classic ground (ll. 320 – 321). 
54
 For example, Serpieri et al (1981: 164) notes that “every author, in writing for the theatre, has in 
mind a stage realization which he stamps in the text, drawing upon the system of conventions operative 
in his time.”   Sir Peter Hall (2000: 135), in his Clark Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge, noted 
that a dramatic work “must be studied with a sense of performance even when it is read … we need to 
learn the language of the theatre if we are to judge drama … We must develop knowledge and skills 
which take us beyond reading texts just as texts.”    
55
 See Elam (1980 [2002]) for the semiotic import of these factors.   No signal can be dismissed, 
because “theatrical messages are non-redundant to the extent that, even where the direct semantic 
information is low, each signal has (or supposedly has) an „aesthetic‟ justification” (Elam, 1980: 43).  
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Thus, it is suggested that, inspired by the ostensive aspects of drama, Aristotle 
generated a discourse about tragedy, ordering the constituent features of “the 
representation of actions and life,” and that the performative and participatory aspects 
are central both to enacting the arses and theses of the choral liturgical aspects 
embedded in the drama of the Gospel of Mark, and also of following a way that both 
generates and entrenches communal and social solidarity.   Unlike narrative, where a 
narrator, through focalization, may occupy a singular “positional advantage;”
56
 in 
drama, positional siting and epistemic awareness is modally nuanced.   The audience 
may experience some marginalization or occlusion, but, in contrast to the reader of a 
novel, whose invitation into the diegetic world is proffered to the imagination, the 
invitation into the mimetic world is extended to bodily presence, and the imaginative 
attendance is spectrumized from the more visually literal to (almost) visual off-stage 
exclusion – gesture, scenic presentation, and, often, sonic presence, however, more 
than likely, still “playing its part.” 
 
Foucault (1969: 9) controverts the long and linear vision of historians, who,   
 
comme si, au-dessous des péripéties politiques et de leurs épisodes, ils 
entreprenaient de metre au jour les équilibres stables et difficiles à rompre, les 
processus irréversibles, les régulations constantes, les phénomènes tendanciels 
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 Bernard Williams (2002: 42) employs this concept, which may be useful here, in his exploration of a 
“state of nature” story in the quest for “truth and truthfulness” and “the virtues of truth:” “it is 
uncontroversial that a basic function of language is communication where this includes, notably, telling 
other competent language-users things that they do not know.   To embody this, we should include 
right at the beginning the idea of what may be called a purely positional advantage.   This is the idea 
that a speaker can tell someone else about a situation because he is or was in it, while his hearer is not 
or was not.”   In dramatic performance, the concept of “dramatic irony” permits audience knowledge 
and character ignorance.   Alternatively, the suspension of knowledge is germane to the attendance at 
repeated performances of the same work.       
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… les grands socles immobiles et muets que l‟enchevêtrement des récits 
traditionnels avait recouverts de toute une épaisseur d‟événements. 
 
Foucault (1969: 17 & 19) contrasts “une histoire globale” with “une histoire 
générale,” rejecting the former which “resserre tous les phénomènes autour d‟un 
centre unique” for the latter, which “déploierait au contraire l‟espace d‟une 
dispersion.”   In spite of the disparate nature of historical data available to researchers, 
it is   
 
Comme s‟il avait été particulièrement difficile, dans cette histoire que les 
hommes retracent de leurs propres idées et de leurs propres connaissances, de 
formuler une théorie générale de la discontinuité, des séries, des limites, des 
unités, des ordres spécifiques, des autonomies et des dépendances 
différenciées.   Comme si ... on éprouvait une répugnance singulière à penser 
la différence, à décrire des écarts et des dispersions ...” (Foucault, 1969: 21). 
  
His own archaeological inquiry is 
 
prêt à accueillir chaque moment du discours dans son irruption d‟événement; 
dans cette ponctualité où il apparaît, et dans cette dispersion temporelle qui lui 
permet d‟être répété, su, oublié, transformé, effacé jusque dans ses moindres 
traces, enfoui ... (Foucault, 1969: 37). 
 
When “toutes les unités admises” are suspended, the restitution 
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à l‟énoncé sa singularité d‟événement, et de montrer que la discontinuité n‟est 
pas seulement un de ces grands accidents qui forment faille dans la géologie 
de l‟histoire, mais là déjà dans le fait simple de l‟énoncé; on le fait surgir dans 
son irruption historique; ce qu‟on essaie de mettre sous le regard, c‟est cette 
incision qu‟il constitue, cette irréductible – et bien souvent minuscule – 
émergence” (Foucault, 1969: 40). 
 
And the examination is located in “dans ce champ où se manifestent, se croisent, 
s‟enchevêtrent et se spécifient les questions de l‟être humain, de la conscience, de 
l‟origine, et du sujet” (Foucault, 1969: 26).   This open field engenders an inquiry into 
the statements that construct the “monuments” of history in their own discursive 
locations, that emergence of diverse, discrete, and specific discourses, which are 
derived from “l‟arbre de dérivation” (Foucault, 1969: 192).   Employing the image of 
this tree, at its “racine,” there exists “énoncés recteurs,” which, in spite of their 
definitional and governing status also “font apparaître les possibilités les plus 
générales de caractérisation et ouvrent ainsi tout un domaine de concepts à construire 
… laissent place au plus grand nombre d‟options ultérieures” (Foucault, 1969: 192).   
Both the tree and its branches represent “un buissonnement, des „découvertes‟ … des 
transformations conceptuelles … des émergences de notions inédites ...” (Foucault, 
1969: 192).   Within the life of this tree, within its trunk, pulsating through and 
between its branches and leaves, which grow from the same root, are linkages, 
limitations, and contradictions, both the coherent and “natural,” as well as the angular 
and mutant, outgrowth of the “root statements;” the “successions linéaires” or the 
interruptions, the “actes et seuils épistémologiques” (Foucault, 1969: 9 – 11).   The 
énoncé is general and specific, and its specificity is that discursive irruption, which, 
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once the oppressive restriction of historical continuity is abandoned “tout un domaine 
en effet se trouve libéré.   Un domaine immense, mais qu‟on peut définir: il est 
constitué par l‟ensemble de tous les énoncés effectifs ... dans leur dispersion 
d‟événements et dans l‟instance qui est propre à chacun” (Foucault, 1969: 38). 
And, more importantly,  
 
où on pourrait décrire, entre un certain nombre d‟énoncés, un pareil systéme 
de dispersion, dans le cas où entre les objets, les types d‟énonciation, les 
concepts, les choix thématiques, on pourrait définir une régularité (un ordre, 
des corrélations, des positions et des fonctionnements, des transformations), 
 
there exists for Foucault (1969: 53), a “formation discursive.”   This “discursive 
formation” constitutes a “regularity” in which objects are formed from various 
“surfaces of emergence” – that host of political, economic, social, cultural, religious, 
academic, and familial arenae – and are then “delimited” and defined by the 
authorities that appropriate and begin to employ these énoncés, and which, in turn, 
refine them by means of similarities and contrasts into increasingly sophisticated 
“grilles de spécification” (Foucault, 1969: 58).   The objects that form a regularity 
constitute a discursive practice, enabling “la formation des modalités énonciatives” 
(Foucault, 1969: 68 – 74), who employ the strategies that organize and regulate the 
objects and concepts of a discourse, strategies that are forged at “les points de 
diffraction” (Foucault, 1969: 87) between discourses and sub-groups within 
discourses, and are delimited by the choices of the authorities, which are then enacted.   
From a “dispersion d‟éléments ... l‟unité d‟un discours” (Foucault, 1969: 95) coheres: 
from an anterior field of juxtaposing, conflicting, disputatious statements and 
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conceptual formations, a discourse inspissates; but “derrière la façade visible du 
système,” there exists “la riche incertitude du désordre” (Foucault, 1969: 100). 
 
It is this “most sustained and searching analysis and formulation of the nature of a 
discourse ... passed over rather quickly by most of Foucault‟s own commentators,” 
since it is his “most difficult book” (Young, 2001: 394), that illustrates the possibility 
of the development and conceptual transformation of the same discursive 
terminology, which then constitutes a discourse with its own „thin facade‟ of stability, 
buttressed by its own specialized use of discursive terminology, and guarded by its 
own peculiarly established rites of entry and propriate rituals.   Thus, discursive 
statements (root statements) may belong to diverse discursive regularities, from 
which, with increased and focused specialization, discursive formations arise.   Whilst 
these more clearly defined and field-determined regularities, through the application 
of diverse forms and the pressure of variously covert and overt coercion, often attempt 
to occlude discursive instability, not only are attempts at closure always insufficient, 
since within the tree and at the branch level of the archive the same terms draw their 
life possibilities from the same root, and thus, not only do attempts at unique usages 
of discourse fail in their provenient power, but also definitional hegemony requires a 
marginalized other, which is an internal absent-presence, in order to demarcate its 
boundaries.   In this vein, it is suggested that Aristotle‟s Poetics is less confined to a 
reading in which concepts may be linked and comprehended in a singularly linear 
fashion, since the rays of light that cast angled shadows upon the sundial depend upon 
the daylight hour, and which the locality of viewpoint may maximize or minimize.   
Perceived through this image, Aristotle‟s reflections upon drama are both shaded and 
unshaded; both informed and prescribed, and unique and innovative.   Seeking its 
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meanings in the past may be significant, but its significance must be balanced by the 
discursive fecundity of new regularities.   In this sense, the Poetics is a beginning, but 
a beginning with a wide and varied discursive past, as demonstrated in the scarce and 
fractured evidence above, and a future no less open and variegated in its attempt to 
accrete as a discursive formation.   To look over the shoulder of the Poetics may be 
less informative than to address it as a discourse; indeed, formed from those diverse 
emergent surfaces and collocations, but then forming its own objects and concepts, 
increasingly refining its definitional terms, and permitting new voices to speak its 
lines, with an inexorable and vulnerable exposure to an unknown futurity from an 
known and unknown past. 
 
The coalescing of a discourse on poetry from existing “surfaces of emergence,” 
through critique, controversy, and scrutiny, assembles the Poetics of Aristotle.   But 
ultimate refinement, as in any systematic formulation, and, more especially in the 
Humanities, resides beyond its reach, in its future, and in the future of its past, those 
hidden presences and occlusions both known and unknown to its initial inspissation as 
a discursive regularity.   Therefore, the Poetics cannot be bound too tightly to its past, 
where that past dictates its definitional present.   The “authorities” which construct the 
“grids of specification” (Foucault, 1969) form the traditio – the handing on or 
handing over – of Aristotle‟s present to the present present, and the stability of 
meaning is contested in the a0gw/n, which, toujours déjà, is an open contest. 
 
Thus, our access to the pluri-dimensional, multifarious past of “le jeu citationnel” 
(Derrida, 1972b: 111) and significatory plenitude both distant from, and proximate to, 
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the Poetics – both its present past and its present future – is provisional, since it is a 
field where  
 
des forces d‟association unissent, à des distances, avec une force et selon des 
voies diverses, les mots „effectivement présents‟ dans un discours à tout les 
autres mots du système lexical, qu‟ils apparaissent ou non comme „mots,‟ 
c‟est-à-dire comme unités verbales relatives dans un discours.   Elles 
communiquent avec la totalité du lexique ... (Derrida, 1972b: 148; and see n. 
50 above). 
 
In this dispersed and disseminated arena, the unbounded site of “excès irréductible, 
par le jeu du supplément, de toute intimité à soi du vivant, du bien, du vrai” (Derrida, 
1972b: 195), a reading, and no more than a reading, of the Poetics may be undertaken.   
It solicits the Poetics in an alleyway, lit, but sparsely, by the shadows cast upon the 
mildewed façade from the dim streetlamps.   Such a reading may be interpretively 
courageous and may adopt a provisional semantic presence of relative stability for its 
own purposes, but it is neither brave enough to venture upon any “resolution” of the 
problematics of ka/qarsij, nor is it singularly convinced to decide definitively upon 
the relationship between pra/cij and mu=qoj.   Rather, it does not claim rights, since it 
is aware that textuality is toujours déjà interpretive: “Il roule (kulindeitai) ici et là ... 
comme qulqu‟un qui a perdu ses droits, comme un hors-la-loi, un dévoyé, un mauvais 
garçon, un voyou ou un aventurier” (Derrida, 1972b: 165).   Following Foucault 
(1969), the notion that new discursive regularities arise from existing and diverse 
discursive formations, enables the appropriation of variously marginal or central 
technical terminology of other discourses to be employed in yet another discourse in 
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varying degrees both of discordance and also of consonance between those 
discourses, and, subsequently, to be comprehended in tentative and provisional 
consonance and harmony within a discourse.   A discourse solicits and scavenges, 
and, whilst it attempts to „grid its specifications‟ and „authoritatively guard them,‟ 
“lorsqu‟on l‟interroge à tous les coins de rue ... il ne sait pas plus répéter son origine” 
(Derrida, 1972b: 165). 
 
This inability to „repeat‟ with precision, with exact replication, splices pristine self-
present signification, and disseminates the definitive semantic content of textual 
readings.   But it does offer a temporary discursive stasis for the purposes of 
establishing momentary and transient protocols of a tragic poetic work, a pied-a-tèrre, 
which enables a tantalizing anticipatory „forward reading‟ of some selected dramatic 
features in the Gospel of Mark, and extends a provisional invitation to a “modalité 
énonciative” (Foucault, 1969: 68 – 74).   Thus, it is as an “enunciative modality” that 
Dame Iris Murdoch (1992), in her 1982 Gifford Lectures, occupied a voiced position, 
and appropriated a discursive regularity of the fourth century BCE – one fissile yet 
viscous, fragmented yet adhesive and tenacious, both in its initial accretion and in the 
longue durée.    
 
Murdoch (1992: 99) summarized Aristotle‟s account in a seemingly uncontested 
manner:   “Tragedy, he [Aristotle] tells us, is primarily an action or happening 
(praxis), requiring a story or plot (mythos), portrayal of character (ethos) and 
intelligent spoken presentation (dianoia).”   But her summary is a reading amongst 
readings, and whether or not Aristotle “tells us” is a moot point.   Moreover, 
Aristotle‟s use, perhaps „exploitation‟ may be more apposite, of terminology in a 
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particular manner may reflect his own education, in that poetry both demands, and 
must be examined in terms of, its own protocols, since, for Aristotle, “elke wetenskap 
sy eie metode het en kragtens sy eie norme geëvalueer moet word.   Die navorser 
moet dus steeds na die eiesoortige uitgangspunt (archê) van elke besondere 
wetenskap soek” (De Kock & Cilliers, 1991: xxv). 
 
Furthermore, Aristotle scrutinized a real, observable world, rather than an ideal realm, 
like Plato.   In fact, employing the notion of craft, as explored above, the poet, for 
Aristotle, is a craftsman amongst other craftsmen, only, in this instance, he is “a 
maker of plots” (emphasis added) (to\n poihth\n … tw=n mu/qwn ei]nai dei= poihth/n, 
Poetics, 1451b 27 – 28), and the generation of a specific discourse that defines, grids, 
authorizes, orders, and invites discursive appropriation concerns the craft of poetry, 
and here, more specifically, of tragic poetry, since “elke afsonderlike ding (die plant, 
die dier, en ook die tragedie) het ŉ ideale vorm waarheen dit strewe en waarheen dit 




Thus, Aristotle begins kata\ fu/sin prw=ton a0po\ tw=n prw/twn (1447a 12 – 13), 
and naturally refers to e0popoii/a, kwmw|di/a, diqurambopoihtikh\, au0lhtikh/ and 
kiqaristikh/, in addition to tragw|di/a (1447a 13 – 15).   All of these assume 
mimetic forms – pa=sai tugxa/nousin ou]sai mimh/seij (1447a 15 – 16) – and 
produce their imitation in rhythm, speech, and in melody (e0n r9uqmw|= kai\ lo/gw| kai\ 
a9rmoni/a|, 1447a 22), but they do so either distinctly or in combinations (xwri\j h1 
memigme/noij, 1447a 23).   One of the branches of the mimetic arts that employs all of 
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the aspects mentioned (ai4 pa=si xrw=ntai toi=j ei0rhme/noij, 1447b 24 – 25) is 
tragedy. 
 
These mimeticists represent actions (mimou=ntai oi9 mimou/menoi pra/ttontaj, 1448a 
1), which may be elevated and serious or trivial and common (spoudai/ouj h2 
fau/louj, 1448a 2), a distinction which separates tragedy from comedy (e0n au0th=| de\ 
th|= diafora=| kai\ h9 tragw|di/a pro\j th\n kwmw|di/an die/sthken, 1448a 16 – 17).   
The manner of representation may employ both pronouncements and narrative 
description (a0pagge/llonta, h2 e3tero/n ti gigno/menon, 1448a 21 – 22), narrative 
without variation (mh\ metaba/llonta, 1448a 22 – 23), or only performance (pa/ntaj 
w9j pra/ttontaj, 1448a 23).   Mimesis is both congenital to, and enjoyable for, all 
(su/mfuton ... to\ xai/rein toi=j mimh/masi pa/ntaj, 1448b 5 & 8 – 9), and is natural 
for human beings to undertake (kata\ fu/sin de\ o1ntoj h9mi=n tou= mimei=sqai, 1448b 
20).   The choice between the portrayal of noble characters and their actions (ta\j 
kala\j e0mimou=nto pra/ceij kai\ ta\j tw=n toiou/twn, 1448b 25 – 26) by the more 
devout scriptwriters (semno/teroi), or of the actions of common people (ta\j tw=n 
fau/lwn, 1448b 26) by the less worthy authors (eu0tele/steroi, 1448b 26), relates the 
choice between the noble genres (epic, tragedy) and the less noble genres (comedy, 
iambic verse) to the character of the poet and his mimetic creations. 
 
This initial emphasis upon mimesis is significant, because it signals the development 
of a finer lexical definition within a specific discursive formation.   Whilst “poetry, 
like painting, sculpture, instrumental music, and dance, is an art of „representing‟ 
human characters and actions” (Ford, 2002: 95), tragic mimesis is enactively 
expressive, “manifesting a human capacity to model and imaginatively enact the 
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possibilities of experience” (Halliwell, 2005: 402).   Aristotle removes the 
delimitation of mimesis from static representation, and transgresses the boundaries of 
the mimetic arts
57
 in two ways.   First, „reality‟ or traditional myths are reordered with 
licence, and therefore “against the Platonic castigation of mimesis as falsehood, he is 
adumbrating a concept of fiction which allows the poet‟s stance towards reality to be 
more oblique” (Halliwell, 1986: 133); and second, the dynamism of poetic mimesis in 
its portrayal of action and character permits an audience responsiveness and 
identification on a number of levels, which themselves are non-static but progress 
impactively and transformatively both during and following a performance, a matter 
not insignificant to performing the gospel in its liturgical and ethical dimensions.   But 
lest one be drawn too quickly to the ethical import of poetry, there is an extended 
aspect to the participatory experience which is suggested by the sui generis use of 
mimesis.   The tradition emphasized by Aristophanes that poets teach and also shape 
the moral formation of character, summarized in Pluto‟s injunction to Aeschylus at 
the end of Frogs: sw=|ze po/lin th\n h9mete/ran gnw/maij a0gaqai=j, kai\ pai/deuson 
tou\j a0noh/touj: polloi\ d‟ ei0si/n: (ll. 1501 – 1503),58 and criticized by Plato 
because, rather, of the falsehoods they convey, is contrasted with Aristotle‟s 
appropriation of mimesis for his own literary purpose, which centres on how 
representation operates in poetic performative works.   Dynamic mimesis, that 
enactive and influential ostension of action, is attractive.   This is not mere 
                                                 
57
 Without perceiving the manner in which discourses form, scholars may accuse Aristotle of 
misrepresentation, as David (2006: 25) does: “The fact ... that Aristotle‟s conception of tragedy as a 
kind of mimetic or representational art, combined with his neglect of its roots as a species of xorei/a, is 
symptomatic of a distortion of the poetic realities as they are found in the whole train of poets from 
Homer to Euripides.”   
58
 Bennett (1997) notes the difficulty of undertaking quantitative and/or qualitative research on the 
impact of a dramatic work upon the audience.   The matter may be of more relevance in societies in 
which agitprop theatre is employed as a form of political protest.   The pertinent issue concerns the 
degree to which, for example, protest theatre influenced audiences in their political thought and social 
action during the years of apartheid in South Africa, which is explored in a little more detail in Chapter 
Four.   
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observation, but purposeful enticement of the intellect of the spectator into the 
possible world of the drama, so that “the spectator is guided from the features of the 
figure, as they are represented in the image, and through a cognitive process, to 
identification with the actual object” (Tsitsiridis, 2005: 443).    
 
Thus, in employing mi/mhsij, Aristotle generates a technical term, or, perhaps more 
exactly, a specific usage of a term, which is constrained, rather than defined, by an 
incipient discursive regularity.   In the technical lexicon, its definitional status is 
supported by increasingly specialized classificatory demarcation and bounded by rites 
of entry and authoritative usage (cf. Foucault, 1969).   But, at another level, within the 
world of the drama, and generated by the dramatic text and its mise en scène, it 
engenders an instability, it is errant, and attracts spectator identification.   On the one 
hand, the dynamism of mimesis, although a foundational term within a technical 
discourse on drama, forges an inexorable concatenation of key terms within the 
Poetics: it is the mi/mhsij of a mu=qoj, evident in ta\ h1qh, which reflects the pra=cij; 
on the other hand, in its errancy and deviancy, mi/mhsij breaches the fourth wall, and 
causes e1leoj kai\ fo/boj, and engenders a ka/qarsij.   Thus, Aristotle‟s 
understanding of tragedy “correlates the „internal‟ requirements of dramatic 
construction with the emotional effects of plays on audiences” (Halliwell, 2005: 402).    
Therefore, from inceptive moments of improvised spontaneity (a0p‟ a0rxh=j 
au0tosxediastikh=j, 1449a 9 – 10),59 and following after the example of the leaders 
of the dithyramb (a0po\ tw=n e0carxo/ntwn to\n diqu/rambon, 1449a 10 – 11), or, in 
Foucauldian and Derridean terms, through liminal border raids of pilfer and plunder 
                                                 
59
 The origins of tragedy remain a matter of scholarly dispute.   For the claim of that Icarius dressed in 
the skin of a slain goat, who was eating the new shoots of his vines, and danced around them, see 
Davidson (2007: 293); cf. p. 34, n. 14.  
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of proximate and distant lexical réseaux, tragedy adjusted and transformed, 
restructured and reformed itself; or, more idiomatically, structured and fashioned 
itself in terms of its own creative activity, until it reached a sophisticated (Plato‟s 
critique is perceptible in this word) status, which was its true nature, and, for 
Aristotle, was no longer subject to transformative improvements (kai\ polla\j 
metabola\j … h9 tragw|di/a e0pau/sato, e0pei\ e1sxe th\n au9th=j fu/sin, 1449a 14 – 
15).   Here, for Aristotle, it ought to have remained, retaining this exalted and 
excellent form (see Green 1994: 50), when ta\ e0no/nta kai\ ta\ a9rmo/ttonta (1450b 
5) are uttered; however, in contrast, in Aristotle‟s contemporary milieu, characters 
employ rhetoric (oi9 de\ nu=n r9htorikw=j, 1450b 7 – 8).   But this gradual augmentation 
(kata\ mikro\n hu0ch/qh, 1449a 13), whilst practically ostended and publicly evident to 
an audience in performance, simultaneously is generative of a theoretical discourse 
about the art of dramatic fiction.   Playwrights instrumental in the propagation of an 
influential classificatory inventory included Aeschylus, who employed two actors 
rather than one (e0c e9no\j ei0j du/o, 1449a 16), reduced the part of the chorus (ta\ tou= 
xorou= h0la/ttwse, 1449a 17), and forged the domination of speech (to\n lo/gon 
prwtagwnistei=n pareskeu/asen, 1449a 17 – 18), and Sophocles, who added a third 
actor and scenery (trei=j de\ kai\ skhnografi/an, 1449a 18 – 19).   Superficial and 
insubstantial plots, which were accompanied by ludicrous speeches, were no longer 
employed (e0k mikrw=n mu/qwn kai\ le/cewj geloi/aj, 1449a 19 – 20), and the 
superiority and prestige of tragedy was recognized (a0pesemnu/nqh, 1449a 20).   In 
addition to other elements, the appropriate meter of speech, the iambic trimeter 
(ma/lista ga\r lektiko\n tw=n me/trwn to\ i0ambei=o/n e0stin, 1449a 24 – 25), became 
the principle meter of tragic dramas, and the number, and/or length or, perhaps, even 
complexity (e1ti de\ e0peisodi/wn plh/qh, 1449a 28), of the episodes was changed so 
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that an intentional coherence was maintained.   Indeed, with reference to Foucault 
(1969), it is these mutations of greater of lesser innovation, and which were 
observable in performances, that accrete to constitute an expository source of future 
dramatic writing.  
 
Aristotle notes that the history of the development of comedy has been lost, because it 
did not attract sufficient attention to be documented (h9 de\ kwmw|di/a dia\ to\ mh\ 
souda/zesqai e0c a0rxh=j e1laqen, 1449a 38 – 1449b 1), whilst that of tragedy has been 
preserved in the common memory (ou0 lelh/qasin, 1449a 38).   And although tragedy 
appropriated the practice in epic of dealing with matters of serious import (mi/mhsij 
ei]nai spoudai/wn h0kolou/qhsen, 1449b 10), in contrast to tragedy, epic „tells‟ but 
does not „show,‟ and the metre is a simple one (to\ me/tron a0plou=n e1xein kai\ 
a0paggeli/an ei]nai, 1449b 11).   Epic is without the constraint of time, which is one 
of its distinguishing features (a0o/ristoj tw=| xro/nw| kai\ tou/tw| diafe/rei, 1449b 14); 
and although tragedy initially is similarly structured (kai/toi to\ prw=ton o9moi/wj … 
e0poi/oun, 1449b 14 – 15), with regard to length or duration of the action (tw=| mh/kei, 
1449b 12), the norm was soon established to endeavour to reach its dénouement 
within a single revolution of the sun or even in more restricted time (peira=tai u9po\ 
mi/an peri/odon h9li/ou ei]nai h2 mikro\n e0calla/ttein, 1449b12 – 13). 
 
In these comparisons and contrasts between the two genres, Aristotle is sharpening, 
defining, and delimiting the boundaries of tragic drama, and, of course 
simultaneously, sharpening, defining, and delimiting the boundaries of epic and 
comedy.   But the borders of definition haemorrhage, and, as the connotation 
suggests, the protocols of definition ride on the back of the transgressing farmako/j, 
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excluded but “reguliérement mis en place par la communauté” (Derrida, 1972b: 152), 
a recognition that Aristotle appears to share, since that which epic possesses is also 
the property of tragedy (u9pa/rxei th=| tragw|di/a|, 1449b 19); but not all of that which 
constitutes tragedy is present in epic (ou0 pa/nta e0n th=| e0popoii/a|, 1449b 19 – 20.) 
 
With restrictions and qualifications in mind, Aristotle closes in on tragedy: A tragic 
drama represents an action that is serious, complete, and of importance (e1stin ou]n 
tragw|di/a mi/mhsij pra/cewj spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj me/geqoj e0xou/shj, 1449b 24 
– 25), in language that has been embellished distinctly and specifically in each section 
of its forms (h9dusme/nw| lo/gw| xwri\j e9ka/stw| tw=n ei0dw=n e0n toi=j mori/oij, 
1449b25 – 26) – whether that of speech or of melody – and in a dramatic rather than a 
narrative mode (drw/ntwn kai\ ou0 di‟ a0paggeli/aj, 1449b 26 – 27), engenders pity 
and fear, and, subsequently, finally achieves the purification of such anguish and 
emotion (di‟ e0le/ou kai\ fo/bou perai/nousa th\n tw=n toiou/twn paqhma/twn 
ka/qarsin, 1449b 27 – 28).   But, such definitional closure is premature, and vexatious 
terms now jostle for space and power in their quest for greater terminological 
exactitude and hegemony, and, as a consequence, they also extend interpretive options 
to the reader, and thus the traditio continues in subsequent hermeneutic inquisitions, 
suspicions, and choices.      
   
Immediately, however, it must be noted, once again, that the persistent attempts to 
distance Aristotle from the performative nature of dramatic texts are contested by 
Aristotle himself, since, without pause, he adverts to visible ostension: Since actors 
undertake representative actions, chiefly and by necessity, a constituent part of a 
tragedy would involve the arrangement of visible aspects – that is, tragic drama is 
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unable to omit performative aspects (e0pei\ de\ pra/ttontej poiou=ntai th\n mi/mhsin, 





But, of more significance is the chain generated by the distinctive application of 
mi/mhsij, which interpolates a hierarchy of terms with vital conceptual import, as 
Dame Iris Murdoch (1992) summarily pointed out above, and which is germane to 
this study.   Soliciting, even seducing, the definition of tragedy is the notion of 
pra=cij.   Aristotle informs us that e1stin ou]n tragw|di/a mi/mhsij pra/cewj (1449b 
24), when defining tragedy, and, more exactly, when defining the type of action that 
constitutes the subject of a tragic work: the action is serious, of importance, elevated.   
This, controversially upostatic, concept of the emanative dynamic of a tragic drama is 
replicated twice in quick succession, when noting that the action will be acted out or 
performed by actors – e0pei\ de\ pra/cew/j e0sti mi/mhsij, pra/ttetai de\ u9po\ tinw=n 
pratto/ntwn (1449b 36 – 37) – and when referring to the mu=qoj – that e1stin de\ th=j 
me\n pra/cewj o9 mu=qoj h9 mi/mhsij (1450a 3 – 4).   Thus, from a wide field, mimesis is 
appropriated by the narrower pasture of literary theory, and then, subsequently, by the 
demarcated patch of the theory of drama, and germinates both its own, as well as 
other, hybrid auxiliaries, as the image of Foucault‟s (1969) tree of discursive 
possibilities illustrated. 
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 The translation of prw=ton me\n e0c a0na/gkhj as “chiefly, and by necessity,” seems to emphasize a 
defining aspect of dramatic works, namely, their performative nature.   The practical nature of 
Aristotle‟s treatises, and not simply this one on poetry, is emphasized by Hamilton Fyfe (1940: xiv), 
who, with reference to the Poetics, states that “before tacking in the Poetics the theory of poetry and 
drama, he [Aristotle] compiled a list of plays produced at Athens with the titles of the plays and the 
names of the author, producer and actors, and the winners of prizes.”  
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Primary amongst them then, it is argued, is pra=cij.   First, there are no variant 
readings to the above citations: the one that engenders some concern occurs later, in 
1450a 16, and demands closer scrutiny.   Second, a series of linked terms is 
circumscribed and hierarchized by the pra=cij, which is mimeticized.   Whilst, for the 
writer of a tragedy, the action is the informing rationale of the mu=qoj; for the viewer, 
it unfolds in a proleptic manner and, ultimately, is viewed as a construct of the mu=qoj.   
The pra=cij resides outside the mu=qoj for both author and spectator: known and 
inscribed by the former in the drama; perceived in, and the product of, the 
performance or of a reading by the latter.   The mu=qoj displays the pra=cij, which, 
both in its present absence and its absent presence, constitutes toujours déjà a known, 
and yet anticipatory, suspense.   Thus, as Aristotle states (1450a 38), the mu=qoj is the 
yuxh/ of the tragic work as an ostensible drama, and the use of yuxh/, which is 
qualified by oi[on, arguably, ought not to transgress the performative raison d’être of 
playwriting, but neither does it stand alone, but is contrasted with ta\ h1qh (1450a 39).                 
 
It is this sublation of pra=cij for which Kitto (1939: 104), with some prevarication, 
and writing primarily about Aeschylus, reaches, when he states that 
 
[i]t is not the characters that shape the plot either in Aeschylus or in 
Sophocles.   Nor is it the story … once it has been seen that he [Aeschylus] is 
neither dramatizing a story nor making a drama about individuals of a certain 
kind in a certain situation, but about man and the gods, and certain verities of 
the human universe ... (1939: 104 & 106). 
            
 102 
These “verities” were foregrounded, so that Aeschylus‟s “interest in character was 
limited … [and the] … elaboration of character would only distract attention from 
what is really going on; therefore it is kept to a minimum …” (Kitto, 1939: 103), and, 
some twelve years later, Kitto (1951: 185 – 186) is more succinct: “All Greek plays 
are built on a single conception, and nothing that does not directly contribute to it is 
admitted.”   This thematic singularity coheres with Aristotle‟s emphasis on an 
informing action which is given shape in a plot.   Without the action, little coherence 
will be forged in the dramatic writing, and the lack of fidelity to the action causes 
episodic incoherence.
61
   Halliwell (1986: 141 – 142) perspicaciously observes that  
 
… the „action‟ (praxis) is the structure of the play‟s events viewed as a 
dimension of the events themselves; it is the pattern discernible in the „actions 
and life‟ which the poet dramatizes.   As such, it can be described as the object 
or content of the plot-structure (muthos), which can in turn be understood to be 
the design or significant organization of the work of art. 
 
The prominence of an heroic tragic character, who attracts critical attention and 
occludes the foundational intentionality of the action, and who is afflicted by an 
a9marti/a, may be less apt to the „monumental‟ examination of the Poetics than to the 
period 
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 In Holt‟s novel, The Walled Garden (1990), which has been referred to above (n. 36), the importance 
of a central action, although here in comedy, is evident.   Eupolis, after returning from the war against 
the Syracusans, visits his farm in Pallene: “While I was busy with my vetch, I started work on a new 
Comedy.   It virtually crept up on me when I wasn‟t looking, for I had not intended to enter anything 
for a while; but before I knew where I was I had thought of a splendid entry for a chorus of sheep, and 
after that there was no stopping me.   Of course I needed a Message, and I couldn‟t really think of one.   
The City was a very different place now, after the disaster, and the old themes no longer seemed 
appropriate” (Holt, 1990: 442). 
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when Romanticism became the new orthodoxy … [and] … people turned to 
those parts of the Poetics which seemed to promise human psychological 
interest – to katharsis, and to the dramatic character who shall strike us as like 
ourselves, and to the idea of a fatal flaw or blunder (hamartia).   They turned 
most insistently to the tragic hero (Jones, 1962: 12). 
 
An interiority, seamlessly introjected from a later vantage point, demands a mandate 
of proscriptions, more especially with respect to the will, and, in particular, to our 
vespertine readings of the Antigone (to which we shall return), because 
 
even if it would appear to us that there is nothing more obvious than an 
individual will, there are no classical philosophical texts which speak of such a 
will, just as there are no appearances of the will as such in classical literature, 
and not even in Greek tragedy, for the Greek tragic hero or heroine is not a 
uniquely singular individual, and never does that hero or heroine engage in an 
interior agon or conflict (Altizer, 1990: 120). 
 
Thus, subsequently, Jones (1962: 18) launches a trenchant attack on those who 
insistently foreground character rather than action.   His own words require citation:  
 
Notice the helpless and almost lunatic fixity of the sober academic comment 
(one could cite a hundred like it) that Aeschylus‟s Suppliant Women 
“represent the primitive character of Greek tragedy.   It has no „hero.‟   Chorus 
and heroine are one;” whereas his Seven against Thebes “presents us with the 
first proper hero in the history of tragic art.”   (What is a proper hero?)   This is 
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the environment of the long sterile debate as to whether Creon is the real hero 
of Antigone‟s play and Odysseus of Ajax‟s, and Clytemnestra the heroine of 
Agamemnon‟s; while The Women of Trachis has been pulled in two between 
Deianeira and Heracles; one or other has to be granted the heroic role; we 
must make our minds up. 
 
But, characters are the product of an arrangement in the mu=qoj of the pra=cij, and the 
 
interpolation of the tragic hero is the first step towards re-writing Aristotle‟s 
treatise, and a decisive one in that the most elementary loyalty to his principles 
is surrendered as soon as the hero appears and attracts to himself, as he 
automatically does, the idea of tragic error (Jones, 1962: 46).    
 
Aylen (1964: 154 – 155) is as insistent in asserting that “all talk of the „tragic hero‟ is 
irrelevant” and that the Classical Greek tragedies “are not plays of „character,‟”
62
 and, 
in a similar fashion to Jones (1962) invoking Romantic individualism as engendering 
the focus upon a single character, Aylen (1964: 247) states: 
 
When we see Greek tragedies we ask of the actions represented, Was it right, 
Was it wrong?   How was it right, how was it wrong?   And we shall be shown 
how to make up our minds.   All the poetry leads towards insight.   In the 
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 Jebb‟s (1841 – 1905) influence on character-centred approaches to the Classical Greek tragedies 
ought to be noted, since he held the Regius Chair of Greek at Cambridge and produced editions of the 
plays of Sophocles (see Rehm, 2004: 43 – 44).   However, the realization of a changing conception of 
character may lessen the perceived foregrounding of this aspect by Victorian and early twentieth 
century commentators, because a notion of „character stability‟ may have been more prevalent during 
this period and may have cohered less obtrusively with the conception of a unitary pra=cij (see 
Budelmann, 2004: 35).           
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nineteenth century we are asked to become involved with a surge of emotion 
in the hero‟s misfortunes ... 
 
and, adverting to the practice where “the Greeks never used more than three actors in 
tragedy,” Aylen (1964: 29) is able to assert that “they preferred to emphasize basic 
pattern at the expense of the details of characterization.” 
 
But, toujours déjà, and not simply since a more „individualistic understanding‟ of the 
human person, readings of the Poetics have been reliant upon various types of 
interpretive translations and the „misprisions‟ of readers, no matter how diligent, and 
whether or not they have access to Classical Greek.   The matter, one avers, is less one 
of a „correct‟ reading of Aristotle‟s lecture notes – and they do appear to be notes – 
than of having access both to the slippages in the „original‟ and also to the subsequent 
dispersed interpretive readings.   Without this, rather hesitant and uncertain, 
perspective, the peremptory conflation of „action‟ and „plot,‟ or the inability to 
distinguish between „action‟ and „actions,‟ results in some dubiously „definitive‟ 
pronouncements:    
 
Aristotle ... claims in his Poetics, [that] the most important point of drama is 
the plot and the connection between the plot and the characters.   We find this 
same emphasis on character and action at points in the dialogue when reason 
seems to fail (McCoy, 2008: 18).           
 
Citing Aristotle, Goodkin (1991: 39 – 40) adverts to the lack of congruity between 
tragedy as the mi/mhsij pra/cewj spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj me/geqoj e0xou/shj 
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(Poetics, 1449b 24 – 25), and the “middle case” of the “tragic hero,” who is “neither 
purely good nor purely bad, [and] seems to be defined as an average taken between 
extremes, an example of the ethical middle, a being who is in no essential way 
distinguishable ... from the collectivity,” and thus he perceives those resident 
uncertainties that plague the act of reading.   The reference to, rather than the denial 
of, these problematical assertions is of more, and not of less, assistance.   Referring to 
the possible explanation that “perhaps Aristotle means that the hero himself is 
average, though his action is good,” Goodkin (1991: 40) continues that “such 
explanations do nothing to efface the ambiguity of Aristotle‟s attitude toward the 
tragic hero, who is simultaneously meant to be like us, that is, average, and better than 
us.”   This exposition contributes both to elucidate the dramatic character of the 
prwtagwnisth/j, for whom „pity‟ must be felt and „fear‟ experienced, in order for 
the ka/qarsij to occur, and also contributes to maintain the distinction between praxis 
and character that Jones (1962) so vehemently defends and that causes Halliwell 
(1986; and evident in 2005: 404) some equivocation. 
    
In fact, the disputed reading of pra/cewn for pra/cewj in the fourteenth-century 
manuscript, Riccardianus 46, in line 1450a 16, may draw more attention than is 
necessary in this contest of superior interpretational insight.
63
   First, Riccardianus 46 
is later than Parisinus 1741, and, for that reason, it may be preferable to accept the 
latter, as Halliwell (1995 [1999]) does, rather than the former reading, which is 
employed by Kassel (1965: 11).   Second, before this occurrence, Aristotle has stated 
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 In the text, Kassel (1965: 11) reads “pra/cewn kai\ bi/ou,” and notes that “pra/cewn” is found in 
Riccardianus 46, saec. XIV, whilst “pra/cewj” is found in Parisinus 1741, saec. X/XI, which is earlier 
than Riccardianus and Guilelmi codex graecus deperditus.   In Parisinus, lines 1450a 15 – 16 could be 
rendered: “Tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of an action and of life;” but Riccardianus 
is translated: “Tragedy is an imitation not of human beings but of actions and of life.”   If the text 
employed by Kassel (1965) is appropriated, the possible implication is that tragedy mimeticizes the 
actions of human beings, rather than revealing an action through the ostended actions of characters.      
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twice that pra=cij is foundational to tragedy (1449b 24; 1449b 36).   Third, and 
significantly, immediately before dealing with the mu=qoj and its arrangement, 
Aristotle re-emphasizes that e1stin de\ th=j me\n pra/cewj o9 mu=qoj h9 mi/mhsij (1450a 3 
– 4).   Fourth, the contested reading is contextually explicable, because it follows the 
listing of the me/rh e3c (1450a 8) of tragedy, and they concern that which is internal to 
the tragic drama.   Fifth, the assertion that action is essential to tragedy, whilst 
character is not (a1neu me\n pra/cewj ou0k a2n ge/noito tragw|di/a, a1neu de\ h0qw=n 
ge/noit‟ a1n, 1450a 24) evinces evidence that, for Aristotle, the pra=cij of a dramatic 
work is not the same as the pra/ceij of the actors as they appropriate the characters in 
a dramatic work.   And even if, as Eagleton (2003: 27) concedes, “what grips the 
imagination is the death of the hero,” he admits that the sometime professor of drama 
at Cambridge, Raymond “Williams is right to insist that „the ordinary tragic action is 
what happens through the hero.‟”   Characterization is a feature of the composition of 
a tragic dramatic work and focuses the emotions of the audience, but the action is both 
the possibility of a play – it is its inaugural promise
64
 – and its possible final reading.    
As Aristotle turns to the internal organization of the action in the mu=qoj, so may one 
turn to Narrative Theory, in order to seek some assistance and, perhaps, some clarity 
about the relationship between the action of a dramatic work and the plot.   Arguably, 
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 It ought to be noted that it was Theophrastus (372 – 287 BCE), “Aristotle‟s favourite pupil and 
successor as head of the Peripatetic School” (Carlson, 1984; 1993: 21), who defined tragedy as a 
“„change in a hero‟s fortunes‟ [h9rwikh=j tu/xhj peri/stasij, Diomedes, De Poematibus, 8.1], and it 
may be that we have here a rarely exact parting of the ways in the late fourth century, with Aristotle 
telling his students that Tragedy is not an imitation of human beings, and with those students – or some 
of them – unmoved and sceptical in the light of their experience of Euripidean creations like Medea: at 
a time, too, when the visible presence of the stage-figure is becoming newly and „heroically‟ 
magnificent, and virtuoso acting is on the increase” (Jones, 1962: 276; emphasis added; also see 
Carlson, 1984; 1993: 21).   Steiner (2003: 6 & 80 ff.), in the 2001 – 2002 Charles Eliot Norton 
Lectures at Harvard, illustrates the contest and betrayal between teacher and pupil in the bitter 
relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, whilst  Neel (1988: 173 – 174), in his Derridean critique 
of Plato‟s understanding of writing, notes that “since they [our students] can never speak with our voice 
absolutely, they must silence us in order to have a place to speak at all.   Our discourse, what we would 
write if we held the pen, falls silent, allowing the student a space in which to write.   Derrida writes this 
way all the time by writing through and even inside other texts.”   Perhaps Aristotle‟s relative silence or 
economy on the expatiation of the more exact relationship between action and plot has offered space 
and voice to his pupil, Theophrastus, as, indeed, to his other pupils, and his pupils‟ pupils. 
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it may be suggested that Genette‟s histoire, or the fabula of the Russian Formalists – 
that is, the story removed from the time and space of its diegetic recounting – 
corresponds to the action; whilst the plot – that is, the textual arrangement of the 
events – is not dissimilar to the recit or the suzet
65
 (see, Webster, 1996: 51 – 52; 
Rimmon-Kenan, 1983: 3; Eagleton, 1983: 105).   The ordering of the narrative text, 
and, by inference, the structuring of the dramatic performance, is the province of the 
récit or suzet, an imaginatively, or literally, sensory experience that produces a 
ka/qarsij (Halliwell, 1995 [1999]: 18 – 19; Cooper, 1963: 31 – 32).66   If, for 
Aristotle, the plot is the soul of the tragedy (yuxh\ o9 mu=qoj th=j tragw|di/aj, 1450a 
38), the action is the soul‟s kindling genesis, which, if the drama unfolds with a 
fidelity to the pra/cij, it will be “there” in its authorial creation, and evident and 
perceptible to the reader or viewer, even the subject of discussion and debate, at the 
te/loj (see Butcher, 1936: 2).    
 
Words, as generative of the possible world of the drama and the dramatic experience, 
command the important, elevated, noble, and accomplished (spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj 
me/geqoj, 1449b 24 – 25) nature of the tragic work to exercise care in the use of 
language (h9dusme/nw| lo/gw|, 1449b 25), in order that the enactment (drw/ntwn, 
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 The spelling here appears more widely accepted amongst English-speaking literary theorist, although 
Elam (1980) employs “sjuzet.” 
66
 The following caution ought to be noted: “Die ooreenstemming tussen fabula en praxis blyk nie so 
eksplisiet nie omdat Aristoteles nêrens sê dat die handelinge wat nageboots word, mekaar kronologies 
opvolg nie …” (De Kock and Cilliers, 1991: 135); whilst Elam‟s (1980: 119 ff.) fairly wide use of 
“fabula” is apposite, although he writes from a visual rather than compositional perspective: “It is clear 
that the fabula, being an abstraction from the sjuzet/plot as such, is a paraphrase of a pseudo-narrative 
kind, made, for example, by a spectator or critic in recounting the „story‟ of the drama.   It is usually 
the prime object of the spectator‟s hypothesizing in witnessing the representation: he anticipates events, 
attempts to „bridge‟ incidents whose connection is not immediately clear and generally endeavours to 
infer the overall frame of action from the bits of information he is fed.   In trying to project the possible 
world of the drama, the spectator is principally concerned with piecing together the underlying logic of 
the action.” 
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1449b 26) of the tragic work causes an affective and transformative identification 
(perai/nousa th\n tw=n toiou/twn paqhma/twn ka/qarsin, 1449b27 – 28).     
 
Internal to the tragic dramatic text are plot (mu=qoj), character (h1qh), diction (le/cij), 
intention (dia/noia), spectacle (o1yij), and the musical setting of the choral odes 
(melopoii/a) (1450a 9 – 10).   Of these me/rh, the ability to order the events of the 
mimetic creation in a tragic composition of quality is the most significant (me/giston 
de\ tou/twn e0sti\n h9 tw=n pragma/twn su/stasij, 1450a 15), where, as Aristotle 
stated earlier, the plot is the composition and combination of events (th\n su/nqesin 
tw=n pragma/twn, 1450a 4 – 5).  
 
Expanding slightly on his hierarchy of the tragic dramatic composition, Aristotle 
again states that the plot is primary and may be said to be the soul of tragedy (a0rxh\ 
me\n ou]n kai\ oi[on yuxh\ o9 mu=qoj th=j tragw|di/aj, 1450a 38 – 39).   Second is the 
matter of characterization (deu/teron de\ ta\ h1qh, 1450a 39), which reveals the 
possibility of choice (o4 dhloi= th\n proai/resin, 1450b 8 – 9), and is displayed by 
actors, whose raison d’être is to reveal the action (e1stin te mi/mhsij pra/cewj kai\ 
dia\ tau/thn ma/lista tw=n pratto/ntwn, 1450b 3 – 4).   Perhaps perceptible in the 
third feature of tragic composition is an adversative stance to the tangential asides in 
comedy, where the ability of the dramatist is tested with regard to the cohesion of 
intentionality and apposite writing (tou=to de/ e0stin to\ le/gein du/nasqai ta\ e0no/nta 
kai\ ta\ a9rmo/ttonta, 1450b 4 – 5), an ability that will be demonstrated in the 
suitability of characterization that will be ostended (dia/noia de\ e0n oi[j 




   Fourth, the diction in the speeches
68
 entails the selection of apposite 
words (le/cin ei]nai th\n dia\ th=j o0nomasi/aj e9rmhnei/an, 1450b 13 – 14) by the 
playwright, whilst the choral odes provide the most felicitous embellishment to the 
drama (h9 melopoii/a me/giston tw=n h9dusma/twn, 1450b 16).   Exhibitionist scenic 
stagecraft receives little approbation from Aristotle: h9 de\ o1yij yuxagwgiko\n me/n, 
a0texno/taton de\ kai\ h3kista oi0kei=on th=j poihtikh=j (Poetics, 1450b 16 – 17).69   
Rather, no matter what its appeal,
 
spectacle tends to “upstage” the playwright but, at 
most, is ancillary to tragedy (e1ti de\ kuriwte/ra peri\ th\n a0pergasi/an tw=n o1yewn 
h9 tou= skeuopoiou= te/xnh th=j tw=n poihtw=n e0stin, 1450b 19 – 20).70    
 
If a tragedy is to be whole, a beginning, a middle, and an end must be evident (o3lon 
de/ e0stin to\ e1xon a0rxh\n kai\ me/son kai\ teleuth/n, 1450b 26 – 27), and, furthermore, 
for Aristotle, carefully constructed plots neither begin nor end randomly (dei= a1ra 
tou\j sunestw=taj eu] mu/qouj mh/q‟ o9po/qen e1tuxen a1rxesqai mh/q‟ o3pou e1tuxe 
teleuta=n, 1450b 32 – 33), a matter appropriated with particular importance with 
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 Intentionality and purpose is suggested in the term dia/noia, which is linked to ostension, because 
Aristotle may be presenting a “nuwe gedagte, te wete dat die handelende persone sekere kwaliteite 
moet hê danksy hul karakter en denke” (De Kock and Cilliers 1991: 133).   Therefore, “intentionality” 
extends to the actor‟s portrayal of a character, as De Kock and Cilliers (1991: 136) later note: “Dit 
word [denke (dianoia)] dus openbaar deur ŉ figuur se woorde waardeur hy ŉ sekere houding by die 
ander dramatiese figure en by die toeskouers teweeg wil bring.”   Halliwell (1986: 154 – 156), not 
without cause, perceives no intrinsically aware ironic slippage between the attributes of a character and 
his utterances and gestures; however, the possibility of an ironizing of intentionality, which is not 
irrelevant to the Gospel of Mark, may be suggested in the plots of complex recognition (Poetics 1455a 
12 – 16; cf. Ford, 2002: 85).   In addition, connotative citational play cannot be neutralized (cf. Derrida, 
1972b: 111).   In contrast, Bilezikian (1977: 112) appears to abstract the notion of dianoia, and label it 
the “intellectual content” of the drama. 
68
 Kassel (1965: 12) notes that tw=n me\n lo/gwn is included in cod. Parisinus 1741, saec. X/XI, cod. 
Riccardianus 46, saec. XIV, and Guilelmi codex graecus deperditus, but that it is omitted in translatio 
Tkatsch. 
69
 This rendering is contained in cod. Parisinus 1741, saec. X/XI, whereas in cod. Riccardianus 46, 
saec. XIV ai9 o1yeij is found (see critical apparatus, Kassel, 1965: 13). 
70
 Hutton‟s (1982: 52) somewhat free translation reads: “Spectacle … is … least germane to the art of 
poetry.   For tragedy fulfils its function even without a public performance and actors, and, besides, in 
the realization of spectacular effects the art of the property man counts for more than the art of the 
poets.” 
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reference to dramatic Mark in the following chapter.   Since many of the fifth-century 
BCE Athenian tragic dramas were based upon the common store of generally known 
legends, the matters of beginnings and endings of plays – the former, perhaps, more 
significant than the latter (as noted in Frogs above, by Euripides accusation of 
Aeschylus‟ use of a silent prwtagwnisth/j at the beginning of his plays) – 
demanded the special attention of the playwright.   The challenge was how to be 
innovative in the inception and conclusion of the drama‟s internal dynamic without 
contradicting, or, at least, abusing, a traditional myth (Roberts, 2005: 136 – 137).   
The majority of conclusions to classical tragedies are grave and earnest, with a 
prevalence of concluding exequies and their attendant lamentations, a feature not 
absent from the Gospel of Mark.   As Walsh (2008: 7) laconically observes, tragedy 
provides “a profound space for acknowledging loss.” 
 
The plot of a tragedy is to be both apprehended and also recalled with ease (tou=to de\ 
eu0su/nopton ei]nai ... tou=to de\ eu0mnhmo/neuton ei]nai, 1451a 4 – 6), and the 
durational limits are to accord with the probable or necessary successive 
transformation from fortune to misfortune or from misfortune to fortune (w9j de\ 
a9plw=j diori/santaj ei0pei=n, e0n o3sw| mege/qei kata\ to\ ei0ko\j h2 to\ a0nagkai=on 
e0fech=j gignome/nwn sumbai/nei ei0j eu0tuxi/an e0k dustuxi/aj h2 e0c eu0tuxi/aj ei0j 
dustuxi/an metaba/llein, i9kano\j o3roj e0sti\n tou= mege/qouj, 1451a 11 – 15). 
 
Thus, Aristotle requires the length of a play to cohere with the orderly outworking of 
the plot, and it is the plot that must be single and complete, which, significantly, is not 
the same as the exclusive focus upon one character.   In fact, he states that emphasis 
upon one character does not ensure coherence and singularity (Mu=qoj d‟ e0sti\n ei[j 
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ou0x w3sper tine\j oi1ontai e0a\n peri\ e3na h]| ... h9 mi/a mi/mhsij e9no/j e0stin, ou3tw kai\ 
to\n mu=qon, e0pei\ pra/cewj mi/mhsi/j e0sti, mia=j te ei]nai kai\ tau/thj o3lhj, 1451a 16 
– 17;1451a 30 – 32), a gentle chastisement of the singular focus upon the 
prwtagwnisth/j in the Gospel of Mark, whose shift to the margin may foreground 
both the plot, and more significantly, the central tragic action of the Gospel. 
 
Aristotle, perhaps overhearing Thucydides, draws a distinction between playwrights 
and historians: the former are the purveyors of the imaginative art of probability, 
whilst the latter deal with actuality.   The remit of the te/xnh of the dramatist permits 
of that „probability or necessity‟ which allows the universally recognizable (kaqo/lou, 
1451b 7) words or gestures that a character in such a similar situation would utter or 
enact, rather than the factual circumstances and actions of, for example, Alcibiades 
(o3ti ou0 to\ ta\ geno/mena le/gein, tou=to poihtou= e1rgon e0sti/n, a0ll‟ oi[a a2n 
ge/noito kai\ ta\ dunata\ kata\ to\ ei0ko\j h2 to\ a0nagkai=on … ti/  0Alkibia/dhj 
e1pracen h2 ti/ e1paqen, 1451a 36 – 38; 1451b 11),71 and the stock of traditional stories, 
which most often inform dramatic works, is not necessarily their essential material 
(w3st‟ ou0 pa/ntwj ei]nai zhthte/on tw=n paradedome/nwn mu/qwn, 1451b 23 – 24).72   
And, in contrast to the lyric poets, the playwright, who is practising the dramatic craft, 
focuses upon the mimetic nature of his own te/xnh, which is to make plots that 
involve an enactive mode (dh=lon ou]n e0k tou/twn o3ti to\n poihth\n ma=llon tw=n 
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 Halliwell (1986: 284) endeavours to elevate Aristotle‟s poetic intentions, by “attributing to it the 
power to dramatize general truths about human actions,” which invokes “the spectator‟s possibility to 
reflect upon and to lead himself inductively to something beyond empirical data” (Tsitsiridis, 2005: 
446).  
72
 Croally (2005: 67) notes four exceptions, three of which (The Phoenician Women, The Capture of 
Miletus by Phrynichus, and The Persians by Aeschylus) were based on current events, whilst one was 
entirely fictional (The Antheus by Agathon, which, as Aristotle notes, in spite of this, remains 
pleasurable, Poetics, 1451b 21 – 23). 
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mu/qwn ei]nai dei= poihth\n h2 tw=n me/trwn, o3sw| poihth\j kata\ th\n mimhsi/n e0stin, 
mimei=tai de\ ta\j pra/ceij, 1451b 27 – 29).73    
 
But whether the plots rely on the tradition or are more innovative, Aristotle finds them 
written either without due concern for their episodic concatenation by indifferent 
playwrights, or, in order to display the actors by good poets (poiou=ntai u9po\ me\n tw=n 
fau/lwn poihtw=n di‟ au0tou/j,  u9po\ de\ tw=n a0gaqw=n dia\ tou\j u9pokrita/j, 1451b 
36 – 37), and he states that successive episodes that fail to cohere to the events of the 
drama (ai9 e0peisodiw/deij ei0si\n xei/ristai:   le/gw d‟ e0peisodiw/dh mu=qon e0n w[| ta\ 
e0peiso/dia met‟ a1llhla ou1t‟ ei0ko\j ou1t‟ a0na/gkh ei]nai, 1451b 34 – 35), should be 
avoided.   Proleptically, it would not be unobserved that if the necessary tragic 
concision is to be envisaged in a rendering of the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian 
tragedy, then ruthless editing may be required.   The speeches of the characters and 
the dialogic exchanges between the characters constitute an episode, which, in 
Halleran‟s (2005: 168) analysis, may fall on a spectrum comprising forty lines to over 
six hundred lines, with an average episode forming about two-hundred lines.   
Noteworthy is the framing of episodes, because the exits and entrances of dramatic 
participants permit controversial, even contradictory, viewpoints to be asserted, as 
well as dramatic deception to be aired; whilst the a0gw/n, the formal dispute, 
simultaneously exhibits contrary opinions, and also anticipates Markan exchanges (for 
example, Hippolytus by Euripides, ll. 902ff.; also, Frogs, above, ll. 905ff.). 
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 “Aristoteles … stel dit baie ekplisiet dat die digter die maker/skepper … van plots en nie van verse 
moet wees,” and that “Die primêre taak van die digter is dus die strukturering van die gebeure tot ŉ 
plot” (De Kock and Cilliers, 1991: 160).  
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In the transition of fortune, simple plots unfold without reversal or recognition, like 
the Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus, whilst intricate plots contain one or both (a1neu 
peripetei/aj h2 a0nagnwrismou= h9 meta/basij gi/netai, peplegme/nhn de e0c h[j meta\ 
a0nagnwrismou= h2 peripetei/aj h2 a0mfoi=n h9 meta/basi/j e0stin, 1452a 15 – 18), 
which ought to emerge from the coherent plot construction (tau=ta de\ dei= gi/nesqai 
e0c au0th=j th=j susta/sewj tou= mu/qou, 1452a 18 – 19), like Oedipus Tyrannos by 
Sophocles. 
 
A reversal is evident when the current flow of events is changed and, subsequently, 
progresses in the opposite direction ( 1Esti de\ peripe/teia me\n h9 ei0j to\ e0nanti/on 
tw=n prattome/nwn metabolh\, 1452a 22 – 23), and recognition entails the transition 
from ignorance to knowledge (a0nagnw/risij … e0c a0gnoi/aj ei0j gnw=sin metabolh/, 
1452a 29 – 31), whilst the simultaneous occurrence of both is best (kalli/sth de\ 
a0nagnw/risij, o3tan a3ma peripetei/a| ge/nhtai, 1452a 32 – 33).   Accompanying 
these transitions are destructive and painful events which cause suffering (pa/qoj de/ 
e0sti pra=cij fqartikh\ h2 o0dunhra/, 1452b 11 – 12).   This reference to distress may 
be linked to the heightened experience of e1leoj and fo/boj, since “reversal and 
recognition set the transformation in stark relief” (Halliwell, 1986: 172), and the 
identification of this moment, or these moments, is pivotal to subjecting the Gospel of 
Mark to Aristotelian protocols.     
 
Common to all tragedies (koina\ me\n a9pa/ntwn tau=ta, 1452b 17 – 18) are the 
following sections: the prologue (pro/logoj, 1452b 16), which occurs prior to the 
entrance of the chorus, the episode (e0peiso/dion, 1452b 16), which is between two 
complete choral parts (metacu\ o3lwn xorikw=n melw=n, 1452b 20 – 21), the exit 
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(e1codoj, 1452b 16), which concludes the work, and various choral parts (xoriko/n, 
1452b 16), which include the parodos, the first complete statement of the chorus 
(xorikou= de\ pa/rodoj me\n h9 prw/th le/cij o3lh xorou=, 1452b 22 – 23), and the 
stasimon, which is sung by the chorus, but does not employ anapaests or trochees 
(sta/simon de\ me/loj xorou= to\ a1neu a0napai/stou kai\ troxai/ou, 1452b 23 – 24).   
The antiphonal kommos is a dirge taken up by the chorus (on the orchestra) and by 
those on stage (the actors) (kommo\j de\ qrh=noj koino\j xorou= kai\ a0po\ skhnh=j, 
1452b 24 – 25).   But these songs for the players and the antiphonal threnodies are 
unique only to some tragedies (i1dia de\ ta\ a0po\ th=j skhnh=j kai\ kommoi/, 1452b 18). 
       
Next, plot, character, and the effect of the tragedy receive Aristotle‟s attention.   An 
intricate plot is the best (th\n su/nqesin ei]nai th=j kalli/sthj tragw|di/aj mh\ a9plh=n 
a0lla\ peplegme/nhn, 1452b 31 – 32), and should display fearful and pitiable events, 
which, significantly, as the discourse is specified more finely, is the unique and 
peculiar feature of this kind of mimesis (tau/thn foberw=n kai\ e0leeinw=n ei]nai 
mimhtikh/n (tou=to ga\r i1dion th=j toiau/thj mimh/sew/j e0stin), 1452b 32 – 33).   The 
prwtagwnisth/j plays a character who should not be distinctive in virtue or 
exceedingly righteous, and it seems that Aristotle prefers that the trials and 
misfortunes of the principle character should not result from a personally intentioned 
act of evil or wickedness (e1sti de\ toiou=toj o9 mh/te a0reth=| diafe/rwn kai\ 
dikaiosu/nh| mh/te dia\ kaki/an kai\ moxqhri/an metaba/llwn ei0j th\n dustuxi/an, 
1453a 7 – 9), but be the effect of some, almost congenital, or, at least, imposed, fault 
or error (a0lla\ di‟ a9marti/an tina/, 1453a 9 – 10).   Whilst the issue of legal 
culpability was not absent from the perennially forensic Athenian community; 
nevertheless, the notion of limited liability owing to a fault of nature, of 
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uncontrollable circumstances, or, what MacIntyre (1981: 163) calls, “a flaw in 
practical intelligence which springs from inadequate possession or exercise of some 
virtue,” is evident in the Encomium to Helen.   Halliwell‟s (1986: 146) initial 
resistance to foregrounding more rigorously the divide between pra=cij and mu=qoj, 
and his conviction of an 
 
agent-centred perspective within which dramatic poetry is seen in the treatise: 
it is the agents themselves who are the prime causative force in the action of 
the play; it is they who direct, or through the failures of action for which 
hamartia stands, misdirect, the development of events which gives the plot its 
structure and unity, 
 
once again, is mitigated somewhat later, when, closer to MacIntyre (1981: 163) 
above, Halliwell (2005: 404) states that “„a great hamartia‟ will encompass various 
kinds of scenario in which limitations of human agency – limitations of knowledge or 
ethical judgement – lead ... to pitifully far-reaching consequences.”
74
   It must be 
conceded, however, that, in the earlier work, Halliwell (1986: 215 – 222) does admit 
that hamartia is not a „settled term‟ in the Poetics, again, an allusion which attends 
upon a Foucauldian archaeological excavation of the formation of discourses, but, of 
more importance to the internal development and coherence of the discursive 
regularity within the Poetics is his allusion to the emotional aspect of the perception 
of a fault and the subsequent fall of the prwtagwnisth/j, an impact upon the 
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 The distinction between the Poetics and Aristotle‟s other works, which has been suggested, may be 
evident in the notion of character in the Nicomachean Ethics, where there is full responsibility “for the 
character we develop,” whose acts are voluntary when “the moving principle of the action must be in 
the agent and not extend to him” and “the action must not be done in ignorance of particulars” (Orr, 
2006: 68, 74 & 76).   In the Poetics, the character rather more „suffers‟ or „undergoes‟ (pa/sxein), 
actions which have personal consequences. 
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emotions, which, for Aristotle, is central to the theatrical experience of the readers or 
spectators. 
     
Although Euripides may err in other areas, he is hailed by Aristotle as the most tragic 
of playwrights, because his plays follow a single trajectory (o9 Euripi/dhj, ei0 kai\ ta\ 
a1lla mh\ eu] oi0konomei=, a0lla\ tragikw/tato/j ge tw=n poihtw=n fai/netai, 1453a 
28 – 30), which, for Aristotle, is most fitting (a0na/gkh a1ra to\n kalw=j e1xonta 
mu=qon a9plou=n ei]nai, 1453a 12 – 13).   From positions of wealth, honour, acclaim, 
the prwtagwnisth/j descends into poverty, rejection, and shame, but, again, not 
through personal, almost willed, acts of wickedness, but, perhaps, one could suggest, 
through significant „systemic‟ failures or faults (e0c eu0tuxi/aj ei0j dustuxi/an mh\ dia\ 
moxqhri/an a0lla\ di‟ a9marti/an mega/lhn, 1453a 15 – 16). 
  
Whilst Aristotle admits that theatrical spectacle can engender fear and pity ( 1Estin 
me\n ou]n to\ fobero\n kai\ e0leeino\n e0k th=j o1yewj gi/gnesqai, 1453b1 – 2), he avers 
not only that this experience can be engendered from the compositional arrangement 
and ordering of the events (e1stin de\ kai\ e0c au0th=j th=j susta/sewj tw=n 
pragma/twn, 1453b 2 – 3), but that the latter is the manner in which the superior 
playwright achieves these effects.   Thus, when merely listening to the dramatic 
events as they unfold, but without the aid of special visual effects, the hearer would 
shudder and experience sorrow (a1neu tou= o9ra=n … to\n a0kou/onta ta\ pra/gmata 
gino/mena kai\ fri/ttein kai\ e0leei=n, 1453b 4 – 5).   Aristotle emphasizes that the 
requisite emotions of the dramatic tragic experience, namely, those of pity and fear, 
must be embedded in the mimetic events (th\n a0po\ e0le/ou kai\ fo/bou dia\ mimh/sewj 
dei= h9donh\n paraskeua/zein to\n poihth/n, fanero\n w9j tou=to e0n toi=j pra/gmasin 
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e0mpoihte/on, 1453b 12 – 14), and that the inclusion of sensational theatrics provides 
the kind of pleasure incommensurate to tragedies (oi9 de\ mh\ to\ fobero\n dia\ th=j 
o1yewj a0lla\ to\ teratw=dej mo/non paraskeua/zontej ou0de\n tragw|di/a| 
koinwnou=sin:   ou0 ga\r pa=san dei= zhtei=n h9donh\n a0po\ tragw|di/aj, 1453b 8 – 11).    
 
These notions of fault, fall, and emotional identification impel an agitated momentary 
decent into the problematics of ka/qarsij and its relation to pity and fear.   In the 
Politics (1341b 37 – 40), Aristotle‟s reflection on the benefits of music adverts to the 
Poetics, when he lists them as paidei/aj e3neken kai\ kaqa/rsewj – ti/ de\ le/gomen th\n 
ka/qarsin, nu=n me\n a9plw=j, pa/lin d‟ e0n toi=j peri\ poihtikh=j e0rou=men safe/steron 
– tri/ton de\ pro\j diagwgh\n, but the latter work provides little assistance. 
 
Halliwell‟s (1986: 350 - 356) helpful appendix on this topic supplements his assertion 
that the emotions are affected and “changed” in some way by “a conscious, cognitive 
experience of a work of mimetic art” (Halliwell, 1986: 199 & 200), through which an 
imaginative act of recognition is stimulated (Halliwell, 1986: 182).   The cognitive 
dimension is appropriated by Belfiore (1992), whose later inquiry returns to the 
Rhetoric, and commences with the fearful sensation, by stating that “tragedy, like 
rhetoric, arouses fear by leading us to understand that we, like others, are „such as to 
suffer‟ (toioutoi/ ei0sin oi[oi paqei/n, Rhet. 1383 a 8 – 12)” (Belfiore 1992: 246; 
emphasis added).   Pity is felt both because the spectator and the tragic character are 
fellow sufferers,
75
 and because the a9marti/a that afflicts the tragic character causes a 
suffering that is undeserved.   The Aristotelian concept of medical ka/qarsij, through 
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 The reference to this notion is evident, when Bloom (1987: 108), writing of the “sexual revolution” 
and the influence of Feminism on university campuses in the USA, notes: “Aristotle teaches that pity 
for the plight of others requires that the same thing could happen to us.   Now, however, the same 
things that used to happen to people, at least in the relations between the sexes, do not happen to 
students anymore.”  
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which the body expels that which prevents normative functioning, is also invoked 
(Belfiore, 1992: 299 – 300), but, where Golden (1992: 37) asserts that the medical 
analogy is incomplete, it may be better perceived as the manner in which terms are 
appropriated by incipient discourses, and both retain their semantic links to the former 
field initially, and then generate their own, less erstwhile traceable semantic 
connections.
76
   In tragedy, the purgative means in medicine is appropriated by this 
emerging dramatic lexicon, and is transformed into an awareness and intellectual 
cognition of the reasons for the experiences of pity and fear, of recognizing and 
apprehending the consequences of active choices and passive events (Halliwell, 1986: 
76 – 77).   Thus, tragic ka/qarsij suggests a cognitive, epistemic act that focuses the 
emotions, and, most significantly, nucleates them in the meta/basij; and then, in the 
subsequent unfolding of the mu=qoj, realigns, re-orders, and „purifies‟ them of their 
menace, disempowering them through a ka/qarsij that restores the equilibrium of the 
spectator, or, in Frede‟s (1996: 246) reading of Plato‟s Sophist, engenders “a 
harmonious order ... [when] ... all the soul‟s inventory is straightened out.”
77
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 The porous and unstable nature of discourses, in spite of formidable attempts restrict them, is evident 
in Craik‟s (2006) counter reading of the majoritarian view that Aristotle drew upon medical ka/qarsij, 
since “there is evidence to suggest rather that medical theorists themselves were airing ideas of mind-
body interaction or parallel action” and that the “Poetics – and with it the parallel discussion in Politics 
– may be seen as a considered contribution to ongoing medical debates ... on corollaries in the 
functioning of mind and body” (Craik, 2006: 293 & 297).   This important perspective is noted later 
(see n. 95).     
77
 Something of the troublesome centrality of ka/qarsij in the Poetics and its role in the interpretation 
of the genre of tragedy may be observed in the following references: 
 The perception of ka/qarsij in Crisis and Catharsis: the Power of the Apocalypse is similar to that of 
Frede (1996), as Yarbro Collins (1984: 152) notes, “There is a certain analogy between Aristotle‟s 
explanation of the function of Greek tragedy and the function of Revelation.   In each case certain 
emotions are aroused and then a catharsis of those emotions is achieved.   Tragedy manipulates the 
emotions of fear and pity; Revelation primarily fear and resentment.   Aristotle‟s term „catharsis‟ is a 
medical metaphor.   In the medical sense it refers to the removal from the body of alien matter that is 
painful and the restoration of the system to its normal state.   The relation between this medical sense 
and Aristotle‟s application of the term to tragedy has been much debated.   He does not appear to have 
meant that the emotions of pity and fear are removed by tragedy, but only that their painful or 
disquieting elements are removed.   Fear and pity in daily life can be disquieting for at least two 
reasons.   Such feelings are very often inarticulate, vague, and thus difficult to deal with.   Also, they 
relate to people and events that are very close to home and thus especially threatening.   This 
threatening character applies also to pity in Aristotle‟s understanding: we pity others where under like 
circumstances we would fear for ourselves.   The emotions of the audience are purged in the sense that 
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Examining Racine through Aristotelian lenses, Goodkin‟s (1991: 171) observation, 
noted above, concerning the “tragic hero” of the Poetics as “„in between,‟ that is, in 
the middle between good and evil” provides some tangential assistance to the notion 
of ka/qarsij explored here, since “[t]he exclusion of the hero leads to the 
establishment of tragic magnitude.   It gives the hero a newly established value, a 
majesty in suffering which makes him purely other.   His exclusion leads the audience 
back to „prudence‟ ...”   It is the „otherness‟ and „sameness‟ of tragedy, which is vital 
                                                                                                                                            
their feelings of fear and pity are intensified and given objective expression.   The feelings are thus 
brought to consciousness and become less threatening.” 
De Kock and Cilliers (1991: 131 – 132) also first highlight the „medical interpretation‟ of katharsis, 
which, subsequently, informs the „moral interpretation.‟   In the former, the emotions are stimulated by 
“ŉ homeopatiese proses;” whilst, in the latter, “die emosies deur die proses van katarsis gestimuleer 
word, indirek die bonus mee dat hulle geoefen en versterk word en deur gewenning nader aan die 
korrekte norm gebring word.” 
Halliwell (2005: 404 – 405) emphasizes the pleasure of tragic ka/qarsij, but it is a pleasure of both 
identification and differentiation. 
Leech (1969: 47 – 55) notes various interpretations of ka/qarsij in a fairly cursory manner, he does 
refer to an experience of viewing Lear, with Sir John Gielgud in the eponymous role, at Stratford-
upon-Avon, which is not dissimilar to that suggested above.   In the aftermath of the performance, 
Leech (1969: 50 – 51) recalls his heightened emotional state, which included a sense of recognition and 
knowledge of his identification with the experiences suffered by the central character. 
With reference to the experience of „pity,‟ Taylor‟s (1991: 27) analogy is illustrative of the aspect of 
identification: “Like Greek tragedy, sacrifice is a substitute for the literal dismemberment of the 
individual.   By identifying with the victim, one vicariously experiences the return to intimacy without 
actually dying.” 
Scruton (1994: 349), writing of “imaginary worlds,” suggests that “it seems that we can feel towards 
these fictitious scenes a version of the emotions that animate our real existence.   We feel sympathy for 
the tragic character, and Aristotle assimilated this sympathy to pity and fear.”   But, contrary to 
asserting their extended impact, Scruton (1994: 349) continues: “Yet – because the objects of these 
emotions are not only unreal but known to be so – we are not motivated to act as we normally should 
act.   We do not rush on to the stage to make common cause with the beleaguered hero.   On the 
contrary, we relax into our emotions, and live for a while on a plane of untroubled sympathy, laughing 
and crying without the slightest moral or physical cost.”   In contrast, appropriating ka/qarsij for his 
own purpose in a somewhat compressed and tangential manner, Mayne (1998: 104) states: “The 
earliest Greek drama had recognized both its moral and psychological role.   Great men who showed a 
self-confident contempt for a divine moral order, and their proper place within it, demonstrated the 
flaw of hubris.   They had to be punished.   That aroused in the audience a healthy pity and terror, what 
Aristotle in his Poetics describes as that purging of strong emotion in the process known as catharsis.”   
The notion of ka/qarsij as “restoration” was not foreign to Plato (Sedley, 1996: 102), nor was both the 
“sensual” and “intellectual” components of a pleasurable experience (Frede, 1996: 234, n. 27). 
Walker (2000: 77) adds the caveat that paqhma/twn (1449b 28) ought not to exclude the agonies and 
torments endured by the characters in the plot, because it “can mean „experiences‟ or „sufferings,‟ or 
„emotional things,‟ and thus can refer to the tragic events portrayed on stage; but can also mean 
„emotional conditions‟ or states of mind and thus can refer to the pity and fear felt by the audience, and 
this variance makes elusive the specific meaning of katharsis in the Poetics,” thus engendering the 
possibility of evaluating their katharsis within the mimetic world. 
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to the dramatic katharsis, and which also invokes a tragic vocation for the Gospel of 
Mark.    
         
The obscure, almost non-culpable, nature of that fault line, the a9marti/a, is evident in 
the tragic character, which, for Aristotle, should be moral, and display these attributes 
in good intentional choices in word and deed (e4n me\n kai\ prw=ton, o3pwj xrhsta\ h|] 
... fanero\n o9 lo/goj h2 h9 pra=cij proai/resi/n tina ... h]| ... deu/teron de\ to\ 
a9rmo/ttonta, 1454a 16 – 19; 22).   But the characterization must also ostend a 
fidelity to real experience (tri/ton de\ to\ o3moion, 1454a 24),78 and the character must 
maintain a recognizable consistency for the duration of the drama (te/tarton de\ to\ 
o9malo/n, 1454a 26).79   The intentionality of choice, invoked by the word, 
proai/resij, is emphasized by Halliwell (1986: 151), but the deliberative aspect 
present in this word remains subservient to the pra=cij,80 and, indeed, as noted above, 
by the tragic notion of a9marti/a, thereby limiting Aristotle‟s concept of 
characterization, as Halliwell (1986: 164) admits.   The emphasis, expectedly, is, as 
Aristotle notes, upon decided utterances and consequent external actions rather than 
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 Halliwell‟s (1995 [1999]: 79) note states: “As the rest of the sentence suggests, likeness in basic 
humanity: cf. „like us‟ at e.g. 48a 5 – 6.”   Here Halliwell (1995 [1999]) follows Else (1967: 460, 461 
& 478), although, in contrast, the latter seeks clarity by referring to 1454b 8 – 14, which, as Else (1967: 
480) admits, presents its own difficulties.   Else (1967: 481 – 482) conjectures, a conjecture that 
importantly retains the didactic dimension of dramatic instruction and is highlighted in the “discussion 
of terms” below (esp. i; & iv & v), that Aristotle begins by contrasting tragic and comedic 
characterization and, therefore, elevates the former over the latter, but he also requires a degree of 
identification between spectator and character and, therefore, the character must be “like us,” as well as 
requiring a „universal‟ dimension.        
79
 This impacts upon gestures and words, since “Speech is a product of the body: producing breath 
involves the whole body and formations of the mouth may instinctively be echoed by other parts of the 
body.   This corporeality of the spoken or sung word tends to be forgotten in a culture of the book, and 
it is symptomatic that discussion of embodiment has virtually vanished from academic discussion of 
drama in translation” (Harrop & Wiles, 2008: 62) 
80
 MacIntyre (2006: 74) notes that, for Aristotle, deliberation “is about means and not about ends.   
When we deliberate about what means to adopt in order to achieve some end, we take for granted, for 
the moment at least, that this particular end should be our end, that it is the good to be pursued by me 
or by us here and now.”   In a similar manner, the action of a dramatic work already has prescribed the 
end, and the choices made by the characters, which are exhibited in their words and deeds, are 
subservient to the pra=cij, as are those of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark.     
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upon internal states of equivocal deliberation.   The issue of the identifiable 
consistency and coherence of characterization leads Aristotle to broaden his purview 
momentarily.   Thus, he notes that the dénouements of plots must proceed from, and 
correspond to, the plots (ta\j lu/seij tw=n mu/qwn e0c au0tou= dei= tou= mu/qou 
sumbai/nein, 1454a 37 – 1454b 1), whilst informative anaphoric or proleptic events or 
announcements may be displayed by means of mechanical devices (mhxanh=| 
xrhste/on e0pi\ ta\ e1cw tou= dra/matoj, 1454b 2 – 3).   Events internal to the drama, 
however, must remain reasonable and plausible (a1logon de\ mhde\n ei]nai e0n toi=j 
pra/gmasin, ei0 de\ mh/, e1cw th=j tragw|di/aj, 1454b 6 – 7). 
 
The transition from ignorance to knowledge, that sudden recognition of the reason for 
the situation of the drama, may occur through a sign, which is the least skilled manner 
(prw/th me\n h9 a0texnota/th kai\ h[| plei/sth| xrw=ntai di‟ a0pori/an, h9 dia\ tw=n 
shmei/wn, 1454b 20 – 21), through a fabricated situation or event (ai9 pepoihme/nai 
u9po\ tou= poihtou=, 1454b 30 – 31), through triggering the memory by means of some 
sensory perception (dia\ mnh/mhj tw|= ai0sqe/sqai ti i0do/nta, 1454b 37 – 38), or 
through the inferences of the reason (h9 e0k sullogismou=, 1455a 4), and perhaps the 
first two are perceptible initially in the meta/basij in the Gospel of Mark.   In 
addition, and without insignificance to the blindness and insight of the participants in 
the drama of Mark, is composite recognition (e1stin de/ tij kai\ sunqeth\ e0k 
paralogismou= tou= qea/trou, 1455a 12 – 13), in which deception is evident between 
the character and his actions.   Yet, in Aristotle‟s view, the superior way in which the 
turning-point of the action is comprehended occurs when the events themselves 
generate awareness and recognition (pasw=n de\ belti/sth a0nagnw/risij h9 e0c au0tw=n 
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tw=n pragma/twn, 1455a 16 – 17), a matter not without import in reflecting both 
upon the mu=qoj and the pra=cij of a drama. 
 
The performative nature of poetic composition resurfaces when Aristotle refers to the 
collocation of the plots and their supplementation with apposite dialogue.   Whilst 
considerable dispute remains – here, as with the other terms, the discourse of 
Aristotelian dramatic theory remains porous – Aristotle seems to suggest that the act 
of playwriting ought to be undertaken through a creative act of visual „seeing‟ (Dei= de\ 
tou\j mu/qouj sunista/nai kai\ th=| le/cei sunaperga/zesqai o3ti ma/lista pro\ 
o0mma/twn tiqe/menon, 1455a 22 – 23).   Imaginative construction, as if present at a 
performance (ou3tw ga\r a2n e0narge/stata [o9] o9rw=n w3sper par‟ au0toi=j 
gigno/menoj toi=j prattome/noij, 1455a 23 – 25), enables the playwright to observe, 
and to discriminate between, the appropriate and the contradictory (eu9ri/skoi to\ 
pre/pon kai\ h3kista a2n lanqa/noi [to\] ta\ u9penanti/a, 1455a 25 – 26).   Gestural 
and emotional identification – whether literal, displaced, or imaginative – is also 
required of the dramatist (o3sa de\ dunato\n kai\ toi=j sxh/masin sunapergazo/menon:   
piqanw/tatoi ga\r a0po\ th=j au0th=j fu/sewj oi9 e0n toi=j pa/qesi/n ei0sin, kai\ 
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 Although it is remains contested amongst scholars of the Poetics, one suggests that the performative 
nature of dramatic works is evident in this section, and to place the events “before one‟s eyes … as if 
being at the events themselves” (pro\ o0mma/twn … w3sper par‟ au0toi=j gigno/menoj toi=j 
prattome/noij) means that the playwright ought to envisage his work being performed, in order to 
discover what may be fitting (eu9ri/skoi to\ pre/pon) and to note the contradictions.   Thus, McLeish‟s 
(1998: 24) translation: “So far as possible, they should act out what they are writing, even down to the 
characters‟ movements and gestures.”   Thus, Harrop and Wiles (2008: 51) state forthrightly that “In 
his advice to the playwright about the process of working out lexis or language, Aristotle argues three 
things: (1) the writer should place the scene before his eyes; (2) he should as far as he can work out the 
schemata or „gestures;‟ and (3) he should feel the emotions of the play.”   In “Notes on Seeing and 
Hearing Shakespeare‟s Plays in South Africa,” Professor Guy Butler (1994: 18) exceeds Aristotle‟s 
balance of reading and viewing drama, but his bold viewpoint is worth stating: “Performance – the 
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When the whole outline of the play has been envisioned, the episodic sequence is to 
be established (dei= kai\ au0to\n poiou=nta e0kti/qesqai kaqo/lou, ei]q‟ ou3twj 
e0peisodiou=n kai\ paratei/nein, 1455b 1 – 2), which, it is suggested in the subsequent 
chapter, would involve re-ordering the sequence in the Gospel of Mark for the 
scripting of an Aristotelian dramatic Mark.   Then the choice of the names of the 
characters is made, and the expansion of the outline for the harmonious insertion of 
the episodes, which must be appropriate, brief and focused (u9poqe/nta ta\ o0no/mata 
e0peisodiou=n:   o3pwj de\ e1stai oi0kei=a ta\ e0peiso/dia ... e0n me\n ou]n toi=j dra/masin 
ta\ e0peiso/dia su/ntoma, 1455b 12 – 13; 15 – 16)82 is undertaken, and which, it is 
proposed, in tragic Mark, should involve excisions. 
 
For Aristotle, every tragedy contains both a predicament and a resolution ( 1Esti de\ 
pa/shj tragw|di/aj to\ me\n de/sij to\ de\ lu/sij, 1455b 24).   The former may inform 
the play either from outside or from within the possible world of the drama (ta\ me\n 
e1cwqen kai\ e1nia tw=n e1swqen polla/kij h9 de/sij, 1455b 24 – 25), and it dominates 
the action until the final moment before the transition of fortune (le/gw de\ de/sin me\n 
ei]nai th\n a0p‟ a0rxh=j me/xri tou/tou tou= me/rouj o4 e1sxato/n e0stin e0c ou[ 
metabai/nei ei0j eu0tuxi/an h2 ei0j a0tuxi/an, 1455b 26 – 28), which the rest of the play 
then resolves (to\ de\ loipo\n h9 lu/sij, 1455b 25 – 26), which coheres with a dilemma 
                                                                                                                                            
direct appeal to eye and ear – unlocks and liberates emotions and meanings barely discernible in the 
printed text and the date directions of a play script.” 
82
 Episodic coherence is linked to the kathartic function of drama, as Finkelberg (2006: 64) notes: “... 
the episodic plot breaks the dramatic illusion, prevents the spectator‟s or the reader‟s identification with 
the characters, and thus precludes tragedy from fulfilling its edifying function.   To put it in modern 
terms, the episodic plot creates what is sometimes called „emotional distancing.‟   In that it forces the 
spectator or the reader to become estranged from the fictional action, such emotional distancing 
encourages the audience to retain its critical judgement vis-à-vis the dramatic illusion.”   This reflective 
space, however, is pertinent to emotional commitment and participation in the drama of the Gospel of 
Mark.      
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in Mark of „following‟ the cause of Jesus, and the transitional moment of recognizing 
the cost of discipleship. 
 
Of some significance is Aristotle‟s brief reference to the chorus, which ought to 
assume the role of one of the actors, and be a constituent part of the whole drama (kai\ 
to\n xoro\n de\ e3na dei= u9polamba/nein tw=n u9pokritw=n, kai\ mo/rion ei]nai tou= o3lou 
kai\ sunagwni/zesqai, 1456a 25 – 27).   Although Else (1967: 552) notes that “The 
passage is famous, mainly because it is the only one in the entire Poetics where 
Aristotle has even this much to say about the chorus;” nevertheless, it may be inferred 
that, for Aristotle, the chorus may be said to form “not only a collective character 
standing in a defined relation to the other characters of the drama, but also an 
intermediary between the world of the play and the audience whose perspective it 
helps to shape” (Burian, 1997: 198).   But the evidence for choric definitional roles, 
for example, inter alia, as “empirical readers / spectators,” abstract philosophers, the 
authorial voice, or the community‟s perspective, is ambiguous, as Battezzato (2005: 
154 – 155) demonstrates; and whilst, on the one hand, David (2006: 256 – 257) 
implies that Aristotle‟s relative silence on the chorus may be owing to its inextricable 
and provenential association with tragedy; on the other hand, Halliwell (1986: 250 – 
251) implies that the attempt to define tragic poetry led Aristotle to distance lyric 
aspects from his emphasis on action and plot.   The extant dramatic texts suggest not 
only choric implicature in a discourse on the poetics of drama, but also a residual lack 
of concerted discursive traction, owing to the spectrum of distal or proximate choral 
involvement in tragic plots.   The Gospel of Mark provides fertile possibilities for a 
dramatic chorus, and the manner in which choral comment and participation is 
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incorporated in tragic Mark is significant both to the recasting of this gospel as 
Aristotelian drama, as well as to its production arenae and potential actors. 
 
The creative writing of the speeches and the dialogue, and the communication of 
intention and purpose, are amongst Aristotle‟s remaining concerns (loipo\n de\ peri\ 
le/cewj kai\ dianoi/aj ei0pei=n, 1456a 33 – 34).   Although Aristotle states that the 
latter is more relevant to his work on rhetoric (ta\ me\n ou]n peri\ th\n dia/noian e0n 
toi=j peri\ r9htorikh=j kei/sqw, 1456a 34 – 35), nevertheless, he does insist here that 
intention deliberately must be conveyed by the emotional tenor of the utterance (to\ 
pa/qh paraskeua/zein, 1456a 38), and must also be evident in the actions, but, in the 
latter instance, without speech (e0n toi=j pra/gmasin ... ta\ me\n dei= fai/nesqai a1neu 
didaskali/aj, 1456b 2; 5).83   Excellence in the speeches and the dialogue demands 
clarity and the avoidance of a prosaic text (Le/cewj de\ a0reth\ safh= kai\ mh\ tapeinh\n 
ei]nai, 1458a 18).   The employment of foreign words, metaphors, embellishments, 
neologisms, and modified words together with vernacular terms and quotidian 
language in a generally acceptable proportion (to\ de\ me/tron koino\n a9pa/ntwn, 
1458b 12), produces a skilful, entertaining, and intelligible play (to\ me\n ga\r to\ mh\ 
i0diwtiko\n poih/sei mhde\ tapeino/n … to\ de\ ku/rion th\n safh/neian, 1458a 31 – 34).   
The single most important language form that enriches a drama is metaphor, and 
where it is present, a naturally gifted dramatist in present (polu\ de\ me/giston to\ 
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 The following comments are helpful.   Whilst De Kock and Cilliers (1991: 242) explain this passage 
in terms of the speeches: “… dieselfde beginsels … wat die digter moes gebruik om in toesprake die 
beoogde effek te verkry, ook vir die handelingskomposisie geld;” Hutton (1982: 65) refers to both 
speech and action: “Obviously, in their actions as well as in their utterances, the personages will 
employ Thought … the only difference being that the acts must make their impression immediately, 
without verbal explanation.” 
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metaforiko\n ei]nai.   mo/non ga\r tou=to ou1te par‟ a1llou e1sti labei=n eu0fui5aj te 
shmei=o/n e0sti, 1459a 5 – 7).84    
 
Aristotle‟s more exacting comparative reading of metaphor
85
 –  here are Foucault‟s 
(1969: 58) “grilles de spécification” closing down definitional latitude – which 
includes simile, does, nevertheless, connote the interactive transference of language 
images, rather than merely proffer a process of substitutionary naming (Thiselton, 
1992: 353; Stewart, 1988, 144 & 147; Madison, 1988: 194 n. 39; Kennedy, 1991: 222 
n. 25, 246 n. 120), since it is the “bringing to of an alien or foreign name” (metafora\ 
de\ e0stin o0no/matoj a0llotri/ou e0pifora/, 1457b 6 – 7, emphasis added), or the 
application of a term from a source domain to a target domain.   The enticing, almost 
alchemical, quality of this trope is emphasized by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, where he 
states that “metaphor, especially, has clarity, pleasantness, and strangeness, and 
cannot be learned from another person” (kai\ to\ safe\j kai\ to\ h9du\ kai\ to\ ceniko\n 
e1xei ma/lista h9 metafora/, kai\ labei=n ou0k e1stin au0th\n par‟ a1llou, 1405a 8 – 
10).   In this sense, metaphor extends an invitation for an enhanced and pleasurable 
perspicacity which estranges,
86
 and, arguably, or perhaps more boldly, palpably, 
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 The ability of the poet is measured by his choice of metaphors, since they should be a0po\ kalw=n h2 
th=| fwnh=| h2 th=| duna/mei h2 th=| o1yei h2 a1llh| tini\ ai0sqh/sei.   diafe/rei d‟ ei0pei=n, oi[on r9ododa/ktuloj 
h0w\j ma=llon h2 foinikoda/ktuloj, h2 e1ti faulo/teron e0ruqroda/ktuloj, Rhetoric, 1405b 17 – 20. 
85
 Recent research has widened the scope of the influence of metaphor in human cognition and 
interaction and, for example, has produced fertile readings of New Testament texts, see Wanamaker 
(2005).   Although “three components of his [Aristotle‟s] explanation have influenced metaphorical 
analysis up to the twenty-first century ... [i]n 1936, I.A.Richards first made the argument that metaphor 
was a matter of thought, not just word or language ... [and] ... [c]ontemporary cognitive linguistics 
argues that metaphor is a matter of thinking, not a matter of language ... Metaphor imposes structure on 
thinking, and allows one to reason about, not just talk about, one thing in terms of another” (Descamp, 
2007: 19 – 21).  
86
 The quality of estrangement inherent in metaphors, with its soliciting and unsettling quality, suggests 
an instability of meaning and “enforce the understanding that there are at least two sides to everything” 
(Hansson, 1999: 456).  
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engenders a kathartic re-ordering
87
 and provides more profound insight for those with 
ears to hear and imaginations to quarry.
88
 
          
Finally, in the context of evaluating tragedy against epic, Aristotle notes that an art 
that requires gesture must pay attention to the quality of the performances of the 
actors (ei]ta ou0de\ ki/nhsij a3pasa a0podokimaste/a … a0ll‟ h9 fau/lwn, 1462a 8 – 
9),
89
 since music and theatrical spectacle are not without significance to tragic dramas 
(kai\ e1ti ou0 mikro\n me/roj th\n mousikh/n [kai\ ta\j o1yeij], 1462a 15 – 16).   And yet, 
for Aristotle, the distinct nature of a tragedy ensures that it can be apprehended as an 
experience of the senses and with emotional depth, not simply in performance but also 
by reading it (to\ e0narge\j e1xei kai\ e0n th=| a0nagnw/sei kai\ e0pi\ tw=n e1rgwn, 1462a 17 
– 18), and that tragedy accomplishes its purpose with a concision that makes it 
pleasurable (tw=| e0n e0la/ttoni mh/kei to\ te/loj th=j mimh/sewj ei]nai (to\ ga\r 





                                                 
87
 The confluence of the emotions of pity and fear and the kathartic effect, noted above, suggests an 
affective quality of metaphors, which, perhaps, too often is overlooked, see Sopory (2005).  
88
 Wright‟s (1992: 40) insightful definition of metaphor is worth quoting: “Metaphor consists in 
bringing two sets of ideas close together, close enough for a spark to jump, but not too close, so that the 
spark, in jumping, illuminates for a moment the whole area around, changing perceptions as it does 
so.” 
89
 It remains the contention that the composition of a play ought not to be separated from its realization 
on the stage.   Thus, Halliwell‟s (1995 [1999]: 137 – 139) translation states: “… not all movement (any 
more than all dancing) should be eschewed, but only that of crude performers …,” and De Kock and 
Cilliers (1991: 324) note: “Wat wel veroordeel moet word, is die uitbeelding (deur bewegings) van 
swak karakters.”   Aristotle notes that the reason for the lack of attention to the verbal realization by 
actors of the written text is because u9pekri/nonto ga\r au0toi\ ta\j tragw|di/aj oi9 poihtai\ to\ 
prw=ton, Rhetoric 1403b 24), but one asserts that the emphasis on the experiential dimension in the act 
of dramatic composition is because “Aristotle had rated sight and hearing as the two highest of the five 
senses, both absolutely and in respect of their roles in the service of knowledge” (Turner, 1995: 201). 
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Discussion of terms: 
 
Although some iteration may occur, the Foucauldian perspective on the formation of 
the „discursive regularity‟ of the Poetics, quite probably, ought not to exclude a 
discussion of some of the central and controversial terms within the work, although, 
as has been noted, and as will be observed, the work and its terms, no matter how 
technical they may appear, cannot be hermetically sealed from extraneous positive 
and negative contributory effects.   To this caveat – that of repetition – three others 
need to be added.   First, the nature of this study has ensured the retention of an 
element of „undecidability,‟ of the vulnerability of interpretations, and of their 
semantic slippage.   Thus, in avoiding obturation, an element of obscuration may 
persist.   Second, in consequence and under the weight of too august an interpretive 
heritage, all the proposals are submitted with timidity and apprehension, even when 
this does not appear to be the case, although some may retain a greater degree of 
indeterminacy than others.   Third, and as already argued above, the issue of the 
pra=cij of the Aristotelian tragedy for this reader of the Poetics, not only deserves re-
visiting, but also, as is evident in the various discussions of the terms that follow, 
intrudes upon the other concepts. 
 
(i)   Mimesis: 
 
The Poetics opens with a concentration of the mi/mhsij word group, rising from 1447a 
& b to 1448a, and especially concentrated in 1448b, 1449b, and 1450a.   The semantic 
field of this term is wide, and Halliwell (1995; 1999: 29) most usually transliterates 
the noun form of the word, although occasionally he employs the verb, “represent,” 
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Bywater (1909) regularly uses “imitation,” whilst Lucas (1968: 259) states that “we 
need in different contexts „imitate,‟ „represent,‟ „indicate,‟ „suggest,‟ „express.‟”   It is 
possible that Halliwell‟s (1995; 1999) attempt to avoid ambiguity merely compounds 
it – particularly for readers without Greek – and Lucas‟s (1968) breadth of 
translations obscures the attempt by Aristotle to „grid‟ and „specify‟ the term in a 
Foucauldian sense. 
 
The first appearance of mi/mhsij occurs with reference to e0popoii/a, tragw|di/a, 
kwmw|di/a, and diqurambopoihtikh/ (Poetics, 1447a 13 – 14), which were the “kinds 
of poetry ... most important at this date” (Lucas, 1968: 54).   They, together with 
music for the au0lo/j and the kiqa/ra are referred to as „modes‟ or „kinds‟ of mimesis 
or imitation.
90
   These „modes‟ are distinguished with reference to their media – 
whether that of rhythm, melody, or language, or in some form of combination – the 
objects that are represented, and the varying imitative manner of epic, narrative, and 
drama.   Following some detail and examples on the separation or synthesis of the 
media, the distinction or integration of the mimetic manner of each genre, and the 
types of objects which are represented, Aristotle refers to the genesis of poetry as 
su/mfuton (Poetics, 1448b 5), both in the act of imitation and the pleasure derived 
from the act or the product of mimesis.   The assertion that mimesis is natural to 
human beings, is impacted by the additional statement that ta\j maqh/seij poiei=tai 
dia\ mimh/sewj ta\j prw/taj (Poetics, 1448b 7 – 8), and which may embed a 
foundational notion for Aristotle with reference to poetry, and, particularly, to tragedy 
– Halliwell (1995; 1999: 37) places the phrase from kai\ (Poetics, 1448b 6) to 
                                                 
90
 Bywater (1909: 100) notes that “[i]n actual use the word is wide enough to include the counterfeiting 
of movement and attitude by the dancer, that of voice and sound by the singer and musician, that of the 
forms and colours of things by the sculptor and painter, and even the representation of things in words, 
as in speech and literature.”  
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prw/taj (Poetics, 1448b 8) in parentheses – and may inform his claim for the 
pedagogic ability of dramatic tragedy in a Platonic context that may doubt its 
instructive power.   Thus, mimesis itself embodies an act of learning and generates 
understanding, and mimesis, both as an act of poi/hsij, an activity, and as an act of 
witness, of response, is educative.   One suggests that this notion of mimesis ought to 
be retained as informative of Aristotle‟s conception of dramatic tragedy in the 
Poetics, and that it is this instructive aspect of tragic dramatic ostension that generates 
his “grave inconsistency” (Bywater, 1909: 101), to express it strongly, or his 
“equivocal treatment of epic” (Halliwell, 1986: 128), to express it less strongly, in his 
treatise.   Initially, Homer‟s epics are treated as a mixed manner of mimesis (1448a 20 
– 22), then epic is defined as a dihghmatikh\ / -n mi/mhsi(j) / -(n) (1459b 36 – 37 & 
33), and, ultimately, Homer returns as a dramatist of quality (1460a 9 – 11).   But if 
mimesis is pedagogic, and if “Aristotle‟s guiding notion of mimesis is implicitly that 
of enactment” (Halliwell, 1986: 128), then Homer‟s edifying doctrines may well be 
included in the mimesis of enactment.   And, as a paedeutic means, it is attractive to 
place Aristotle‟s challenge to Plato in more forthright terms and upon the same basis, 
and in the “break-through to a new order of ideas; [where] the artist produces not a 
copy but an idealization of his original” (Lucas, 1968: 264).   But Lucas (1968: 264 – 
265) is decidedly cautious here, and appositely exempts Aristotle‟s endeavour as an 
attempt to procure the Platonic ideal, and rather emphasises the importance of the 
structural coherence of tragic mimesis, which “reveals something about the nature of 
an action under the conditions obtaining in our world” (Lucas, 1968: 266).   But this 
too is educational, since the ordered and synchronized compaction of a fine tragedy, 
as the imitation or mimesis of an action, “reveals something about the nature of an 
action under the conditions obtaining in our world ... [and] ... shows a general truth ... 
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(Lucas, 1968: 266; the added emphasis contains a notion central to the suggested 
pra=cij of the Gospel of Mark in the following chapter), and dio\ kai\ 
filosofw/teron kai\ spoudaio/teron poi/hsij i9stori/aj e0sti/n:   h9 me\n ga\r 
poi/hsij ma=llon ta\ kaqo/lou, h9 d‟ i9stori/a ta\ kaq‟ e3kaston le/gei (Poetics, 1451b 
5 – 7).   The distinctness of this notion is acutely observed by Lucas (1968: 120), 
again, with a direct link to the pra=cij of the Gospel of Mark that is proposed in the 
next chapter: “Events happen in the way they must in the light of what has happened 
before and of human decisions superimposed on the logic of events.   When the 
universal regularities are revealed, events are intelligible,” a perception which, for this 
reader, is linked to the kathartic experience and to the appropriation of the action of a 
tragic drama.   One ought not to pretermit the directive thrust in Halliwell‟s (1986: 
137) balanced statement about the two aspects of mimesis in the Poetics: 
 
Aristotle certainly attached value to mimetic directness and vividness as 
qualities of the modes which mimesis might use to embody its material.   This 
vividness is not, however, an end in itself, but a means to the successful 
communication of mimetic significance; for vividness concerns concrete 
details – actions and characters – which are taken, in their unified presentation, 
to be capable of signifying universals. 
 
But, as is evident in the argument above, this disputed reading amongst interpretive 
readings, in its „misprisions‟ and „anxieties,‟ converges with one of Halliwell‟s (1986: 
137) less reluctant statements, which conclude his treatment of mimesis:      
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The immediacy of the mode of poetic enactment is not required for the sake of 
a deceptive simulation of life, but in order to be the vehicle of a structure of 
meaning which Aristotle believes can nourish the understanding and move the 
emotions with ethical force.   In this way, Aristotle‟s interpretation of mimesis 
perhaps restores to the poet at least something of the possibility of the 
knowledge and wisdom which Greek tradition had always claimed for him, 
but which Plato had been impelled to deny. 
 
More than lambent in the “simulation of life” that is not “deceptive,” but “nourish[es] 
understanding” is the significance of fictional portrayals of truthful universals in 
poetry, which is “a serious achievement with which to credit the poet” (Lucas, 1968: 
120).   Nevertheless, however diligently the interpreter endeavours to demarcate 
mimesis, to foreclose upon it, as, indeed, upon other terms, and, more especially, to 
bind it to enactment, its intercalated dynamic marshals a field of terms, of kathartic 
apprehension and, more particularly, of the notion of “action.”   For, inter alia, 
mimesis, imitation, representation, or expression, repeatedly is linked to pra=cij (for 
example, Poetics, 1449b 24; 36; 1450a 3 – 4; 16 – 17; 1451a 16 – 19; 1462b 11), and 
both in its kathartic dimension as well as in the troublesome and, quite possibly, for 
this reader, technical refinement of “action,” some further exploration is required.       
 
(ii)   Muthos: 
 
But, if it may be argued that Aristotle strives for greater definitional clarity of, or, at 
least, there is a sense of predetermination about, mi/mhsij, for this reader of the 
Poetics, mu=qoj remains a disagreeable term, and, possibly more so than “the 
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appallingly intractable Aristotelian concept of katharsis” (Mossman, 1995: 143, n. 6), 
which, shortly, receives some scrutiny.   More precisely, it is the relation of mu=qoj to 
pra=cij that troubles this reader into proposing – again, it is a suggestion amongst 
suggestions, and it may simply be a Derridean „other reading‟ – that a distinction 
between the two terms is present in the Poetics.   Perhaps it is an inchoate distinction, 
but, nevertheless, where other terms are permitted definitional latitude and a degree of 
imprecision, and inferences are required, so the proposal, which has been noted 
above, that muthos and praxis do not seamlessly converge in Aristotle‟s treatise, at 
least, may be entertained.   The issue of a pra=cij or the pra=cij of a tragic drama has 
been engendered by the previous inquiry into mi/mhsij, but now it is an issue 
contiguous to, or, perhaps, enmeshed in, the concept of mu=qoj. 
 
The primary locus of the latter term in the Poetics occurs between 1450a and 1453b, 
with a surfeit of references in 1451a & b, and 1452a.   However, its first appearance 
occurs in the opening statement of the contents of the Poetics, which includes pw=j 
dei= suni/stasqai tou\j mu/qouj (Poetics, 1447a 9).   Lucas (1968: 54) notes that plot 
is mentioned here because “it is the dominating theme” of the treatise, but the 
composition or “structure” (Bywater, 1909: 3) of tragic plots, or, more liberally, the 
“canons of plot construction” (Halliwell, 1995; 1999: 29) will receive explication for 
a particular purpose: ei0 me/llei kalw=j e3cein h9 poi/hsij (Poetics, 1447a 10).   And it 
is this purpose that Lucas (1968: 54) then highlights, since “[i]t is by the construction 
of plots more than by any other single means that the poet achieves his purpose,” so 
that when the appropriate protocols of plot construction are employed, poetic 
excellence is achieved, an achievement that emerges, perhaps, not simply in, but also 
from, the ordered structure of the plot.   
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And the latter is emphasized because, after the “modes” or “kinds” of mimesis, with 
respect to their “media,” “objects,” and “manner,” the tina du/namin e3kaston e1xei 
(Poetics, 1447a 8 – 9), and the origins of drama are noted, the definition of tragedy is 
stated before “plot” is dealt with in detail.   And the purpose, of which plot 
construction is the cause, is to produce a tragedy, and 
 
e1stin ou]n tragw|di/a mi/mhsij pra/cewj spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj me/geqoj 
e0xou/shj, h9dusme/nw| lo/gw| xwri\j e9ka/stw| tw=n ei0dw=n e0n toi=j mori/oij, 
drw/ntwn kai\ ou0 di‟ a0paggeli/aj, di‟ e0le/ou kai\ fo/bou perai/nousa th\n 
tw=n toiou/twn paqhma/twn ka/qarsin (Poetics, 1449b 24 – 28).                                 
 
The opening clause of this definition is repeated throughout the Poetics, as noted 
above, and then, immediately prior to stating what le/gw (Poetics, 1450a 4) muthos to 
be, Aristotle asserts that e1stin de\ th=j me\n pra/cewj o9 mu=qoj h9 mi/mhsij (Poetics, 
1450a 3 – 4).   Therefore, although it is stated that “tragedy is the representation of an 
action” (Poetics, 1449b 24), and that, in Halliwell‟s (1995; 1999: 49) translation, “the 
plot is the mimesis of the action” (Poetics, 1450a 3 – 4) – we are not entirely aided by 
Bywater‟s (1909: 19) rendering of this clause as “the action (that which is done) is 
presented in the play by the Fable or Plot” – the plot is then defined as th\n su/nqesin 
tw=n pragma/twn (Poetics, 1450a 4 – 5; 15).   But the tragedy, as the “mimesis of an 
action” in the definition of such a work, is more than “the construction of events” 
(Halliwell, 1995; 1999: 49) or “the combination of the incidents” (Bywater, 1909: 
19), but is also the effects of the arrangements of the events, so that pity and fear are 
aroused and katharsis is experienced. 
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Bywater (1909) does not render great assistance in his use of “Fable” and “Plot” as 
synonyms, as well as his, often parenthesized, addition to “action” of “actions,” and 
Lucas (1968: 97) appears to refer to the earlier proposals of Jones (1962) and others 
as “almost ineffable mysteries.”   Nevertheless, prior to this dismissal, the, rather 
unfortunate, brevity of the comments of Lucas (1968: 96) includes the statement that 
pra=cij “means ... an action initiated with a view to an end and carried on in pursuit 
of it; it can thus include a whole complex of subordinate actions (cf. 51a 18, 19),” 
which itself may contain a disclosure which suggests that the argument presented by 
Jones (1962), Aylen (1964, 28 – 29; 153 – 159), Kitto (1951: 185 – 186; 1956: 233;), 
and Eagleton (2003: 77) may be a little less enigmatically oracular.   For it is 
Halliwell (1986: 141 – 142) who states that, for Aristotle, the “action (praxis) ... is the 
pattern discernible in the „actions and life‟ which the poet dramatizes.   As such, it can 
be described as the object or content of the plot-structure (muthos), which can in turn 
be understood to be the design or significant organization of the work of art.”   But is 
the “object,” or even the “content,” the same as “the design or significant 
organization” of a drama?   Halliwell‟s (1986: 141) asseveration that “[s]uperimposed 
onto the normal uses [of pragmata, the verb prattein, and the noun praxis], the 
Poetics contains an original development of the word praxis to mean the organized 
totality of a play‟s structure of events, its complete dramatic framework” raises the 
question as to why entertain a neologistic meaning to praxis when Aristotle‟s (and/or 
Halliwell‟s (1986)) muthos is adequate, and, subsequently, bequeath so inextricably 
formidable an examination to his students and subsequent readers, who are required to 
discern when praxis is muthos, when it is a neoteric coinage, and when it is 
indistinguishable from the praxeis of the prattontes.       For, although Halliwell 
(1986: 5; 23 - 24) appears to follow Murray (1927: 150), who claims that “Aristotle‟s 
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praxis, or story, covers the internal as well as the external” meaning and structured 
intent of a dramatic work, he appears required to add that “[a] poetic muthos, in 
Aristotle‟s most concise terms, is the mimetic representation of an action,” which, 
given the above, leaves the reader in a quandary as to what type of “action” Halliwell 
(1986) means, because, for Halliwell (1986: 24), Aristotle‟s “careful consideration of 
the properties of a tragic muthos” includes “the crucial shape of the ideal tragic 
action.”   More forceful is the statement by Halliwell (1986: 143; emphasis added) 
that “the action of a play is not simply the sum of the component actions or events; it 
is a coherent and meaningful order, a pattern which supervenes on the arrangement of 
this material and arises out of the combination of purposive individual actions.”   
Appropriating this statement, it may be proposed that the action is the “order” and not 
the „ordering,‟ it “supervenes” – in a Latin sense which Halliwell (1986) appears to 
invoke – and “it arises out of” the actions (plural) ostended in the muthos, which give 
rise to pity and fear, and is kathartic in its apprehension.   It may be unjustified to 
subject Halliwell‟s (1986) detail to the brief rendering permitted here, but he does 
appear to employ a distinction between pra=cij and mu=qoj, which, on occasions, 
suggests an excess to pra=cij that it not wholly accounted for in mu=qoj.   Thus, 
rightly, “[c]haracter ... is a subordinate aspect of the play, but one which must 
contribute to the unity, and therefore the significance, of the action” (Halliwell, 1986 
162), and whose pra/ceij engender “[p]ity and fear [which] need[s] to be 
comprehended within the framework of a coherent tragic action” (Halliwell, 1986: 
171).   Although the dubiety and irresolution endures – as it ought to do so in Classic 
texts – one is prompted to advert to the display of “universals” that the “coherent 
tragic action” discloses, an action that is pedagogic of the „truths‟ of the meaning of 
being human, as noted in the discussion of mimesis above.             
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Therefore, when Kermode (1979: 154, n.2) asserts that “[f]or Aristotle ... a sequence 
of moral choices is an action,” it is the action that is evident in the sequence as a 
sequence of actions in a plot, which is the “structure of events,” ostended by the 
characters.   It is this dual usage of “action” and “actions,” whose conflation or 
severance engenders too fervent support or detraction, which, for this reader of the 
Poetics, may permit a distinction, a matter which will continue to be examined below, 
because, even if the assertion that “tragedy is the imitation not of people but of an 
action and of life” (Poetics, 1450a 16 – 17) is subjected here or elsewhere to 
translational disputes, as, indeed, is much of the Poetics, and even though discrepant 
readings may be dissentient, it is an assertion that is repeated in the Poetics (1449b 
24; 1449b 36; 1450a 3 – 4; 1451a 16 – 19; 1462b 11). 
 
(iii)   Prattô 
 
Such a notion of pra=cij, which severs the conflation of pra=cij and mu=qoj proposed, 
and yet not proposed, by Halliwell (1986), both comports a diligence with regard to 
the distinction in the use of pra=cij and pra/ceij, and also bears its weight upon the 
related verb pra/ssw – or in Attic, pra/ttw – and its participial form, which often is 
employed of the „actions of the characters.‟   This extended translation of 
pra/ttontej, likewise, may assist in withholding the transfer of rendering pra/ttein 
as “to act,” and, therefore, of the pra/ttontej as “actors,” and also in resisting the 
rather graceless use of “agents” for the participial form.   Once again, as occurs in the 
incipience of a technical discourse, the question arises as to whether Aristotle means 
“actors,” “characters,” or “agents who perform actions,” when he employs 
pra/ttontej.   The diverse English versions of pra/ttontej amongst interpreters all 
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too often leads to the dogmatic foreclosure upon the term by, indeed, embryonic 
schools of interpreters, which, for the reasons evident in Foucault (1969), precipitately 
become indelibly „formalist‟ or functionalist,‟ rather than accord consent to dialogic, 
perhaps, multilogic perspectives.   Else (1967: 240, n. 66) observes the difficulty: 
 
Try as we will, we cannot get a good English equivalent for pra/ttontej.   
„Actors‟ and „performers‟ both suggest the theatre; „enactors‟ is impossibly 
artificial and smacks, if anything, of legal jargon; and „characters,‟ besides not 
carrying the implication of pra/ttein, runs into ambiguity with „character.‟   
Is „agents‟ possible?   I hardly think so. 
 
In acute form, such a dispute is evident amongst scholars at Poetics, 1449b 37, where 
Lucas (1968: 99)
91
 and Else (1967: 239) refer to “actors,” who require qualities of 
“character” (to\ h]qoj, Poetics, 1449b 38) and “intention” (th\n dia/noian, Poetics, 
1449b 38), which is an assertion that Halliwell (1986: 140, n. 2) finds „absurd.‟   If 
Lucas (1968) and Else (1967) had to hand Halliwell‟s (2005: 401 – 402) later 
recognition of the significance of „live theatre‟ to Aristotle, they may have modestly 




However, owing to the nature of the Poetics, a variety of terms may be preferable, 
although the initial appearance of pra/ttontaj, at Poetics, 1448a 1, may appropriate 
a gloss, and suggest that “[s]ince dramatic mimeticists represent actions, the actions of 
                                                 
91
 Lucas (1968: 99) is quite firm: “pratto/ntwn: the performers, who have the same h1qh as the 
original characters in the story.”  
92
 Perhaps some reticence ought to be counselled with respect to the summary dismissal of a 
relationship between possible intended performers and a dramatic and/or musical text, particularly in a 
relatively limited environment of proximate authors and performers.   This especially is evident of 
Mozart‟s operatic music, and, to an extent, of some of the libretti, see Glover (2005: 227 – 228; 233; 
242; especially, 261; 273).        
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the characters (tou/touj) must be of a serious or trivial nature ...”   Consequently, 
when the manner of mimesis is distinguished, the whole mimeticization of “the same” 
(ta\ au0ta\, Poetics, 1448a 20) “objects [sc.]” that epic and narrative represent are 
“acted out and performed” (pra/ttontaj kai\ e0nergou=ntaj, Poetics, 1448a 23) in 
the dramatic manner. 
 
As much as the Poetics is neoteric and, in a sense, „inaugural,‟ in the oppressive 
shadow of his Socratic teacher, Aristotle repeatedly invokes the peerless (a1rista, 
Poetics, 1462b 11) works of Homer, almost as tragedy‟s begetter.   Not only are the 
Iliad and the Odyssey ma/lista mia=j pra/cewj mi/mhsij (Poetics, 1462b 11) – an 
assertion of some magnitude given the discussion of muthos and praxis above – but 
they share with tragedy the art of mimesis, of representing the same kinds of objects, 
although they are separated by the dedication of drama to pra/ttontaj ga\r 
mimou=ntai kai\ drw=ntaj (Poetics, 1448a 27 – 28).   The use of both pra/ttw and 
dra/w by Aristotle here may emphasize that drama is exclusively an enactive mimesis 
– in Bywater‟s (1909: 9) version: “present their personages as acting and doing” – and 
also may enable a brief, if, for Aristotle, questionable excursus to be undertaken on 
the naming of plays as dra/mata rather than as pra/gmata (see Bywater, 1909: 125). 
 
But the use of pra/ttontej or drw/ntwn (the latter not unimportantly employed in 
the definition of tragedy, in Poetics, 1449b 26) to reify this particular enactive mode 
of mimesis, or of mimesis by means of action, th=j e0n tw|= pra/ttein mimh/sewj 
(Poetics, 1459a 15), the phrase with which Aristotle signals that peri\ me\n ou=n 
tragw|di/aj ... i9kana\ ta\ ei0rhme/na (Poetics 1459a 15 – 16), must not be conflated 
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with character in any „modern,‟ psychological, or expressive Stanislavskian sense,
93
 
as Jones (1962: 59) reminds us.   Although Jones (1962: 59) does wish to „enfold‟ 
both „actor‟ and „character‟ in the term pra/ttontej, an assimilation that is dismissed 
by Halliwell (1986: 140, n. 2), he (Jones, 1962: 59 – 60) does efface the actor-
character conflation by interposing the tragic mask, and in his use of the term “stage 
figure” (Jones, 1962: 59), rather than “agent” or “actions of a character.”   In addition, 
the proximity of the playwright to the dramatic performance in Classical Athens ought 
not to be eroded by our sedentary postures and downward textual gaze in concentrated 
„acts‟ of exegesis. 
 
Regrettably, such an exploration of rival interpretations, however nuanced, does little 
to elucidate Poetics, 1450a 15 – 1450b 4.   Nevertheless, it is suggested that, however 
reluctantly, pra=cij ought to be respected as an increasingly technical term to signify 
the “unified action” (mi/a ... pra=cij, Poetics, 1451a 19), whilst the “agents” or “stage 
figures” may ostend “many actions” (pra/ceij ... pollai/, Poetics, 1451a 18), and, in 
some instances, “from which no single action is evident” (e0c w[n mi/a ou0demi/a 
gi/netai pra=cij, Poetics, 1451a 19), and, as a consequence, “the plot is not one” 
(Mu=qoj d‟ e0sti\n ei[j, Poetics, 1451a 16).   And “the plot is not one,” or, perhaps 
better, it does not constitute a unity, if it is centred upon one individual character or 
heroic figure, since, and here Bywater‟s (1909: 25) translation of Poetics, 1451a 17 is 
impactful: “[a]n infinity of things befall that one man.”   Fundamental to the forthright 
reproof of poets who suppose that a single mu=qoj presents a single individual, or, 
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 States (1985: 163 – 164) refers to Veltrusky recalling Stanislavski‟s mention of “the Russian  Actor, 
Yermilov Sadovsky, who ... „suddenly stopped in the middle of a sentence to portray the character 
feeling in his mouth for a hair from his fur collar, and went on for a long time moving his tongue 
around and „trying to take the hair out‟ with his fingers while the sentence he had begun remained 
unfinished‟ ... It is exactly the revelation of something hitherto subtheatrical, not simply realism but an 
audacious display of the actor‟s power to be „real‟ on the microlevel.”     
 142 
more appositely, that a single individual may be represented in a single mu=qoj, is the 
evident point that their respective multiple actions, and the multifarious nature of 
human lives, would be impossible to reproduce.   If such an endeavour were essayed, 
it would not produce a coherent plot, because a coherent plot where ta\ me/rh 
sunesta/nai tw=n pragma/twn (Poetics, 1451a 32 – 33) is to represent a pra=cij, 
which is mia=j te ei]nai kai\ tau/thj o3lhj (Poetics, 1451a 32). 
 
The problematic passage in this context – Poetics, 1450a 16 – 1450b 4 – appears to 
begin by reiterating the repeated statement that tragedy is the mimesis of an action (cf. 
Poetics, 1449b 24; 36; 1450a 3 – 4; 1451a 18 – 19).   However, Aristotle is 
elucidating the actions of characters and their place in a tragic dramatic work, and the 
assimilation of the pra/ttw group of words, which is employed here, with the 
aggregating technical use of pra=cij, as explored above, ought to be contested.   
Furthermore, possibly embedded in the statement that h9 ga\r tragw|di/a mi/mhsij 
e0stin ou0k a0nqrw/pwn a0lla\ pra/cewn kai\ bi/ou (Poetics, 1450a 16 – 17) may be the 
notion of what constitutes the tragic experience or pleasure, since actions produce the 
qualities of character, and it is the actions that bring about their well-being or 
otherwise, because kata\ de\ ta\j pra/ceij eu0dai/monej h2 tou0nanti/on (Poetics, 1450a 
19 – 20).   This proposal renders the use of pra/cewj, which is possible on the textual 
evidence, rather than pra/cewn, as employed by Kassel (1965) above, less likely, and, 
owing to the reiteration that „tragedy as the imitation of an action‟ in the Poetics, the 
former reading is not required to bolster that particular argument.   But, a degree of 
aporia remains, because of the subsequent statements that to\ te/loj pra=ci/j tij 
e0sti/n (Poetics, 1450a 18) is interpreted by Halliwell (1995; 1999: 51, n. c) as the 
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telos “of either drama or life: Ar[istotle] may mean both,” and which extends the 
remit of Halliwell‟s (1986) earlier and reluctant notion of  praxis.  
 
But, this is all rather unsatisfactory, since, within a few lines, Aristotle has asserted 
that ta\ pra/gmata kai\ o9 mu=qoj te/loj th=j tragw|di/aj (Poetics 1450a 22 – 23).   
Thus, perhaps, the “goal” of a tragedy is “a certain kind” (tij) of “action,” but 
“actions” or “events,” to which Halliwell (1995; 1999: 51) adds “the plot” and 
Bywater (1909: 19) places “Fable or Plot” in apposition to “action” (here, notably, in 
the singular), is “the goal” of tragedy.   And, in case aporetic vertigo has not affected 
his students, Aristotle then informs them that “action” or “an action” is central to 
tragedy, and, furthermore, that a tragedy could do without “character” (Poetics, 1450a 
23 – 25).   Thus, on the one hand, Lucas (1968: 102) is right to observe that “te/loj in 
l. 18 is awkward with te/loj in l. 22, especially as the first refers to the end of the 
action which is the subject of the tragedy, the second to the action itself with is the 
end of tragedy;” but, on the other hand, it will be noticed that this is a somewhat 
beguiling statement in the context of Lucas‟s (1968: 96 – 97) earlier rejection of a 
division between praxis and muthos.    
 
Nevertheless, in summary, possibly one may suggest that, in Aristotle‟s thought here, 
he appears to be attempting to address, with lapidary concision – the lecture format 
may have provided him with an opportunity to expatiate – the notion of a pra=cij as 
an informing action of a dramatic work, the “actions” of characters, and the effect of 
those actions in a plot, which contains peripe/teiai kai\ a0nagnwri/seij (Poetics, 
1450a 34 – 35).   The outward informing rationale and the inward informing 
principles seem to be employed in conflict and, if not to clash semantically, at least to 
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blur denotative precision.   But Foucault (1969) has not preceded this exploration of 
some of the concepts in Aristotle‟s Poetics as a stratagem for avoiding clarity; rather, 
it proposes that a relative ambiguity appears to reside in the passage as it seeks for 
discursive coherence, as it would in any similar endeavour to forge a „discursive 
regularity.‟ 
 
Moreover, and as noted earlier, it cannot simply be dismissed that the Poetics is less 
Aristotle‟s ratiocination about tragedy than his reflection upon tragedy within a 
performative environment, and that, in this sense, the Poetics is „theatrical.‟   As 
resistant as Lucas (1968) may be to evoking such an ambience (and not without cause, 
cf. 1450b 17 – 18; although, possibly, Aristotle may be less “emphatic” than Lucas 
(1968)), the Poetics is not without a mood of post-performance meditations upon the 
live dramatic spectacle, and this „practical‟ aspect of his lectures is an experience 
from which his students would not have been excluded.   Therefore, the interpretive 
struggle for precision ought to be mitigated by the unstable processes of generating a 
technical discourse, by the experience of theatre, by the comparison of that 
contemporary experience with evidence of an earlier milieu, and by the proposal that 
the propinquitous apprehension of the lecturer‟s propositions may have been heard as 
less agonistic and more contextually appropriate, with the additional possibility of a 
shared fiduciary framework of common and commonly understood terms between 
lecturer and students, than they continue to be heard by the removed cousins of the 
interpretive tradition.
94
   In essence, then, it is the contention – toujours déjà 
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 The problem of personal and surrounding contexts in the matter of translation, understanding and 
interpretation is emphasized in its most acute form by Steiner (1998: 178 – 179): “No two human 
beings share an identical associative context.   Because such a context is made up of the totality of an 
individual existence, because it comprehends not only the sum of personal memory and experience but 
also the reservoir of the particular subconscious, it will differ from person to person.   There are no 
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corrigible – that, for Aristotle, as possibly for his hearers – a pra=cij in an 
accomplished tragedy prescribes to a mu=qoj, in which the pra/ceij of the 
pra/ttontej are ostended, and through which, by their actions, the fo/boj and e1leoj 
appropriate and proper to the particular mu=qoj and coherent with, and mobilized by, 
the pra=cij is generated.   If this process moves opportunely, then the requisite 
ka/qarsij will be obtained. 
 
(iv)   Hamartia 
 
The desired emotional identification with the central “agent,” the “stage figure,” or 
the „character who performs the actions‟ in the best of tragedies, is focused in the 
metaba/llwn from prosperity to adversity through some kind of a9marti/a (Poetics, 
1453a 9 – 10; 15 – 16).   Although this group of words – its verbal and substantive 
forms – primarily is employed in the Poetics of the errors and faults, the mistakes and 
technical misjudgements of the poetic craft, and mostly of the dramatists themselves, 
although occasionally of the critics (Poetics, 1451a 20; 1453a 24; 1454b 17; 1456b 
15; 1460b 15, 17, 19, 23, 29, 30, etc.), the interpretive challenge resides where the 
change in the fortunes of the prwtagwnisth/j occurs di‟ a9marti/an tina/ (Poetics, 
1453a 9 – 10) and metaba/llein ... e0c eu0tuxi/aj ei0j dustuxi/an ... di‟ a9mati/an 
mega/lhn (Poetics 1453a 14 – 16). 
 
The argument presented above, which foregrounds the importance of the structural 
features of a good tragedy in the Poetics – that a single action is developed in events 
which unfold in a coherent plot, and that character is subservient to a cohesive plot, 
                                                                                                                                            
facsimiles of sensibility, no twin psyches.   All speech forms and notations, therefore, entail a latent or 
realized element of individual specificity.”    
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which itself remains faithful to an action – resists Halliwell‟s (1986: 146) 
brinkmanship with the concepts of pra=cij and mu=qoj, as noted above.   Halliwell‟s 
(1986) retreat from crossing over the praxis-muthos divide, conflates, what appears to 
this reader as, admittedly, an uncertain scission of the two concepts, and leads to this 
puzzling and, again, for this reader, almost beguiling statement, which notably, is 
preceded by an unsurprising concession: 
 
Although the attention paid to action in the earlier parts of the Poetics to some 
extent reflects Aristotle‟s interest in the dramatic mode of mimesis ... it is also 
a sign of the larger agent-centred view of drama which the treatise consistently 
offers ... Scrutiny of the theory of tragedy outlined in the Poetics warrants us, I 
believe, in concluding that Aristotle is concerned to exclude from the structure 
of a plot all those sources of causation which are external to the actions of the 
human figures themselves.   These sources encompass, most importantly, the 
full range of traditional religious explanations for events in the world.   The 
figures of tragedy are primarily characterised as „the agents‟ because it is this 
description which best fits the agent-centred perspective within which 
dramatic poetry is seen in the treatise: it is the agents them[s]elves who are the 
prime causative force in the action of the play; it is they who direct, or, 
through the failures of action for which hamartia stands, misdirect, the 
development of events which gives the plot its structure and unity (Halliwell, 
1986: 146).   
 
The assertion that hamartia signifies a “failure of action” by the agent, who then 
“misdirects” the “development of events” advertises the actions of the agents in the 
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dramatic work, and, particularly, publicizes the actions of the principal character, and 
yet the actions are bound, and, simultaneously, not bound through inaction, to the 
principal character.   The issue is less one of Halliwell‟s (1986) prevarication on some 
of the key concepts of the Poetics – this, as Foucault (1969) has assisted in 
demonstrating, is appropriate – than it is the relative certainty with which he may 
claim that the focus on “action in the earlier parts of the Poetics is ... a sign of the 
larger agent-centred view of drama which the treatise consistently offers” (Halliwell, 
1986: 146).   The reservations of this reader have been stated, and, in addition, the 
focus on the prwtagwnisth/j and his actions, which Halliwell (1986) emphasizes 
here – whether action or inaction, direction or misdirection – when concomitantly 
viewed with his fall, does warrant Jones‟s (1962: 46) admonition with respect to “the 
promising inwardness of hamartia – a familiar world of temptation, self-division, the 
exposed pathos of struggling conscience,” and leads, one concurs, to his contextually 
vital reproof to translators – here, Else and Bywater – of a presumption of 
psychological motives by their imputation of internal motivation in the verb me/llein 
(Jones, 1962: 48 – 50).   In his summary of the views of Jones (1962) and House 
(1964), Eagleton (2003: 77) refers to a9marti/a as “more of a bungling or missing-the-
mark in the action than some moral defect, an objective blunder or error more than a 
state of the soul.” 
 
How, then, is hamartia best appropriated and rendered in Poetics?   One suggests that, 
on the one hand, any proposal ought to endeavour to resist the inward willing act, 
which would permit the interpellation of „modern‟ psychological motives; and, with 
this in mind, on the other hand, to admit meanings that do not present too dogmatic a 
foreclosure upon the term.   Both Janko (1984: 210) and Halliwell (1986: 221) refer to 
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the semantic range of the term in Aristotle‟s writings, and, perhaps in conception, a 
liability to error or failure, which causes actions to be undertaken with a lack of 
malevolent intent (Janko, 1984: 209), actions which are veiled by an ignorance of 
their outcome, invokes the type of hamartia most apposite to that th=j kalli/sthj 
tragw|di/aj (Poetics, 1452b 31).   Actions undertaken in error of understanding, or 
of full knowledge, have tragic implications and results, which lead to a recognition of 
the action undertaken in error, and a reversal, which is h9 ei0j to\ e0nanti/on tw=n 
prattome/nwn metabolh\ (Poetics, 1452a 22 – 23).   And, although contrary 
examples may be cited (see, inter alia, Eagleton, 2003: 80), it is precisely the masterly 
drama that Aristotle is envisioning, and of “those situations in which action is taken or 
intended by those ignorant of the real position” (Lucas, 1968: 303).   More influential 
of Aristotle‟s tragic foreshadowing of the Gospel of Mark is Lucas‟s (1968: 307) 
assertion that “[t]he tragedy of error, of that blindness which is part of the human 
condition ... represents an experience and a vision of life ...” – a vision blinded by its 
own insight and insightful in the cause of its own blind actions, which represent the 
tragedy and truthfulness of being human. 
 
(v)   Katharsis 
 
A strong element of „undecidability‟ is evident both within the Poetics and also when 
pursuing an exegesis of the work, but, possibly, no more provocatively so with respect 
to the burden of tradition, than when reaching the term, ka/qarsij, which “has long 
been the most vexed in the entire work” (Halliwell, 1995; 1999: 17). 
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The crux interpretationis occurs within the definition of tragedy (Poetics, 1449b 24 – 
28), when, di‟ e0le/ou kai\ fo/bou (Poetics, 1449b 27), the achievement of ka/qarsij 
results.   Bywater‟s (1909: 151) note, that the phrase “di‟ e0le/ou kai\ fo/bou: means 
practically di‟ e0leeinw=n kai\ foberw=n,” is not without import with regard to the 
monition of Jones (1962: 46) above, in the sense that what is ostended are “piteous 
and alarming scenes” (Bywater, 1909: 151).   But this is not to attribute the ka/qarsij 
exclusively to the „possible dramatic world,‟ to which Else (1967: 439 & 441) 
inclines, since “the emotions affected are those of the audience” (Janko, 1984: 139).   
Nevertheless, vigilance must be observed lest the homeopathic purification of 
unchecked emotions, which responds to the Platonic suspicion of the emotional 
excesses of theatre, asserts that tragedy is group therapy for the emotionally 
ungovernable.   In addition, cognizance must be taken of Bywater‟s (1909: 161) 
reminder that strong emotions mirrored to the strongly emotional may heighten, rather 
than lessen, emotional exuberance.    
 
Needless to say – the „needless‟ bears the litotes – an interpretation of the contested 
term cannot be settled upon here.   However, the following, somewhat bold, proposal 
is stated:  
i)   the emotional response to tragedy does not exclude any person; 
ii)  the “katharsis” of “pity” and “fear” endeavours not to dispose of the emotions, but 
to order them; and 
iii) that act of ordering generates a sense of equilibrium which is pleasurable in the 
manner appropriate to the “serious” and “elevated” nature of the genre. 
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One agrees both with Bywater (1909: esp. 155) that the medical background to the 
concept of katharsis is informative, but also with Golden (1992: 37) that it remains 
wanting with respect to tragedy.   One is unsure that Halliwell‟s (1986: 354 – 355) 
assertion that the cognitive and intellectual approach is as inadequate as he states, 
since “[events arousing] pity and fear” may not, of necessity, exclude the arousing of 
the emotions of the spectators, nor that the “events” that generate the “arousing” 
would be undertaken or not – „directed‟ or „misdirected‟ – by his „agent-centred 
doers‟ (Halliwell, 1986: 355). 
 
Perhaps one may suggest that, through mimesis, events in a tragedy of a pitiful and 
fearful nature engender pity and fear in the spectator for the „agents,‟ or „stage 
figures,‟ or „characters which perform the actions‟ and their predicaments, and the 
pity and fear undergone and experienced (pa/sxein) by the spectator are not without 
personal and communal import for the audience – with reference both to the self and 
to the polis – and that “pity and fear, aroused by the drama, act on the latent emotions 
of pity and fear in the spectator” (Janko, 1984: 142).   Therefore, those events and 
predicaments cause this pity and fear to arise, and this pity and fear is purged by that 
pity and fear aroused by the events and predicaments – the homeopathic remedy – 
and, through a state of recognition and intellection, a state of relief, understanding, 
and the restoration of equilibrium is activated, which is a pleasurable experience, and 
h9 h9donh/ is of a serious rather than a comedic kind (Janko, 1984: 141). 
 
Lucas (1968) is not alone in wanting more from Aristotle than any „readerly‟ reading 
of the Poetics produces.   Nevertheless, one suggests that the distance may be 
traversed from a detached reflection on, and/or an emotional submersion in, the 
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dramatic ostension, to the sober realization of the nature of human experience and 
existence in a „writerly‟ reading of Aristotle‟s treatise.   Lucas (1968: 278) parodies 
this “theory a tragedy [in] which ... pity and fear are cleansed of their pain because the 
tragic situation is made comprehensible ... and the poet‟s philosophic insight leads to 
a clam and passionless, or acquiescent, contemplation of the human condition,” but it 
is one not without commendation, as has been noted earlier, particularly with 
reference to Belfiore (1992; & ns. 76 & 77).   Somewhat derisively, he concludes that 
Aristotle “would not have said anything so clumsy as that pity and fear purify pity and 
fear”, but, as Janko (1984: 142) points out, “this is the vital principle involved, that of 
homeopathy.” 
 
In fact, it is Janko‟s (1984) inquiry of the Tractatus Coislinianus, as the basis for the 
lost, missing, partial, or non-existent „Poetics of Comedy‟ by Aristotle that generates 
a view not without proleptic significance, and one informative of an attractive 
viewpoint, which is not too indistinguishable from that of Belfiore (1992) and the one 
appropriated here, and, moreover, of relevance to the suggested ka/qarsij evident in 
a possible dramatically tragic Gospel of Mark.   The medical interpretation of 
ka/qarsij casts its pall upon other interpretations, and although Poetics 1453b 12 – 
13 is of uncertain assistance, the phrase, dia\ mimh/sewj, may be a responsive 
equivalent to the manner in which medicinal katharsis may act.
 95
   But, even if it 
cannot bear this exegetical weight (see especially, Lucas, 1968: 151, who reflects the 
uncertainty; also, Janko, 1984: 141 – 142; Bywater, 1909: 19; Halliwell, 1995; 1999: 
75), its proximity to the pleasure of tragedy and of the emotions of pity and fear is 
observed. 
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If a mood of disappointment and dissatisfaction may prevail following the 
examination of some of the disputed terms in the Poetics above, here a permissible 
mood may be one of frustrated discontent.   Perhaps a view may be adopted, and it is 
one that concurs with Belfiore (1992) as stated earlier, is close to Golden‟s view 
(1998: 106 – 107), although he emphasizes the „intellectual‟ aspect specifically, and 
shares in Janko‟s (1984: 141) approval of House (1964), if somewhat less 
forthrightly: 
 
The purpose of the catharsis of pity and fear, as House argues forcefully, is not 
to drain our emotional capacities so that we are no longer able to feel these 
emotions; instead it is to predispose us to feel emotion in the right way, at the 
right time, towards the right object, with the right motive, and to the proper 
degree ... Catharsis „brings our emotions nearer to those of a good and wise 
man,‟ i.e. to equilibrium or emotional balance, the Golden Mean.   The 
restoration of balance naturally causes pleasure. 
 
Lucas (1968: 287) may be too assured in his view that “Aristotle produced his theory 
[of katharsis] ad hoc in answer to Plato‟s condemnation of drama and never 
developed it outside this context,” and he cites the distant futures of Castelvetro and 
Voltaire in agreement (Lucas, 1968: 287, n. 2).   But, if Lucas (1968) means that it 
was especially tied to drama, then it is present not as a peripheral „extra,‟ but present 
within the very definition of tragedy itself.   Therefore, if it requires explanatory 
interpretation, it requires interpretation within that context, and, for this reader of the 
Poetics, that context proposes that the serious matter of an action unfolds in a plot, 
and, in the best of tragedies, causes a heightened emotional identification of some 
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degree, and entails in the spectator a cognitive processing of those circumstances, the 
events and the predicament, which engenders an intellectual comprehension, ordering 
and equilibrium, which is a kathartic pleasure. 
 
The various interpretations of that kathartic pleasure throughout the tradition, and, 
more particularly, through more recent psycho-analytic and psycho-therapeutic 
spectacles, inevitably searches the past through the futures of that past, and invokes 
tragedy which is 
 
pleasurable, majestic, awe-inspiring, suggestive of infinitive capacity and 
immeasurable value, yet also punitive, intimidating, cutting us savagely down 
to size.   We see men and women chastised by the Law for their illicit desire, a 
censure which with admirable economy satisfies our sense of justice, our 
respect for authority and our impulse to sadism.   But since we also identify 
with these malcontents, we feel the bitterness of their longing, a sympathy 
which morally speaking is pity, and psychoanalytically speaking is 
masochism.   We share their seditious passion, while reaping pleasure from 
castigating ourselves for such delinquent delight.   Pity brings us libidinally 
close to them, while fear pushes them away in the name of the Law.    But we 
also fear our own pity, alarmed by our own dalliance with destruction ... [and] 
... the issues at stake remain ethical and political ones, questions of justice, 
violence, self-fulfilment and the like.   Few artistic forms display such 
impressive erotic economy, and perhaps none caters so cunningly to our 
sadism, masochism and moral conscience all at the same time.   Few, also, 
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reveal such a close mirroring between the transactions on stage and the 
transactions between stage and spectators (Eagleton, 2003: 176); 
 
or, subsequently, reveal the transactions between the spectators when they are the 
actors on the stages of their own existence.   For it is also there that human “finitude is 
thus thrown into harsh relief, [and] so by contrast is the august infinity which we 
crave” (Eagleton, 2003: 176), a notion which encapsulates the suggested pra=cij of 




Ironically, to read the Poetics as a “monument” in its own “spaces of dissension,” 
dispersion, and dissemination is not to render it more definitive, as scholars like Jones 
(1962) and Halliwell (1986)
96
 appear to expect.   Rather, a Foucauldian reading 
highlights and foregrounds the activity of discursive solicitation and exploitation 
undertaken by an incipient discourse on poetry, and demonstrates its actions of 
meretricious perfidy, with its duplicitous adducements, its plagiarisms and 
interpretive citations.   Even when the „evidence‟ is so fragmentary, so limited, so 
dimly perceivable; nevertheless, an inquiry that probes discursive constructs must 
examine  
 
the conditions in which the archival material was assembled as living social 
relations embodying tensions, contradictions and struggle.   Thus the material, 
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 The modifications, even though most are modest, between Halliwell (1986) and Halliwell (2005) 
noted above suggest the problems of discursive closure. 
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though it attempts to fix and categorize people in line with the dominant views 
... cannot fully render these tensions static and dead (Doy, 2000: 119). 
 
And the current researcher returns to those interstices of tangential and rival 
perspectives – so often restrictively partial and suggestive – in order to participate in 
those ancient and ongoing struggles, in an endeavour to confront the conflicts which 
have shaped discourses, and, toujours déjà, continue to trap, and foreclose upon, 
discursive fluidity, and to re-invoke the adversative challenges to their  exclusionary 
power, which writes itself upon the bodies of subjects and is ostended in their material 
enactments. 
 
For it is in the discursive struggle, the a0gw/n, to be original and pristine, to utter a 
„new word,‟ and to inaugurate a bounded and hegemonic discourse, that the Poetics 
selectively adopts, adapts, and converts terms and concepts variously utilized and 
serviceable elsewhere, but now for its own adhibition.   But its accretional actions and 
adscititious abilities are not uniform, and its extortionate exactions vary in their 
intimidation and violation of previous terminological limitations.   In the incipient and 
temporary monumental stasis of Aristotle‟s treatise, and breeding and harbouring its 
own farmako/j within – indeed, a poisoner, a sorcerer, and a scapegoat – definitional 
precision toujours déjà is sous rature.   Almost simultaneous with, and, of course, 
consequent to, the inspissation of a discourse from heterogeneous emergent surfaces, 
„definitive‟ interpreters eisegetically create, re-create, mould, and mint a sophisticated 
discursive map, and demarcate its contours and co-ordinates more exactly and finely, 
and then,  prepare the catechism, test the candidates, and conduct the rites of entry and 
rituals of admission.   But discourses are „regularities,‟ and regularities are defined by 
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their exceptions.   Moreover, the power ceded to subject voices, which appropriate the 
discourse, itself engenders interpretive instability, as the more acute examination of 
some of key terms within the Poetics has revealed. 
 
Since a discursive formation is established by raiding existing discourses, seizing, 
colonizing, and then cultivating terms and their variously nuanced conceptual presents 
and futures, so too, these former sequestrations themselves become other future 
tendentious borrowings and confiscations, and commission their consequent, and 
always defective, employment.   Here lies, in its mendacious appropriation, the 
protocols of “reading differently” (Derrida, 1967b: 130), of reading both forward and 
backward, by placing in a dialogic a0gw/n possible dramatic features in the Gospel of 
Mark and the components of a good tragedy in the Poetics of Aristotle. 
 
Central to this reading is the pra=cij, an action external to the possible mimetic world 
of the dramatic mu=qoj, but the kindling of that plot and its quickened flame, which 
shines both within the dramatic world and also disperses light beyond it.   The mu=qoj 
is composed of episodes, peopled with probable human actions and assimilable, 
possibly, reachable human characters, who display noble moral choices, and choral 
interludes, which often reflect the communal story.   The central character stumbles, 
owing to an a9marti/a, and, in the more preferable complex plot, through an act of 
a0nagnw/risij of the circumstances and events themselves, he turns, engendering a 
peripe/teia, and thus forging a meta/basij as the mu=qoj transfers its focus from the 
de/sij, in order to pursue the ultimate lu/sij.   Outside the mimetically subjunctive 
dramatic arena resides the authorial creative world.   If evidence of the pra=cij is 
contained within the flow of the mu=qoj in the mimetic world, the pra=cij is the 
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primary informing power of the very possibility of a mu=qoj.   It is the story behind 
and within the actions ostended behind the fourth wall.   If the „mythoic‟ sphere is the 
„possible‟ world, then the „practic‟ sphere is the „real,‟ or, perhaps better, the 
„implied‟ authorial world and, whether or not emotional identification and re-ordering 
occurs within the dramatic arena, primarily it is in the latter world of the spectator‟s 
being human that the responses of e1leoj and fo/boj arise, and the ensuing ka/qarsij 
is effected.   Finally, it is within the world of the readers and the viewers that the 
pra=cij may be discussed and debated, and although the possibility of multiple 
pra/ceij may reside within the conceptual frame of the author, inevitably, the 
perspectives of viewers and readers will engender an interpretive multivalency of the 
pra=cij or pra/ceij.97 
 
From Plato‟s harsh critique of the poets and their words to Aristotle‟s careful analysis 
of the te/xnh of poetry, perhaps it may be opportune to conclude with a moment of 
applause for the poets from Horace, which later was echoed by Shakespeare:  
 
ac ne forte putes me, quae facere ipse recurem, cum recte tractent alii, laudare 
maligne, ille per extentum funem mihi posse videtur ire poeta, meum qui 
pectus inaniter angit, irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet, ut magus, et modo 
me Thebis, modo ponit Athenis (Epistulae, 2.1.208 – 213). 
 
                                                 
97
 Aristotle‟s observation of the succinct and economic containment of the classical tragedy is noted by 
the professional theatre critic of The Spectator (29
th
 September, 2007), Lloyd Evans: “Strange, perhaps, 
to define a good production by what it lacks but The Burial at Thebes (a version of Antigone translated 
by Seamus Heaney) is an exemplary production of a Greek tragedy.   The Athenians wrote small plays.   
The scripts are short, the cast few and the staging simple to the point of crudity, but directors are often 
intimidated by the 5
th
 century and feel they need to put on a gymkhana.”   
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Recalling the inscriptive power of the classic, and the representative, yet also 
transfiguring, nature of poetic creativity and its impress, it may be asserted that    
 
the poem, the statue, the sonata are not so much read, viewed or heard as they 
are lived.   The encounter with the aesthetic is, together with certain modes of 
religious and of metaphysical experience, the most „ingressive,‟ transformative 
summons available to human experiencing (Steiner, 1989: 143). 
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Derrida‟s (1967b: 130) statement that “Parce que nous commençons à écrire, à écrire 
autrement, nous devons relire autrement” is one that offers an invitation to undertake 
„differential re-readings,‟ readings that seek out and appropriate the occlusions, the 
marginalized, and the concealed suggestive possibilities.   Associations proffered by 
texts, which cannot bypass “être en rapport, de manière au moins virtuelle, 
dunamique, latérale, avec tous les mots composant le système de la langue” (Derrida, 
1972b: 148) throw open the field of signifiers and their possible concatenations and 
intercalations, and include, for Moore (1992: 100), the language of dreams and 
cartoons, even if he asserts that the preference, regrettably, of “biblical scholars and 
theologians ... [is] ... to take a jackhammer to the concrete language of the Gospels, to 
replace graphic images with abstract categories.”   If “concrete” and “graphic” denote 
the etched quality both of the narrower and the deeper glyptic serration, as well as of 
the wider and less caustic, epidemic serrulation, then it is these graphemes, these 
markings, that are the inscriptions of versatile, and, often, purposefully phased
98
 
potencies and pressures on the body-text, and which, subsequently, produce 
                                                 
98
 “Purposefully phased” qualifies “versatile,” because in the construction of ordered and disciplined 
bodies, political, religious, cultural, and familial discourses construct subjects in a deliberate manner, 
and introduce that process as a phased and structured practice.  
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entextualized bodies, both in each inceptive act, as well as in each consequent 
enactive a0na/mnhsij. 
 
BEGINNINGS THROUGH ENDINGS 
 
Dramatic beginnings may be „mythoic‟ rather than „practic‟ in terms of the 
exploration above.   Therefore, in the progression from Implied Author to auditor, or 
in the transfer from the foyer to the dress circle, the spectator is thrust in medias res; 
and when that mu=qoj already is known, its beginning is more, and not less, 
challenging to the playwright‟s ingenuity.   The Gospel of Mark begins with a 
pro/logoj, but here it is one that attempts to state a pra/cij, and then set the opening 
scene.   Taylor (1966), Nineham (1963), Hooker (1991), and France (2002) demarcate 
this section as verses 1 – 13, and Hooker (1991: 32) highlights the “concentration of 
christological material ... as though Mark were allowing us to view the drama from a 
heavenly vantage-point.”   Hooker‟s (1991: 32) use of “drama” is not unnoticed, and, 
in an ostensive presentation, this initial section may be appropriated as a reference to 
the intentional pra=cij of the Implied Author.    Present in the bold opening 
statements and graphic depictions of the “drama” of Mark reside the suspicion that 
other equally forthright pronouncements, as well as other allusive inferences, have 
been marginalized, relinquished, and discharged. 
 
With respect to Aristotle‟s injunctions, it may be more prudent to restrict the 
pro/logoj of the Gospel of Mark to verse 1, which contains the kerygmatic statement 
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of a pra/cij:    0Arxh\ tou= eu0aggeli/ou  0Ihsou= Xristou= [ui9ou= qeou=].99   However, this 
statement is one that requires its own a0gw/n, since, as has been noted, tragedy “begins 
with a problem or conflict which the ensuing action tries to resolve” (Segal, 1992: 
86).   The scenic depictions that follow verse 1 are highly visual, and, in particular, it 
is “[t]he dramatic opening [that] presumes a situation in which the speaker of the 
poem finds himself” (Race, 1992: 13), which is a suggestive theatrical device of 
participation and yet reflective distance, and one which may include the peremptory 
tone of verse 1.   It is these two aspects of the semantic density of the initial statement 
and the richly kinetic and imaginative quality of the descriptions that follow, which 
may evoke a dramatic quality to the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy.   But 
it also engenders an i1xnoj, that residual doubt both in the imperious pronouncement 
in verse 1, as well as in the dramatic exertion in the succeeding and persuasive o1yij, 
which together appear as a compressed and spectacular campaign to convince the 
reader and viewer of an impending portentous occurrence, because, for Aristotle, the 
teratw=dej mo/non ... ou0de\n tragw|di/a| koinwnou=sin (Poetics 1453b 9 – 10).   Here, 
the anti-closural absent presence of Derrida‟s (1967b: 110) “trace,” which “excède la 
question qu’est-ce que et la rend éventuellement possible,” is dynamic, interrogative, 
and reflexive, and that doubt, together with the approach to the Gospel of Mark as an 
Aristotelian tragedy, formulates this opening as a “tragic beginning ... [which] ... must 
motivate the audience to ask who or why.”   However, Segal‟s (1992: 96) subsequent 
caveat is all the more significant, namely, that “only rarely does it make this 
                                                 
99
 Textual insertions, emendations, and revisions, whilst essential to biblical scholarship, are of less 
significance to the location of the Gospel of Mark in a dramatic environment, more especially in the 
recasting of the work as a drama.   Here, however, the omission of ui9ou= qeou= in the original reading of 
Codex Sinaiticus and in q, which is somewhat later, resists an exaltation which is both revealed and 
concealed in the mu=qoj itself, and presents a more human tragic figure, possessed of that perennial 
human quality of u3brij.       
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interrogative gesture overt, perhaps because it aims at creating a total fiction and at 
excluding a self-conscious awareness of its aesthetic frame.” 
 
But such hermeticism has been rejected both in the bodily inscriptive dimension of 
the classics, and here, of the Gospel of Mark, as well as in the deconstructive signifier 
“[c]ourant les rues, il ne sait même pas qui il est, quelle est son identité” (Derrida, 
1972b: 165), and thus, it takes an errant route.   More pertinently, within the devices 
of drama theory itself, Barthes (1972) identifies a rupture between, on the one hand, 
the „total fictionality‟ of a dramatic work, the experience of identification, and the 
subsequent kathartic pleasures of the audience; and, on the other hand, the 
Verfremdungseffekt, the defamiliarization strategy, which, in its socio-political form, 
was the cause of Brecht‟s “epic theatre.”   Using techniques of estrangement, of 
alienation – in the actor/character relationship, in the textual layering or textual 
tissues, in the contrast between set design and action, in the paucity of decor and 
props, which deliberately forces a conscious imaginative effort on the part of the 
spectator, in the use of spatial dynamics between characters, between characters and 
scenic appendages, and between supporting props (see Rorrison in Brecht, 1983: 
xxviii – xxxv) – Brecht sought to ensure that the audience would exercise its critical, 
rather than its affective, faculty, effectively and purposefully breaking that framed and 
fictional dramatic world.   Thus, in Brecht‟s Mother Courage, the eponymous 
character is without sight and the audience without blindness.   The spectator sees 
Mother Courage as a pawn in the economics of war, and observes the way in which 
she is implicated in the noxious bond between capitalism and militarization, and the 
spectator also witnesses her brutalization, her desensitization.   War, the play asserts, 
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does not produce heroes as much as those complicit, at various levels, in the structures 
of exploitative capitalism.    
 
Thus, it is the auditor who is called upon to become an actor, to be a hero in, and not 
simply a passive observer of, the events that occur on the stage, and to perceive his or 
her own participation and, implicit or explicit, ideological complicity, in the social 
and political order, and, having been conscientized, to endeavour to alter the existing 
reality.   That „reality‟ is outside the auditorium, but the fictional frame is broken and 
the message is foregrounded in the dialogic, gestural, scenic, sonic, and vestimentary 
coding of the performance.   But the transition from appropriating the message – that 
pra=cij of which we have spoken – of the dramatic work and the consequential 
adoption of an external practice are distinct, and the impact of the socio-political 
causes of theatre are difficult to measure.   However, the argument that agitprop 
theatre did have an effect in the democratic struggle in a country such as South Africa 
is not without merit, since dramatic enactments, whether in formal theatrical settings 
or in rural locations, were able to fulfil a role denied to the more traditional political 
voices.   As Brink (1997: 166 – 167) notes:  
 
In the context of postmodernism in the United States and Europe, it may be 
entirely understandable for a theatre personality like Robert Wilson to say: “I 
am not interested in changing the world through theatre.   I‟m giving people 
invitations to daydreams.”   In South Africa, under apartheid, conditions 
differed vastly from those confronted by Wilson: Within a closed society, 
where the daily drama of existence permits of little daydreaming, theatre 
almost naturally assumes a more urgent and vital role. 
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And, quite possibly, dramatic works do move beyond proscenium closure in their 
inscriptive promise, whether as resigned acceptance, the reaffirmation of existing 
mores, or, perhaps, with conscientizing potential, and the ensuing ka/qarsij does 
engender a suspicion of unsettling, or, at least, realigning, the sense of equilibrium, 
and, conceivably, invoking the potential of challenge.
100
   Those wider reaches, of 
which we have spoken in Chapter One, are embedded in the multi-perspectives of the 
overt and covert intentions of the Implied Author, and in the „misprisions,‟ the 
„creative misreadings and misinterpretations‟ (Bloom, 1994: 8), which are themselves 
readings and interpretations, undertaken by the spectators in their interpretive worlds, 
and, in the case of the gospels are etched upon the bodies of religious and non-
religious adherents, and enacted with various degrees of enthusiasm (e0nqousia/zw) in 
public and private life-worlds.       
 
With respect to Greek tragedy, and with some import for that extra-theatrical world to 
which a message, a pra=cij, may be transported, Roberts (2005: 137) has noted that, 
whilst surprising, innovative, and challenging techniques of opening and closing 
dramatic works are created by playwrights, and that 
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 See Steadman (1980), Coplan (1985), & Kruger (1999).   With respect to Greenblatt‟s (1994: 29) 
assertion that Shakespeare‟s plays are “centrally and repeatedly concerned with the production and 
containment of subversion and disorder,” one could propose that theatre in South Africa divides into 
the three aspects of Greenblatt‟s (1994) notion.    First, certain local dramatic works simply contain 
“subversion and disorder.”   This is not to argue that such plays are politically innocuous, but that they 
ostend the entrenched values of groups within society, for example, Paul Slabolepszy‟s Saturday Night 
at the Palace (1982).   Second, some plays both produce and then contain “subversion and disorder;” 
for example, Athol Fugard‟s My Children! My Africa! (1989).   Third, some works produce 
“subversion and disorder,” such as Shanti (1976) and Egoli (YMCA, SOWETO; then the Space 
Theatre, 1979).   Nevertheless, political, social, economic, religious, and cultural strictures apply, since 
“[t]heatrical forms ... can be properly evaluated or even seen as theatrical only through the 
investigation of the ownership, contestation, and appropriation of institutions, understood as 
organizations located in social and economic structures (and sometimes in actual buildings) as the 
prevailing conventions that determine the identification and legitimation of certain practices as 
„theatre,‟ certain people as audiences, and certain combinations as „national‟” (Kruger, 1999: 12).         
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[b]eginnings have a programmatic authority in drawing the audience‟s 
attention to the tragedy‟s characters, choice of story, approach, and 
relationship to the genre; endings have or appear to have, interpretive 
authority, since the point of closure may also be seen as the point at which the 
audience can finally look back at a completed action and read it fully, in 
retrospective patterning. 
 
Thus, in the Gospel of Mark, the opening presents a theme, a spectacle, characters, a 
choice of trajectory and an approach, but “[h]ow does an ending complete the action 
of the play, and how does it deal with ... closure, scenes of finality, conclusiveness 
...?” (Roberts, 2005: 137).   The template of dramas informing Aristotle is not without 
its own subversive, even deconstructive, beginnings and endings – spectacular, 
quiescent, latently explosive, beguiling, indecisive, and potentially disturbing.   But 
the funereal obsequies, which are undertaken at the conclusion of the Gospel of Mark, 
appear to predominate amongst the classical tragedies, where “mourning presents the 
most common concluding rituals; of twenty-three plays that end in one way or another 
with death, nineteen end with some form of or reference to burial or mourning ritual,” 
and yet it is also the case that “division and uncertainty undercut or qualify closure at 
the end of a number of tragedies” (Roberts, 2005: 143), and, although this tends to 
occur most often in the individual works that contribute to a cycle of plays, it too 
occurs in plays without sequels. 
 
In fact, the brevity and sense of dislocation, disaster, and ruin with which the Gospel 
of Mark ends finds an unequal parallel in the Heracles by Euripides, where “the 
gestures of closing are unusually unsettled” (Dunn, 1996: 116).   Heracles admits to 
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his murderous act – the uxoricide and infanticide under Lyssa‟s spell – and is now 
required to re-learn the lesson of what is sure and worthy in, and ought to be 
maintained of, the human experience.   From being a nau=j, towing his small children 
(e0folki/daj, ll. 631 – 632), it is he who becomes the boat-in-tow (e0folki/dej, l. 1424) 
by the end of the play.   Now friendship, which replaces his primary allegiance to the 
family that has been slain, is recognized and accepted as superior to plou=ton h2 
sqe/noj (l. 1425), even to valour, and to his heroic Labours.   And yet, with his 
departure for Athens, the venerable Thebans, who compose the Chorus, state:  
 
stei/xomen oi0ktroi\ kai\ polu/klautoi 
ta\ me/gista fi/lwn o0le/santej (ll. 1427 – 1428). 
 
Thus, as Heracles is guided to Athens by Theseus, Thebes loses its “greatest of 
friends,” and what endures is a sense of loss, a profound sense of absence.  
    
With respect to the Gospel of Mark, Smith (1995: 161), preaching to his monks in the 
Cowley Monastery in Cambridge, Massachusetts, has adequately summarized the 
disconcerting nature of an ending that contests closure and challenges kathartic 
equilibrium: 
 
The hard truth is that Mark deliberately ended the gospel on an agonizing note 
of suspense, fear – and we must not hesitate to say it aloud – disobedience.   
The young man in a white robe tells the women not to be amazed.   They gave 
way to tromos and ekstasis; a colloquial translation would be “They 
completely lost it.”   The angel tells them to “Go, tell his disciples and Peter 
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that he is going ahead of you to Galilee; there you will see him, just as he told 
you” (Mark 16: 7).   But they do not do this because they are too frightened.   
The Greek says, “They told nothing to no one.” 
 
How then does drama read the confident and exhibitionist beginning of the Gospel of 
Mark, its forthright statement and theatrics, and the uncertain and adversative 
attenuation, which ends this gospel, with both its rites of lamentation and its 
bewildering perplexity?   And, importantly, what message, what pra=cij, is being 
conveyed in this seemingly doctrinaire mu=qoj, which unfolds through a series of 
variously confrontational e0peiso/dia, and is centred upon an authoritative and assured 
prwtagwnisth/j, and yet ends in confused and fearful hope and terror, almost an 
obloquy of that confident, perhaps hubristic, beginning?   How does the i1xnoj, the 
trace, and its dynamic track of doubt, in the presence of the inaugural promise, its 
programme and its portents, cohere with the terminal moments of a0pori/a?   How can 
the experiences of perplexity and estrangement in the terminal scene of tragic Mark 
be foregrounded in the initial scenes? 
        
Ebbott‟s (2005: 375) statement that “[t]ragedy has the power to defy the difference 
between the centre and the marginal or to reinforce it, and in fact, it does both” is not 
without, at least, some rewarding connotations; and feminist criticism and 
deconstructive readings of texts may be commandeered to propound that “[t]he 
marginal figures in tragedy, outsider roles performed by and for insiders, can also be 
paradoxically central in this dynamic theatrical experience” (Ebbott, 2005: 375).   
With respect to beginnings and endings, how central are Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh\ kai\ 
Mari/a (Mark 16: 1) and the neani/skon (Mark 16: 5) to the Gospel of Mark as an 
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Aristotelian tragedy; and, concomitantly, how central are their statements and 
reactions to a dramatic performance and the informing pra=cij of the Gospel of 
Mark? 
 
Perhaps, appositely, it is a known and unknown theorist who purloins these questions, 
and permits the retention of the earnest of a perplexing promise.   Whether the work 
of V.N.Vološinov, P.N.Medvedev, or M.M.Bakhtin – or, perhaps, Baxtin, or Bahtin 
(see Thiselton, 1992: 389 – 390; Lechte, 1994: 8) – it is the variously attributed 
proposition that the “controlled divergence of intended from apparent meaning” 
generates an attractive a0pori/a about “authentic over ostensible significance” that is 
pertinent.   The proponent of such a notion is more usually known as Bakhtin, who 
“invites the reader to consider the possibility that the contending meanings of a 
potentially ironic text might stand in dialogic relationship with one another” (Busch, 
2006: 477).   Bakhtin (1981) contrasts the poet and the novelist with respect to their 
relationships to, and employment of, language.   The poet, for Bakhtin (1981), 
forecloses upon the distance between the speaker and the lyric subject, and thus he 
assigns to the artist, and his or her expression, a propinquity without remainder 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 285).   But Bakhtin (1981: 291) asserts that language resides in social 
worlds and public spaces, and exists variously as conflictual and compatible 
interrelational “heteroglossia,” which, in its complex partnerships and agonistic 
dynamism, the novelist is able to represent: 
 
The novel can be defined as a diversity of social speech types (sometimes 
even diversity of languages) and a diversity of individual voices, artistically 
organized.   The internal stratification of any single national language into 
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social dialects, characteristic group behaviour, professional jargons, generic 
languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, 
languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, 
languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the 
hour ... this internal stratification present in every language at any given 
moment of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for the 
novel as a genre.   The novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of the 
world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it, by means of the social 
diversity of speech types [raznorecie] and by the differing individual voices 
that flourish under such conditions (Bakhtin, 1981: 262 – 263). 
 
Therefore, in contrast to the poet, the novelist may empower her characters with 
discordant and opposing consciences, which the appropriate contrary and competing 
sociolinguistic sites empower with the capacity for an adversative literary strategy, 
and one that is to be distinguished from the reflexive self-presence of the poet‟s voice.   
Bakhtin (1981), it appears, conceives of poetry as „lyric poetry‟ and understands it in 
comparatively “modern” terms – that „personal song of the heart.‟   But one suggests 
that poetry as drama, to defer to the classical authors, is closer to the multifarious 
figural consciences which the novelist is able to engender, and that constitutive of the 
dramatic Gospel of Mark is a heteroglossic world of contest and crisis, of defiance, 
challenge, and encounter, in which multiple cultural and social language worlds meet.   
This discourse is fugal in nature, but once the subject has taken „flight,‟ its dispersing 
voices become less countervailing than counter-productive, even counter-
revolutionary, in their resistance to return to any concordant stasis or rest, so that  
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even statements that seem relatively straightforward or single-voiced may 
actually be dialogic, making distinct, even competing claims ... [and] ... Mark 
wants to raise sincere and difficult questions about Jesus, including questions 
about his integrity as a representative of God and about the spiritual legitimacy 
of his ministry (Busch, 2006: 497 & 504).    
 
A degree of conflict, which, it has been noted, is pivotal to tragedy, requires 
dissenting polemical trajectories, and if e1stin ou]n tragw|di/a mi/mhsij pra/cewj 
spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj me/geqoj e0xou/shj (Poetics, 1449b 24 – 25), then a candid, 
sceptical, and demanding scrutiny of the oppositional expressions is required, whether 
these divergent views are textually explicit or implicit.   This implicitation of 
contrariety generates a climate of suspicion, and, indeed, one of innovative 
performative opportunities, in order to undertake, or, perhaps, generate, a 
hermeneutics of the marginally central or the centrally marginal.   In addition, the 
diverse intentionalities permit an a0gw/n between the authorial and the figural, 
between the pra=cij and the actions and utterances of the characters within the 
mu=qoj. 
 
The Oedipus Tyrannos by Sophocles was lauded by Aristotle in the Poetics.   It 
demonstrated kalli/sth de\ a0nagnw/risij, o3tan a3ma peripetei/a| ge/nhtai, oi[on 
e1xei h9 e0n tw=| Oi0di/podi (1452a 32 – 33; cf. 1452a 22 – 26),101 and the structure of its 
plot was considered dramatically effective both for the reader and the spectator alike, 
and engendered to\ fobero\n kai\ e0leeino\n ... a3per a2n pa/qoi tij a0kou/wn to\n tou= 
Oi0di/pou mu=qon (1453b 1 & 6 – 7).   Again, later, Aristotle asserts that pasw=n de\ 
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 The a3ma suggests a broader view than a strict and immediate understanding might denote.  
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belti/sth a0nagnw/risij h9 e0c au0tw=n tw=n pragma/twn, th=j e0kplh/cewj 
gignome/nhj di‟ ei0ko/twn, oi[on e0n tw=| Sofokle/ouj Oi0di/podi ... (1455a 16 – 18).   
Likewise, the play is cited with respect to the external deed that introduces the fault-
line (1453b 29 – 31; 1460a 29 – 30), the nescience of Oedipus concerning the murder 
of King Laius (1454b 6 – 8), and, finally, as an example of the economy of tragedy 
(1462a 18 – 1462b 3).    
 
The presence of the Oedipus Tyrannos in the Poetics leans upon the Gospel of Mark, 
when the protocols of the former are sought in the latter.   Associative meanings 
transgress the limen between the play by Sophocles and the Gospel of Mark, and 
suggest that the opening speech of Oedipus in the Oedipus Tyrannos and the 
pro/logoj of the Gospel of Mark share certain features: identification of each 
prwtagwnisth/j (OT, l. 8; Mark 1:1); statements about the populace and the 
location ( 0W te/kna Ka/dmou ... po/lij, OT, ll. 1 & 4;102 e0n th=| e0rh/mw| ... h9  0Ioudai/a 
xw/ra kai\ oi9  9Ierosolumi=tai pa/ntej, Mark 1: 4 - 5); the activity of the participants, 
whether Qoa/zete i9kthri/oij kla/doisin e0cestemme/noi (OT, ll. 2 – 3) or that 
e0bapti/zonto ... e0comologou/menoi ta\j a9marti/aj au0tw=n (Mark 1: 5); the contrast 
of second-hand reports and immediate participants, a0gge/lwn ... a1llwn a0kou/ein 
au0to\j w[d‟ e0lh/luqa (OT, ll. 6 – 7) and ou0k ei0mi\ i9kano\j ... e1rxetai o9 i0sxuro/tero/j 
mou o0pi/sw ... h]lqen  0Ihsou=j (Mark 1: 7 & 9), and the direct question by Oedipus, 
which focuses the audience,  0W te/kna Ka/dmou ... ti/naj (OT, ll. 1 – 2), and the 
suppressed question about what may be occurring when people are flocking to John, 
being baptized, confessing their sins and then, following the baptism of Jesus, 
a0nabai/nwn e0k tou= u3datoj ei]den sxizome/nouj tou\j ou0ranou\j kai\ to\ pneu=ma w9j 
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 Dawe (1982: 85) notes that “in Greek poetry „Cadmus‟ can mean either the legendary founder of 
Thebes, or in certain contexts, the city itself.” 
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peristera\n katabai=non ei0j au0to/n: kai\ fwnh\ e0ge/neto e0k tw=n ou0ranw=n (Mark 1: 
10 – 11). 
 
But, as has been noted earlier, the retelling of traditional stories and informative, 
classical narratives are known futures, because they form part of the communal, 
societal, or national corpus of morphologically instructive stories.   In addition, 
informative occurrences may be essential prerequisites to a dramatic work before its 
scenic ostension begins.    In the Oedipus Tyrannos “[w]e are in Thebes, and Oedipus 
is king; the riddle of the sphinx, the killing of Oedipus‟ father, and the marriage with 
his mother are all in the past, but not yet discovered; fame has not yet turned to 
infamy” (Roberts, 2005: 139).   In the Gospel of Mark we are in Palestine, the 
proclamation of Jesus as a son of God, the challenge of Jesus to the riddling casuistry 
of the Jewish teachers and the challenge to the disciples of the riddling parables 
themselves, the shafts of knowledge and the clouds of ignorance descending upon the 
characters and the auditors, the arrest, trial, and subsequent crucifixion of Jesus, and 
the fearful outcome for his followers are in the future perfect tense of a known yet 
undiscovered future tense.   How to „unknow‟ the known, or, at least, to acquire the 
deflected, metaphoric possibility of a mediated yet searching vision – the exhortative 
yet subversive stained-glass view – in order to simulate a participant and to collapse 
the future into an unfolding present, to be in medias res?   How, indeed more exactly, 
to inquire of the Markan “heteroglossia” their deflective authorial intentions, and to 
analyse and demarcate “the direct intention of the character who is speaking, and the 
refracted intention of the author [... since ... i]n such discourse there are two voices, 
two meanings and two expressions” (Bakhtin, 1981: 324), if not more?   In addition, 
the authority that the opening and closing of a dramatic work confers, in order to 
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permit a comprehensive and coherent appropriation of the pra=cij is not uniformly 
employed, and “[t]he ancient tragedians both enlist these modes of authority and 
undercut or complicate them, offering us at times obscure or misleading beginnings 
and open or disconcerting endings” (Roberts, 2005: 137). 
 
Here, again, the endings of the Oedipus Tyrannos and the Gospel of Mark are not 
without some comparative parallels.   The notions of blindness and insight dominate 
the Oedipus Tyrannos no less than the Gospel of Mark.   The e0ca/ggeloj tells of 
Oedipus, sword in hand, storming the Jocasta‟s chamber, ou[ dh\ kremasth\n th\n 
gunai=k‟ e0sei/domen, plektai=j e0w/raij e0mpeplegme/nhn: o9 de/, o3pwj o9ra=i nin, 
deina\ bruxhqei\j ta/laj (OT, ll. 1263 – 1265).   It is then that Oedipus a0pospa/saj 
ga\r ei9ma/twn xrushla/touj pero/naj a0p‟ au0th=j, ai[sin e0ceste/lleto, a1raj 
e1paisen a1rqra tw=n au9tou= ku/klwn (OT, ll. 1268 – 1270).   Thus e0n sko/twi to\ 
loipo\n ou4j me\n ou0k e1dei o0yoi/aq‟, ou4j d‟ e1xrhizen ou0 gnwsoi/ato (OT, ll. 1273 – 
1274): a sko/toj, a darkness, which sees what ought not to be seen, and no longer 
knows what one wanted to know, on this day of groaning, ruin, death and shame 
(th=ide qh0me/rai stenagmo/j, a1th, qa/natoj, ai0sxu/nh, OT, ll. 1283 – 1284).   
Finally, Oedipus greets his daughters, Antigone and Ismene, with a repeatedly 
vocative and physically pleading gesture: deu=r‟ i1t‟, e1lqete w9j ta\j a0delfa\j ta/sde 
ta\j e0ma\j xe/raj (OT, ll. 1480 – 1481) – the hands with which he has recovered his 
sight by blinding himself, receiving, like Teiresias, who informed him of his deed – 
fone/aj se/ fhmi ka1ndraj ou4j zhtei=j kurei=n (OT, l. 362) – the internal sight of full 




At the end of Oedipus the King ... we do not have any clear sense of the 
outcome that is to follow the play‟s dreadful discoveries.   Will Oedipus be 
exiled, as he requests?   Will Creon force him to linger on in Thebes?   The 
presence of this uncertainty is particularly striking in a play that in other 
senses exhibits such strong closure, revealing the fulfilment of all the story‟s 
oracles and with them fulfilling the audience‟s expectations (Roberts, 2005: 
143). 
 
Not without its similarities, the sense of authoritative, official certainty is undermined 
by the tergiversation at the end of the Gospel of Mark.   The protest and challenge 
which the message of Jesus raised, the a0gw/n between him and the Jewish leaders, the 
ensuing conflict, has ensured a tragic conclusion, and here one of death, rather than 
one of exile or banishment.
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   When 0Iwsh\f a0po\  9Arimaqai/aj ... tolmh/saj 
ei0sh=lqen pro\j to\n Pila=ton kai\ h0|th/sato to\ sw=ma tou= Ihsou= ... Pila=toj ... 
proskalesa/menoj to\n kenturi/wna e0phrw/thsen au0to\n ei0 pa/lai a0pe/qanen: kai\ 
gnou\j a0po\ tou= kenturi/wnoj e0dwrh/sato to\ ptw=ma tw=|  0Iwsh/f (Mark 15: 43 – 
45).   Thus, the death is confirmed, but so too is the burial.   The description of the 
dismounting of the body of Jesus, its subsequent swathing and interment (Mark 15: 
46), if brief, is graphic, and some witnesses were watching: 
 
h9 de\ Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh\ kai\ Mari/a h9  0Iwsh=toj e0qew/roun pou= te/qeitai 
(Mark 15: 47).   Therefore, diagenome/nou tou= sabba/tou Mari/a h9 
Magdalhnh\ kai\ Mari/a h9  0Iakwbou kai\ Salw/nh h0go/rasan a0rw/mata 
i3na e0lqou=sai a0lei/ywsin au0to/n (Mark 16: 1). 
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 Coetzee‟s (2007: 21), possibly, thinly disguised „character,‟ “JC,” records the following „strong 
opinion‟ in his journal:   “No other way than death is a marker and perhaps even a definition of the 
tragic.”  
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But the visit of the women to the tomb is deeply perplexing, witnessing, perhaps, to 
the insanities of being human, a grace-filled liminality, which is indicative of the 
humanly experiential tension between present reality and future hope, of the human 
ability to appropriate the indicative mood of the present tense, but also of being gifted 
the use of the subjunctive and optative moods in their various tenses, of being human, 
and yet that very beingness a perennial question, a stasis as a stasis within the self, 
that beingness always in question, a constant solicitation, a soliciting shadow 
companion, of any concept of self.   Upon entering ei0j to\ mnhmei=on ei]don neani/skon 
kaqh/menon e0n toi=j decioi=j peribeblhme/non stolh\n leukh/n, “and they were 
astounded.” (Mark 16: 5).   The repetition of this word – e0kqambe/omai – in the 
following verse, and the assertion that  0Ihsou=n zhtei=te ... h0ge/rqh ... o3ti proa/gei 
u9ma=j ei0j th\n Galilai/an: e0kei= au0to\n o1yesqe (Mark 16: 6 – 7), unsurprisingly 
produces in the women tro/moj kai\ e1kstasij (Mark 16: 8), which, in Smith‟s (1995: 
161) rendering cited above, demonstrates the pathological insanity of the human 
experiment: “they completely lost it” (Mark 16: 5).   But that loss was inexpressible, 
and, stripped of the human act of apprehension, of metaphoric appropriation, they 
were speechless and fearful, in a surd-like state, in that mixture of irrationality and 
aphonia.   And the author ends with e0fobou=nto ga/r (Mark 16: 8), a fractured text for 
a fractured mood, perhaps a truthful dramatic fiction that may be appropriated when 
approaching the Gospel of Mark as a tragic play, if “[t]ruth is not what is uttered in 
full consciousness ... [but] ... always what „just slips out‟ – the typing error which 
gives the whole show away” (Durrell, 1958: 146).
104
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 France (2002: 673) contends that “the choice must be made” about the nature of the conclusion to 
the Gospel of Mark, and asserts that “my own inclination is to side with the increasingly unfashionable 
minority who find an intentional ending at 16:8 an unacceptably „modern‟ option.”   However, as 
suggested here, a dramatic recasting of the Gospel of Mark may be able to employ this textual 
fracturing productively.  
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How then to begin with that end in view, with those erroneously misplaced 
typographical inscriptions, those slippages, of the truth of a fiction?    How to ostend 
dramatically both the tragic reality of being human, of living in impending extinction, 
and also of capturing the aspirant vision of human promise, which, no less, is etched 
upon bodies and demonstrated in the enactive human experiment, to take that 
performance into the performative actions of life?   Furthermore, this Aristotelian 
inquiry also asks of a dramatic presentation of the Gospel of Mark: How are the loss 
and expectation, the unspoken bafflement of reality as well as the voiced optimism of 
an imaginative future, to be portrayed in Mark as drama?   Or, to clothe the question 
in dramatic costume:   How to retain the symbolism both of the astounded, amazed, 
and shattered women, and also of the glowing optimism of the young man; the two 
images themselves graphically portraying the “trumpet call” at the beginning and the 
“faint whisper of timid women” at the ending (Kermode, 1972: 67)?       
 
The pra=cij of a dramatic work, that central action, which was identified as distinct 
from the unfolding mu=qoj of a dramatic work in the previous chapter, toujours déjà 
resides in the inaugural mind of the Real Author, and is evident as an informing 
intentionality, or, indeed, intentionalities, in the hermeneutic conjectures of textural or 
ostensive participant interpreters, and is a textural-ostensive construct of the design or 
designs of the Implied Author.   But the perception of that design, or of that initial and 
final intentionality, more usually is both proleptic and analeptic for the reader or 
viewer – both variously presented with forthright obviousness or by veiled signals and 
cues in via, and also as a reflective act following the termination of the drama.    
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With respect to sacred scriptures, the attempt to reach that „truthful‟ purpose, in spite 
of the dogmatism of the committed apologists, is, one suggests, less direct than 
initially may appear to be the case, and, rather, engenders multiple stained-glass 
visions of seeing and perceiving.   In fact, the perennial combing of the small patch of 
graphic plantings made close to two-thousand years ago is witness to the 
undecidability of the definitive purpose of these holy writings, where the text and its 
performance, or the texts and their performances, constantly transgress bounded 
interpretations, and even ironize, perhaps mock, those walled gardens and fenced 
vineyards.   This jesting possibility argues for the delay of proposing a possible 
pra=cij, and rather of travelling via the above discussion of beginnings and endings 
towards a pra=cij.   The reference to Durrell (1958) earlier is not without import, 
since the reception by the narrator of the novel Balthazar of an “Interlinear” from the 
eponymous character generates the  
 
idea of a series of novels with „sliding panels‟ ... Or else, perhaps, like some 
mediaeval palimpsest where different sorts of truth are thrown down one upon 
the other, the one obliterating or perhaps supplementing another (Durrell, 
1958: 183). 
 
The opening statement of this work, and a notion returned to throughout it, highlights 
this erasural, replacing, and supplementing arena of the concurrent and changing 
fictional truths of being human, and locates human activity, as much as dramatic 
fictions, in medias res, and portrays the possibility of grappling with tragic import in a 
contemporary location.    
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This dynamic location and its act of worldview creation, which is subject to slippage 
and contestation, may be no less stable than any other historical site and its own 
perception of meaning; but, in spite of attempts to reify erstwhile conceptions of 
human purpose and well-being, it is the dominant stories of the past that become the 
inherited traditio.   Part of the challenge to a multivalent, classic, and thus revered, 
text is the endeavour to retain that openness of interpretive possibilities, and, here, to 
generate the route to a contemporary tragedy which appropriates a theological 
practice that inclines 
 
to subvert quotidian patterns of discourse to display better the supplementarity 
of the text that is its own achievement.   It is a choice to define a space where 
language can be drawn into a free performance displaying its own material 
presence and witness to the otherness that is absent ... Theology is thought in 
the margins of scholarship because it can no longer be itself and simply 
pretend to describe the world as it is or articulate religious doctrines that 
purport to describe the world as it is (Winquist, 1986: 93 & 96). 
 
An ostension of the language of the Gospel of Mark in a performative freedom that 
evinces a contemporary tragedy, one avers, begins in that marginal, confused, and 
timid ending, since it is this appropriation that will elicit a pra=cij of current, if 
liminal, import.   Such a delay in raising a conjectural pra=cij is also faithful to the 
acts of reading or viewing the „possible worlds‟ of texts and their ostension, because, 
as noted above, the central action emerges in the progressive act of reading, seeing, 
and hearing, and in subsequent, post-viewing, reflective practices. 
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Adverting to Bakhtin (1981), the “dialogic,” and, by extension, and perhaps more 
apposite, the multi-logic, nature of angled and glancing, direct and palpable discursive 
exchanges and viewpoints, engenders an uncertainty of singular purpose and permits 
the marginal solicitation of a fetching dramatic ostension, which is evident both in the 
tro/moj and e1kstasij of fo/boj of the women as they fled from the tomb of Jesus 
(Mark 16: 8), and also in the image of clothing, the stolh\n leukh/n ... 
peribeblhme/non (thrown around) the neani/skon (Mark 16: 5), as one possible 
textural tissuing amongst others.   To present the liminal tremor, as well as the tissued 
possibility, of an unstable text challenges dramatic creators; and, in addition, when the 
text not only is the subject of confessional raids but also, quite probably, is pivotal to 
the classic corpus of an e0pisth/mh, and, therefore, is widely known, even if in a 
general way, the ostension requires a degree of faithfulness to the lineaments of this 
traditional deposit, as well as to its layered and woven undecidability. 
 
Here, again, one may advert to the Oedipus Tyrannos, but, more specifically, to the 
particular performance of the play by the Västanå Theatre of Värmland, at the Odense 
municipal theatre in Denmark, in February, 1999.   Two years of preparations and 
discussions preceded the première, and the company embarked upon a dramaturgical 
analysis of the work, one that “brings together theoretical issues of hermeneutics, 
textual analysis and performance theory with practical, creative work in the theatre” 
(Rokem, 2006: 260).   The extensive and prolix traditions of interpretive, editorial, 
compositional, and literary examinations of the Gospel of Mark expand unceasingly, 
but one suggests that the proposals by Bilezikian (1977),
105
 Hooker (1991), Botha 
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 Bilezikian‟s (1977) work, which is unavailable in South Africa, was, it is understood, obtained with 
some difficulty by an anonymous scholar, and kindly dispatched to the present author, who received it 
immediately before the submission of this thesis.   Bilezikian (1977: 20 & 29) is the most forthright of 
the proponents, who observe dramatic features in the Gospel of Mark.   Although he presents his case 
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(1993), Shiner (2003), Dewey (2004), Fast (2005), Byrskog (2006), and Holland 
(2007)
106
 of partial or more comprehensive dramatic features in this gospel lack 
precisely those additional aspects of dramaturgical analysis, namely, of a performance 
theory, for which we have turned to Aristotle and his tragic protocols, and of theatre 
practice.   How is a performance to work, to be ostended, given the nature of the text 
and the informing theory of drama?    
 
The point of ingress to the Oedipus Tyrannos for the Västanå Theatre Company was 
the notion of riddling, of a text of “sliding panels,” to advert to Durrell (1958), of 
ambiguity, of engendering answers that fail.   Thebes, now afflicted by pestilence, 
receives news from the Oracle of Delphi that the visitation of these ills is the result of 
housing the slayers of the former king, Laius.   Whilst the play hails the lu/sij tou= 
ai0ni/gmatoj th=j Sfiggo/j, who had afflicted the people of Thebes by killing those 
who were unable to solve her puzzles, by the prwtagwnisth/j, that riddle was about 
the identification “of the animal that had one voice, but two, three, or four feet, being 
slowest on three” (Dawe, 1982: 103), and the answer to this riddle is the same answer 
to the „riddle‟ of the current plague, namely, a human being, and, in this instance, that 
person is Oedipus Tyrannos.   In fact, Oedipus, who had slain the Sphinx, becomes 
                                                                                                                                            
confidently (Bilezikian, 1977: esp. 51 – 106), Bilezikian (1977) also aptly displays a certain reticence 
(Bilezikian, 1977: 30; 109; 137), even though he seems more forthright on some occasions (Bilezikian, 
1977: 141) – even to the extent of attributing the choice of Greek tragedy to the author/s kerygmatic 
purpose (Bilezikian, 1977: 142 & 145) – than on others (Bilezikian, 1977: 137).   In contrast, this 
adjunctive document seeks not to view the Gospel of Mark as a Greek tragedy or to conjecture as to the 
author/s familiarity with the genre (Bilezikian, 1977: 48 – 50), nor to examine it as a classical tragedy, 
but rather to highlight its dramatic power as a classic and suggest how that dynamic may be „enacted.‟  
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 Although France (2002: 11 – 15) views the Gospel of Mark as a “Drama in Three Acts,” he states 
that “[t]his is not meant to suggest either that Mark designed it for „performance‟ in three sections, or 
that it is possible to discern clear breaks between the „acts.‟”   France (2002: 12) uses the dramatic 
idiom as a means of suggesting “how I discern the development of the plot, not about any indication 
Mark may have given of how he planned the structure of his text” (emphasis added).   However, 
almost immediately, he states that “suspense is woven into Mark‟s dramatic structure as a whole” 
(France, 2002: 20) (emphasis added).   It is precisely such denials and subsequent affirmations of the 
presence of the dramatic art in the Gospel of Mark that the current work attempts to avoid, by asking 
rather, why and how the Gospel of Mark may be read dramatically, and, quite specifically, as an 
Aristotelian tragedy.  
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another Sphinx for the people of Thebes, and who needs, in one way or another, to be 
„slain‟ if the dying is to cease. 
 
In order to retain the riddling quality of the play, but also to generate solutions 
through the performative act, the Västanå players presented their production as the 
memories of Oedipus‟s daughter, Antigone.   The play begins with the entrance of a 
girl, whom the leader of the xoro/j then approaches, and straightens and neatens her 
apparel.   Informing this particular mise en scène are the commensurate aspects of the 
text, its interpretation, and its practical dramatic ostension – the dramaturgical-
analytical approach – and for this company,  
 
it was important not to create any additional semiotic cues regarding the 
identity of the young girl until the very end of the performance, when she 
became directly involved in the performance calling out “Father.”   We 
wanted this performance, telling this well-known narrative, to contain an 
enigmatic, riddle-like quality regarding its inner structure.   For those 
spectators who were interested to decipher this aspect of the performance, it 
should remain an enigma that could only gradually be solved.   At the same 
time, though, it was important not to draw too much attention to this scheme in 
order not to disturb the progression of the play‟s central narrative of how 
Oedipus reveals his identity (Rokem, 2006: 265). 
 
This recasting of the Oedipus Tyrannos is suggestive when approaching the Gospel of 
Mark as drama.   First, by appropriating the final figures in the Gospel of Mark, 
namely, Mary Magdalene (as the only constant figure amongst the women, cf. Mark 
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16: 1; 15: 40 & 47) and the young man (Mark 16: 5), then seizing upon any clues of 
these figures in the text, and, finally, placing them at the beginning of the production, 
dramatic Mark assumes a riddling quality, which, as a Gospel that both overtly 
contains riddling exchanges – bad answers to good questions, false responses to 
honest interrogation, the persistent contrast between impercipience and discernment – 
it is also one that closes with a suspenseful, indecisive riddle.   Such a siting of these 
characters would inform the mu=qoj.   Second, this unfolding plot is generative of a 
pra=cij, and, for viewers, the central actions of dramas are retrospective meditations, 
undertaken when the sun sets (Gutierrez, 1973: 11), even if they are present in the 
inaugural authorial process.   Viewers of the Västanå presentation, reflecting upon the 
presence of Antigone at the beginning of the production and her subsequent 
appearance later, and to whom no dialogue is allocated in the text by Sophocles – a 
marginal absent-present image that becomes central owing to its silent „otherness‟ in 
the context of a possible dramatic world generated so purposefully by words (as are 
the classical dramatic works) – would not be constrained from returning to her 
subsequent appearance in Sophocles‟s earlier play, the Antigone. 
 
But, before doing so, since, subsequently, it has implications for the concept of the 
central tragic character, the dialogic, multi-logic, heteroglossic, and agonistic nature 
of the Gospel of Mark has „handed over‟ – paradi/dwmi – in a Judas act, i0dou\ o9 
paradidou/j me h1ggiken (Mark 14: 42), a traditio of contested interpretive 
possibilities, or has teased the tradition of commentary with riddles, with cryptograms 
to decipher, and to which various solutions and responses are proffered.   The Gospel 
of Mark admits, even embraces, riddles and bequeaths a riddle, and, whilst resistance 
to definitive answers remains vital (the provenance of this word is significant),  
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[t]he inherent ambiguity of the riddle text transforms the riddling situation into 
a kind of game, because the seemingly obvious solution, which as a rule is 
sexually provocative, has to be rejected in favour of a solution which is more 
difficult to find but which generally is more ordinary or everyday (Rokem, 
2006: 261). 
 
A “solution” suggested here, and one, indeed, “more ordinary or everyday,” defers, in 
our case, to a contemporary tragic significance, and to an answer which is a possible 
pra=cij of a tragic and dramatic Mark.   In order to provide an overarching sense of 
structural coherence to this riddle text, and also to present the drama of the Gospel of 
Mark with a sense of current import, it is suggested that, following the example in the 
Västanå production, o9 neani/skoj and Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ are retrojected to the 
opening of the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy.   This proposition contains 
fertile dramatic opportunities, which are not without theological import. 
 
Perhaps forming a narrative and choral function, or perhaps merely announcing the 
opening lines, or, alternatively, as silent presences – „Antigones‟ – it is suggested that 
these characters accompany the action in the tragic drama of Mark from the very 
opening scene.   A dramaturgical analysis, since it widens the scope for dramatic 
enactment by including an occasion for the selection from the interpretive corpus that 
accrues to a discursive formation, those augmentative “grilles de spécification” of 
Foucault (1969: 58), could appropriate four instances in the Gospel of Mark, two of 
which are conjectural, although one with less ground than the other, for the 
participation and identification of these two characters prior to their exposure as 
marginally central to the dénouement of tragic Mark. 
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The character of Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/, extends a dramatically inviting, if 
exegetically questionable, retrospective projection, but her presence elsewhere in the 
text must be sought.   Aware of, but contrary to, historical criticism, le premier pas 
commences in its textual shadow within a rejected part of the tradition.   In Mark 14: 
3 – 9, where h]lqen gunh\ e1xousa a0la/bastron mu/rou na/rdou pistikh=j 
polutelou=j, suntri/yasa th\n a0la/bastron kate/xeen au0tou= th=j kefalh=j (Mark 
14: 3), this gunh/ has been identified with Mary of Magdalene from as early as the 
fourth century (Hooker, 1991: 327; Taylor, 1966: 532).
107
   Because the „possible 
world‟ of a dramatic tragedy is being created, rather than an exegetical commentary, 
this identification, even without firm historical foundation, nevertheless contains the 
response from Jesus that proe/laben muri/sai to\ sw=ma/ mou ei0j to\n e0ntafiasmo/n 
(Mark 14: 8), and one that even the more historically vigilant exegetes may admit 
anticipates Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh\ kai\ Mari/a h9  0Iakw/bou kai\ Salw/nh h0go/rasan 
a0rw/mata i3na e0lqou=sai a0lei/ywsin au0to/n (Mark 16: 1).   The identification of this 
Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ with the woman who poured the expensive balsam of nard, 
therefore, is not surprising, but itself raises a riddle: Why would Mari/a h9 
Magdalhnh/ anoint the body of Jesus twice?   Here, in fairly stark form, the obvious 
answer – that the same woman did not undertake, or endeavour to undertake, both acts 
– is undercut by the answer submitted by this riddle text: She did not anoint the body 
of Jesus following his entombment, because she had already done so.   The role of 
Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ as an accompanying dramatic character, both as a participant, 
and yet, more importantly for ostensive purposes, also as an observer, of the unfolding 
mu=qoj, may be heightened towards the conclusion, where she was amongst some 
gunai=kej a0po\ makro/qen qewrou=sai the crucifixion and death of Jesus (Mark 15: 
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 France (2002: 550): “It was Ephraem in the fourth century who first suggested that she was Mary of 
Magdala.” 
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40), and, subsequently, was one of those who e0qew/roun pou= te/qeitai (Mark 15: 47).   
The reason for including the later three textual denotations of Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ 
with the earlier gesture of „anointing‟ by a gunh/ in Mark 14: 3 – 9 in the dramatized 
ostension of this gospel, is encouraged by the statement of Jesus: o3pou e0a\n khruxqh=| 
to\ eu0agge/lion ei0j o3lon to\n ko/smon, kai\ o4 e0poi/hsen au3th lalhqh/setai ei0j 
mnhmo/sunon au0th=j (Mark 14: 9).   And it is this latter textual legacy that has 
conferred the dramatic and interpretive concession of some invigorating fertility, and 
one that coheres with an encompassing dramaturgical approach. 
 
First, the account of a woman undertaking the act of anointing – whether of the head 
or the feet of Jesus, whether in the home of Simon the leper or in the home of Lazarus 
– appears with a variety of differences in all four gospels.   Whilst Kermode (1979: 
130) is referring to another passage in the Gospel of Mark, namely, the seemingly 
awkward insertion of the account of the death of John the Baptist in Mark 6: 14 – 29, 
his assertion is no less apt with respect to the attempts to resolve and/or conflate the 
disparate renderings of some core story about a woman and her anointing of Jesus: 
 
A favourite explanation of commentators not content to let the whole thing 
pass as clumsiness or a fortuity is that the episode was put in to fill [a] gap ...   
This, I‟m afraid, gives me an insight into the remarkable naiveté of 
professional exegesis when confronted with problems of narrative; behind it, 
perhaps, is a lingering obsession with historicity, a wish to go on thinking of 
the gospel narrative as a map of truth. 
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Kermode (1979: 130 – 131) asks some uncomfortable questions of these exegetes, 
and states that “[i]t is hard to avoid the conclusion that the commentators are swayed, 
perhaps unconsciously, by a desire to save their text from its own complexity ...” 
(Kermode, 1979: 131).   In fact, reminiscent of the dramaturgical approach to texts 
and their ostension, which “is a complex, heterogeneous activity connecting research 
and practice designed to reflect on, as well as to develop and enhance, the creative 
work of the theatre” (Rokem, 2006: 260 – 261; emphasis added), Kermode (1979: 
137) concludes that “I have been proposing that the device of intercalation in Mark‟s 
narrative is an emblem of many conjunctions and oppositions, which are found at 
many levels of the discourse” (emphasis added).   This “intertwining of forms,” which 
entails “l‟entrelacement tissant le système des differences” is the process through 
which “„le discours nous est né‟” (Derrida, 1972: 191), and it generates the text both 
in terms of its structure and its message, but also fissures the text in its very inaugural 
act for subsequent multiple readings, whether proximate or distal.   Thus, the 
familiarity of the words and actions of Jesus in the gospel accounts, whether to 
contemporary or modern and postmodern audiences, advances to a dramatist, and/or 
to a producer, and to a theatre company, the latitude to exploit that inaugural 
technique of textual weaving and braiding, and, thereby, of engendering a product, or 
a production, that employs the techniques of both familiarity and estrangement, and 
the estrangement of the familiar, in order to return the familiar in an altered guise and 
in an angled perspective.   Whilst, therefore, such consequent intercalating devices 
cast new light, and, indeed, new shadows, on the canonical accounts, they also allow 
for episodic disjunctions to be ameliorated and for repetitious units to be harmonized 
and, quite feasibly, made implicit in a single rendition, in order to ensure a less halting 
mu=qoj, and one that places a specific pra=cij proposed by the particular mise en scène 
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in higher relief.   Perhaps, even to a text held as sacred, these recastings are less 
hubristic than humbling, a recognition of human limitation, since 
  
it is far beyond us to reproduce the tacit understandings that existed between 
this dead writer and his audience.   Those accords are lost.   We cannot know 
the original generic set of Mark; and to read it against our own is to read it 
differently ... [and even if] ... We glimpse the secrecy [of the Gospel of Mark] 
through the meshes of a text; this is divination, but what is divined is visible 
from our angle (Kermode, 1979: 138 & 144). 
 
The complex, intercalated, and fissured nature of texts and textual readings liberates 
the gospels, and an individual gospel, from being forced upon a Procrustean bed of 
narratological or dramatic protocols as the texts or text stand/s, and permits the events 
to be modulated into an alternative key, with the necessary recension and 
restructuring that, in this instance, writes the body-text of an Aristotelian tragedy, and 
one in which may inhere current resonances.   When Malbon (1992: 24) proposes that 
the Gospel of Mark is a work of narrative, she employs a surfeit of dramatic 
denotations, and states that  
 
[t]he writer of Mark is no longer a cut-and-paste editor but an author with 
control over the story he narrates.   The Jesus of Mark is no longer a shadowy 
historical personage but a lively character.   Galilee and Jerusalem are no 
longer simply geographical references but settings for dramatic action.   The 
account of Jesus‟ passion (suffering and death) is no longer the source of 
theological doctrine but the culmination of a dramatic and engaging plot. 
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And although a narrative approach, as, indeed, a dramatic approach, to the Gospel of 
Mark advances obscured and neglected aspects of the work, editorial emendations 
would not be unrewarding, and, from a dramaturgical approach, engenders a 
proposition like that of employing the various instances of the appearance of Mari/a 
h9 Magdalhnh/ and, by appropriating a strand of the tradition, reading her into the 
account in Mark 14: 3 – 9, and then situating her as the narrator, a commentator, or as 
a silent witness – one who „watches‟ (Mark 15: 40), and „sees‟ (Mark 15: 47), and 
„acts‟ (Mark 14: 3) – at the opening of dramatic Mark, and allows her to accompany 
the events, again, feasibly, as narrator, commentator, or as silent witness, in a 
proposal that bears upon the pra=cij and its contemporary import.    
 
Second, the statement of Jesus that o3pou e0a\n khruxqh=| to\ eu0agge/lion ei0j o3lon to\n 
ko/smon, kai\ o4 e0poi/hsen au3th lalhqh/setai ei0j mnhmo/sunon au0th=j (Mark 14: 9), 
implies that the action of the woman in Mark 14: 3 – 9 is integral to the message of 
Jesus, and it is an action that, in the interpretation of Jesus, anticipates his death: 
proe/laben muri/sai to\ sw=ma/ mou ei0j to\n e0ntafiasmo/n (Mark 14: 8b).   This 
dramatic microséquence emphasizes a pra=cij, and one which we may appropriate, 
because the certainty of „discipline and punishment,‟ to allude to Foucault‟s Surveiller 
et Punir (1975), and here, of death, is consequent upon the protest, the challenge, and 
the conflict pivotal to the tragic genre; and it is inevitable for a character of such 
unyielding resistance, who refuses to be “enlanguaged” (Vorster, 1997: 397), or 
written upon, in „that ordering of things,‟ to adapt the English title to Foucault‟s Les 
Mots et les choses (1966), by the extant rules, codes, and ordinances of the 
community, society, or nation.   When Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ is identified in the final 
scenes of tragic Mark, and is perceived to have been present throughout the drama, 
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and is also the same woman who anointed the body of Jesus prior to his burial, then 
the desire to anoint the body after its burial cannot simply be answered by the fact that 
she did not do so, as proffered above, but, concomitantly, may be perceived as a 
confirmation of her identity and of her conviction that Jesus was dead.   Through her 
quiet acts and observations, the presence of this woman denotes the tragedy of human 
protest of a radical and revolutionary kind, and suggests that her tro/moj kai\ 
e1kstasij and astounded silence is engendered rather by the assertion of o9 neani/skoj 
that h0ge/rqh and o3ti proa/gei u9ma=j ei0j th\n Galilai/an: e0kei= au0to\n o1yesqe (Mark 
16: 6 & 7).   In contrast to this claim of resurrection, the human person, for Mari/a h9 
Magdalhnh/, is a „being unto death,‟ and the gaze, in its classical sense of the view of 
the spectator, and, in addition, of an act of mental consideration, looks on and looks 
into the tragic figure of protest – a beholding no less of admiration for the actions of 
that person than one of resigned acceptance of the consequences of those actions.   
“The viewpoint of tragedy,” Aylen (1964: 164) succinctly states, “is the viewpoint of 
death.” 
 
But there is another fellow traveller, who, likewise, may be written into a role of 
narrator, commentator, or silent witness.   In spite of the conjectural identification of 
the woman who anoints Jesus in Mark 14: 3 – 9 with Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/, inherent 
in the texture of the text, in its iterative telling, is the story of this woman who, as 
Kilgallen (1998: 111) notes when reflecting on the Lukan account (Luke 7: 36 – 50), 
“works only in gesture,” since the proclamation of the gospel story necessarily entails 
relating these anticipatory obsequies of unction, and engenders Crossan‟s (1991: 416) 
proleptically contributory comment to the above proposal, namely that “[o]ne could 
surely ... make a better case for Mark-as-woman obliquely signing her manuscript by 
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that sentence at 14:9 than one ever did for Mark-as-man obliquely signing his by that 
flapping nightshirt in the garden at 14: 51 – 52.”  
 
Adapting an authorial function to the dramatic arena, and adopting the oft-conjectured 
propinquity between the Implied Author and the first-person narrator focalizer in the 
diegetic world; here, in order to maintain a coherent theme that may be suggestive of 
a pra=cij, the recounting of the story may be better served by handing over that 
implied authorial role to a homo-mimetic narrator-observer, because internal to the 
mimetic world of the dramatic work is the unfolding mu=qoj, which requires that 
telling or witnessing, whilst outside it is the reflective pra=cij, which is gleaned from 
the mimetic production, and is the province of the Implied Author.    
 
But Crossan‟s (1991: 416) dismissal of the neani/skoj as the autographic author is not 
without the possibility of the “naked young man” occupying a similar role to that 
suggested for Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/.   The dramaturgical-analytical approach would 
furnish the productive inquiry with the hermeneutical material that, inter alia, denotes 
the two verses relating to the appearance of the neani/skoj, namely, Mark 14: 51 – 52, 
as “a total enigma” (Hooker, 1991: 352), and his role in the gospel as “utterly 
baffling” (Miller, 1992: 410).   But these riddling aspects merely emphasize the 
riddling nature of the story and, as a text in search of a solution to its puzzles, the 
neani/skoj may be an absent-presence who informs and presents the adversative, yet 
complementary, tragic solution to the drama of that of the women, and of Mari/a h9 
Magdalhnh/ in particular.    
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However, before turning to that aspect of kathartic dénouement and its import for the 
pra=cij, when the interpolated interlinear erasures are presented to a theatrical 
production as it attempts both to blend and braid the text and its interpretive tradition 
and possibilities, and then, subsequently, engender a viable ostension, various fertile 
connections could be forged.   First, the link between Mark 14: 51 – 52 and the final 
eight verses of gospel contain the same kind of allusive relationship which the 
references to Mari/a h9 Magdalhnh/ in Mark 15: 40; 47; & 16: 1 traced upon the 
woman in Mark 14: 3 – 9.   In Mark 14: 51 – 52, neani/skoj tij sunhkolou/qei au0tw=| 
peribeblhme/noj sindo/na e0pi\ gumnou= kai\ kratou=sin au0to/n: o9 de\ katalipw\n th\n 
sindo/na gumno\j e1fugen, whilst, in Mark 16: 5, the women who entered the tomb 
ei]don neani/skon kaqh/menon e0n toi=j decioi=j peribeblhme/non stolh\n leukh/n.   The 
association between the two instances has been noted, if dismissed, by Hooker (1991: 
352 – 353), who, when commenting on Mark 14: 51 – 52, states: “Another 
[perspective] links the story with the young man (here too a neani/skoj) dressed in a 
white robe who announces Jesus‟ resurrection in 16:5, interpreting both references in 
the light of later baptismal practice, where a convert took off his/her garment before 
immersion and put on a white one afterwards.”   But, even if the rejection of the 
associative conjunction between the two accounts is based on the information that the 
young man e1fugen, in Mark 14: 52, and that the garment, in Mark 14: 51 – 52, is a 
sindw/n, whilst that in Mark 16: 5 is a stolh\n leukh/n, an interesting interpretive 
conduit is opened by the statement that Joseph of Arimathea kaqelw\n au0to\n 
e0nei/lhsen th=| sindo/ni kai\ e1qhken au0to\n e0n mnhmei/w|  (Mark 15: 46), or, as Hooker 
(1991: 353) declares, but, in fact, also concedes in her accentuation: “Jesus dies alone, 
and it is he who is wrapped in a linen cloth (sindw/n)” (original emphasis).   Thus, 
both the neani/skoj and  0Ihsou=j “share” a sindw/n, but, perhaps more significantly – 
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that is, signifying, communicating, generating citational relations – the young man 
who fled acts out both the emotions of Jesus in the Garden of Gethsemane, who 
h1rcato e0kqambei=sqai kai\ a0dhmonei=n (Mark 14: 33), the expression of those 
emotions, peri/lupo/j e0stin h9 yuxh/ mou e3wj qana/tou (Mark 14: 34), and the plea: 
pare/negke to\ poth/rion tou=to a0p‟ e0mou= (Mark 14: 36).   An additional marginal 
link shelters in the use of e0kqambe/omai in Mark 14: 33 and in Mark 16: 5 & 6, with 
Taylor (1966: 552) remarking that “[t]he difficulty of translation is manifest” in the 
former verse, where he cites Rawlinson‟s “shuddering awe” and Swete‟s “terrified 
surprise,” and notes later that it is a word which Mark “alone among NT writers uses” 
(Taylor, 1966: 606).   In the former, Jesus is “amazed;” whilst, in the latter, the 
women are “amazed” and are told not to be “amazed.”   The translation in the 
Authorized King James Version of e0kqambei=sqai in Mark 14: 33 as “sore amazed” 
attempts to retain the sense of distress and trepidation, and, perhaps, of a revelatory 
shock that Jesus experienced, which, one suggests, would approximate to a personal 
realization of the consequences of the a0nagnw/risij that, we will propose, resides in 
Mark 8: 27 – 30.   Furthermore, the sense of grief and surprise, of fear and of 
experiencing a startling blow, is similar to the response of the women in Mark 16: 5, 
ameliorated little by the statement of the young man that they ought not to be 
surprised (Mark 16: 6), and which evokes a confused, yet kathartic, realization of the 
inevitable consequences to the life they had known, a response that, once again, 
foregrounds a pra=cij, with its sense of „hopeful fear.‟ 
 
But, additional promise for the dramaturgical approach may be present in the episode 
of the neani/skoj than Crossan (1991: 416) dared to allow.   This „daring‟ is not 
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without import when recasting known stories, even the classics of the tradition,
108
 and 
the discarded and embalming sindw/n may engender a suggestive conflation of 
character, which may be a feature of the jostling riddles woven into the text and, as 
will be noted, into its palimpsestical tissues, and which may enable a tragic pra=cij to 
emerge from, and with the contribution of, the dissembling surface of the text.    
 
Resident in the arena of information available to the dramaturgical-analytical 
exploration of a mise en scène of tragic Mark would be two excerpts from the Secret 
Gospel of Mark, which, probably, are prior to canonical Mark (Crossan, 1991: 328 – 
329; Miller, 1992: 5; but cf., Hooker, 1991: 353, n. 1).   But, whilst the matter of 
linear historicity is of less significance here than the performative capacity that they 
contain, the preserved accounts, more particularly the former, that appear in a 
fragment of a letter of Clement to Theodore at the end of the second century CE,
109
 
may unseal the hermeticism in which the mystery of the canonical ending is enclosed.   
The first of these excerpts, which may be inserted at Mark 10: 34, tells of the raising 
of a neani/skoj, who had died in Bethany, by Jesus after having been approached by 
the sister of the deceased youth.   Both Jesus and the woman proceed  
 
into the garden where the tomb was.   Just then a loud voice was heard from 
inside the tomb.   Then Jesus went up and rolled the stone away from the 
entrance to the tomb.   He went right in where the young man was, stuck out 
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 Recalling the account in the Odyssey of Oedipus and the marriage to his mother, and impact on 
Aristotle of Oedipus Tyrannos by Sophocles in the Poetics, Dawe (1982: 3) states that, at an emotional 
level, Sophocles had enacted a transformation by “play[ing] on certain latent terrors that are part of 
man‟s nature in all kinds of societies and at all epochs; terrors whose influence may pervade our lives 
in ways we scarcely guess; and if we are aware of them at all, it is because our eyes have been opened 
by Sigmund Freud, upon whom this play made such a profound impression.”     
109
 “It was discovered in 1958 by Morton Smith of Columbia University in the Greek Orthodox 
Monastery of Mar Saba between Bethlehem and the Dead Sea” (Crossan, 1991: 411). 
 195 
his hand, grabbed him by the hand, and raised him up.   The young man 
looked at Jesus, loved him, and began to beg him to be with him.   Then they 
left the tomb and went into the young man‟s house.   (Incidentally, he was 
rich).   Six days later Jesus gave him an order; and when evening had come, 
the young man went to him, dressed only in a linen cloth.   He spent that night 
with him, because Jesus taught him the mystery of God‟s domain.   From there 
(Jesus) got up and returned to the other side of the Jordan (Secret Mark 1: 4 – 
13, in Miller, 1992: 411, which contains both excerpts in full; cf., Crossan, 
1991: 329 & 412 for both excerpts). 
 
Whilst it may be fashionable in some ecclesial communities, or in some provinces of 
those churches,
110
 to incorporate this passage in dramatic, or, indeed, canonical, Mark, 
owing to its homo-erotic character, it must also be borne in mind that, if this pericope 
from Secret Mark provides evidence of baptismal practice, women would also partake 
of this ritual of initiation. 
 
For the purposes of furnishing supplementary material for the dramaturgical analysis 
of a production of the Gospel of Mark, and based on the priority of Secret Mark and 
the homosexual or, simply, erotic, allusions in it which were objectionable, Crossan‟s 
(1991: 414 – 416) proposes that the above account is edited, reformulated, and 
disseminated in the later canonical Mark.   The „raising‟ of the young man, who, it 
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 It may be suggested that the account in the Secret Gospel of Mark would have particular relevance 
to the Episcopal (Anglican) Church of the United States following the consecration of an openly gay 
bishop, but a regional acceptance precisely is what threatens the unity of the Anglican Communion.   
As Treloar (2008: 62) states: “For good, possibly, a broad church with soft edges has flourished 
seasonally and regionally, creating a healthy dialectical environment for theological discourse.   For ill, 
certainly, implicitness has for too long governed its hermeneutical theories and argumentative practice.   
Under such conditions it is too easy for ecclesial identity-formation to become culturally fraternal, and 
thus biblically fratricidal and idolatrous.”    
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may be recalled, spoke before being brought out of the tomb, is projected on to the 
life of Jesus, as, indeed, is the presence of three women in the second of the two 
fragments of Secret Mark (see Miller, 1992: 411; cf. Crossan, 1991: 412). 
 
Whilst Crossan‟s (1991) bold venture that „original Mark‟ ended with the 
proclamation of o9 kenturi/wn ... a0lhqw=j ou[toj o9 a1nqrwpoj ui9o\j qeou= h]n in Mark 
15: 39 is not without importance to tragic Mark, it would be problematic to employ 
such a recension of the Gospel of Mark, if only for the import already yielded to the 
women and their reaction in Mark 16: 1 – 8, which would, therefore, deter the 
perspective of a tragic pra=cij emerging from beginnings and endings. 
 
But what Secret Mark does cast (again, a suitably dramatic term) upon the ending of 
canonical Mark, and, more widely, upon a dramatically tragic reading of the Gospel 
of Mark, is solicitous in the tremor it effects, and also is solicitously enticing.   
Kermode (1979: 64), in his examination of the problematics of Mark 14: 51 – 52 and 
its obscured ancestor, states that “it seems not unlikely that in the two verses we have 
been considering [that is, Mark 14: 51 – 52] the secret gospel is showing through, a 
radiance of some kind, merely glimpsed by the outsider.”   This Brechtian sense of 
estrangement engenders some proposals for a dramaturgical-analytical tragic Mark. 
 
First, the account of the empty tomb in canonical Mark 16: 1 – 8 is stripped of any 
literal claim that it may make about the resurrection of Jesus, and is reconceived as a 
literary and dramatic device by means of which the relevance of a life and message 
may be retained, even propounded.   An additional, although, admittedly, somewhat 
strained, reason for the rejection of Secret Mark – and even if it is unnoticed by 
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Crossan 1991); nevertheless, it may lend tangential imaginative support to his 
hypothesis both with respect to the exclusion of the contentious passage and with 
respect to the ending at 15: 39 of „original‟ Secret Mark – may have as much to do 
with the erotic connotations in the passage as with the connotation that the extract is 
an account which is less about resurrection, than with a story about a young man who 
is buried alive, for whatever prankish – perhaps the young man closed the tomb 
himself and then discovered that neither he nor his sister were able to remove the 
stone at the entrance of the tomb – or more serious reason.   In this „writerly‟ sense, 
the anger of Jesus, in verse 4 of Secret Mark, may be directed less at “the disciples 
[who] rebuked her [the woman]” (Secret Mark 1: 3), than at the woman and her 
brother for their foolishness.   Therefore, appropriating this dramatically creative 
possibility, it was when Jesus observed the expression on the face of the neani/skoj, 
and realized that his fear was genuine, that Jesus and his disciples went off to his 
home (Secret Mark 1: 9), possibly in order to comfort and reassure both him and his 
sister, and, in addition, for refreshment.   In the light of these conjectures and, more 
profoundly, in the arena of tragedy, this account of the „raising of a young man‟ 
foregrounds the fear of dying (cf. Mark 14: 33 – 36), and the hopeless hope of 
resurrection (cf. Mark 16: 7 – 8) – that is, that the future tense of human possibility 
resides less as a result of entombment upon death, than in the celebration of life.   And 
where the additional information about the „wealth‟ of the young man, in Secret Mark 
1: 9, evokes feasting and celebration, with its Eucharistic significance of the 
productive sacrificial promise of death, and, perhaps more particularly, of the 




[a]n old pair of shoes ... [which] ... when they are finally past serving will pass 
on something of the spirit of service as they are consigned with some parting 
sorrow to the rubbish dump.   The very rubbish dump will be transformed, for 
everything that ever served should be given a decent burial (Mackey 1987: 
188). 
 
Second, the „shared‟ sindw/n asserts an identification of the neani/skoj with Jesus at 
the critical points of desertion and death and, concealed behind the act of desertion in 
Secret Mark, is the point of embarking upon the path of discipleship through the rite 
of baptism.   By initially appropriating the latter and embedded reference as 
dramaturgically significant, the mise en scène is able to invoke the opening baptismal 
scene of the Gospel of Mark and, in particular, the baptism of Jesus.   Baptism 
signifies the act of commitment to a cause, a commitment that involves pursuing a 
path that, in this case, leads to death.   The dual identity of the young man/Jesus or 
Jesus/young man engenders the meta-fictional possibility where this dual 
identification morphs into an accompanying commentator or witness, with the 
associative evocation of the prwtagwnisth/j observing his own life.   Whilst not 
examining “Mark‟s Naked Disciple” in the extra-canonical account, Hatton (2001: 35 
– 36) states that 
 
the historical focus of past and recent studies [of Mark 14: 51 – 52] has 
assumed the historicity of the story, and with few facts to work with, the 
struggle to reach a consensus on the real behind the story is interminable.   
Facts are hypothesized, sometimes tortuously, to advance possible historical 
explanations.    Of course, leading commentators have stated that there is no 
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good reason for Mark to have included this story unless it was based on a real 
event (Taylor 1963 [1966]: 561).   I disagree with that conclusion, as I believe 
that there are good reasons to have included it other than reflecting real 
memories ... [and] ... this article will not take a stand on the historicity of the 
event.   Instead, it will bracket its historicity, and take a literary tack ... to 
discover [what] significance may derive from the young man text‟s 
strangeness and difficulty.  
 
Of the five verbs that appear in Mark 14: 51 – 52, Hatton (2001: 36 – 37) foregrounds 
the first of these, namely, sunhkolou/qei, and he is attentive to the past continuous 
time of its Imperfect Tense.   He then refers to its one other occurrence, in Mark 5: 37, 
in the account of the raising of the daughter of ei[j tw=n a0rxisunagw/gwn (Mark 5: 
22), probably the child of Jairus – an account that, one may propose, may be one of 
Crossan‟s (1991) dispersed fragments of Secret Mark, since the one who is raised ou0k 
a0pe/qanen a0lla\ kaqeu/dei (Mark 5: 39) – and notes that the intensification of 
a0kolouqe/w – the sun – closes the space between the follower and the followed, 
suggesting the proximity of accompaniment, rather than the distance of pursuance.   
In Mark 5: 37, sunakolouqe/w refers to “the closest and most privileged disciples 
[and thus] seems to point to the young man as particularly close to Jesus” (Hatton, 
2001: 37), whilst the first use of a0kolouqe/w occurs in Mark 1: 18, where the first 
disciples h0kolou/qhsan au0tw|=, and the use of the dative denotes “attachment to the 
person” (Taylor, 1966: 169).   Hatton (2001: 38) employs the notion of 
“„following‟/discipleship” as a sub-text, an intra-textual device of disturbance, and of 
self-referential commentary.   This narrative use resists the wider thematic manner in 
which discipleship ruptures the diegetic world as an informing theme.   From a 
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dramatic perspective, the act of discipleship, of response to the call of the 
prwtagwnisth/j, operates both within the mimetic world and outside it.   Here, we 
draw close to the pra=cij, but first a final reference ought to be made to the 
neani/skoj in Mark 16: 5.   It may be less profitable to view this young man as an 
angel (Gould, 1896: 300; Nineham, 1963: 444; Taylor, 1966: 606 – 607; Hooker, 
1991: 384) than as both the same young man of Mark 14: 51 – 52 as well as the self-
referential prwtagwnisth/j, who, in his own act of following himself – that is, 
following in the i1xnoj of his own words and actions – is changed by those who see 
him.   Indeed, tragedy is transformatively equilibrating. 
 
Thus, the beginning of tragic Mark is viewed through the ending.   It is an ending 
which resides both prior to dramatic Mark and is its instaurative marker.   At the 
opening of a dramaturgical-analytical performance of an Aristotelian tragic Mark, 
stand a woman and a man.   The man is wrapped in a sindw/n; the woman stands 
behind him, as the one who sees.   She is both spectator and actor.   She is watching 
and being watched, and the audience who sees her accompanying the drama, now 
stepping forward in the dramatic ostension of Mark 14: 3 – 9, now observing the 
events of crucifixion and burial in Mark 15: 40 & 47, finally witnesses her reaction in 
Mark 16: 1 – 8, and perceives in her the one side of the tragic action.   Closer to the 
dramatic enactment of the gospel events, the young man, sometimes indistinguishable 
from the primary character, deserts the cause in Mark 14: 51 – 52.   But his nudity 
may signify more rather than less of his commitment, since he appears transformed, 
transformed in that manner in which tragedy both changes everything and yet changes 
nothing, tells the same story, and yet tells it differently.   The woman and young man, 
devoted followers, observing the construction of meaning and its meaninglessness, are 
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the ironizing influences in a gospel of dissemblance, disclosing the answer to the 




Jones (1962: 24) states that “in the Poetics ... an action is a form which the tragedian 
contemplates, and it stands logically and chronologically before the business of 
composition,” and whilst we have noted Halliwell‟s (1986) hesitation in agreeing with 
Jones (1962) entirely in his earlier work, later Halliwell (2005: 404) appears to draw 
closer to a more definite distinction between an authorial purpose – the pra=cij – and 
the plot – the mu=qoj – in which the intent unfolds. 
 
Before turning directly to the Gospel of Mark, some examples are cited with respect 
to Aristotelian notion of the pra=cij in the Poetics as interpreted in Chapter Three 
above.   First, together with the Septem and the Persae, Kitto (1939: 22) identifies the 
Prometheus Bound
111
 as an “Old Tragedy,” where “the essence ... was not one 
character joined in conflict with another, but the solitary hero facing his own destiny 
or playing out an inner drama of his own soul.”   That “essence” is not the pra=cij of 
the unfolding mu=qoj according to our exploration above, rather it is, for Kitto (1939) 
at least, the core concept of the plot-structure, behind which resides the pra=cij of the 
play, which, one avers, centres on the conflict between two gods: the one, 
Prometheus, takes on the human cause against the other, Zeus, who is the supreme 
god.   The latter, the recently inaugurated ruler, has “from time to time entertained the 
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 On issues of authorship, of proposals concerning a „Promethean Trilogy,‟ which would include 
Prometheus Unbound and Prometheus the Fire Bearer, and of where the Prometheus Bound may to be 
located in a sequence, see Griffith (1977: 17 – 18, 252, 254; 1983: 32), Herrington (1970: 119), Taplin 
(1977: 240), Bers (1977: 44).  
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idea of destroying man altogether” (Murray, 1940: 88), whilst the former, now being 
chained to the rock face by the lame god of fire and the crafts, the metal-smith 
Hephaestus, under the supervision of the servants of Zeus, Kra/toj and Bi/a, has 
ensured the survival of humanity by giving them fire.   Implicit in the antagonistic 
relations between Zeus and Prometheus, is the empowerment of human beings, where 
fire signifies survival of both the material and physical kind.   Therefore, the play 
reaches beyond the issue of personal conflict – of the disobedience of one god leading 
to his condemnation and punishment by the other god, which Kitto (1939) seems to 
concentrate upon – to the power given to, and accepted by, human beings.   The 
power relations – h9 du/namij – the dynamics between the gods and the mortals are 
redefined by the acquisition of fire.   Thus, human beings become „enlightened‟ close 
to their distant inauguration, rather than in Kant‟s Aufklärung.   But a pra=cij is 
always sous rature, and, recently, Bollack (2006: 79) has engendered the possibility 
of reading the Prometheus Bound as a “seminar” in dialectic over “the meaning of the 
conflict that has erupted between himself [Prometheus] and Zeus ... [and which] 
amounts to something like an initiation, an apprenticeship in research – and a very 
human one in its way.”   This notion supports reading the play as more than that 
immediate conflict between the two gods.
112
     
 
Second, the pra=cij of a play of some importance to this study, and one that also  
reflects the recent history of South Africa, but, perhaps, may be of more significance 
to its present and possible future, is The Island, which was devised by Athol Fugard 
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 The Trappist monk, Thomas Merton (1996: 369 – 370), records a highly personal response to this 
play in a journal entry:   “January 17, 1960, II Sun Post Epiphany ... After dinner – read the 
Prometheus Bound of Aeschylus.   Shattered by it.   I do not know when I have read anything so 
stupendous and so completely contemporary ... A great religious experience.   Prometheus, archetypal 
representation of the suffering Christ.   Prometheus startles us by being more fully Christ than the Lord 
of our own clichés – I mean, he is free from all the falsifications and limitations of our hackneyed 
vision which has slowly emptied itself of reality.” 
 203 
(1995), John Kani, and Winston Ntshona.   It appropriates the historical account of a 
performance of the Antigone on Robben Island (see Mandela, 1994: 540 – 541; 
Sampson, 1999: 234 – 235), a prison in Table Bay, where Nelson Mandela, Walter 
Sisulu, and other political prisoners were incarcerated in 1963, during National Party 
rule in South Africa.   The Island was first performed in 1973, and relates to the 
production of the Antigone, of which Norman Ntshona, one of the Serpent Players, is 
the source (Fugard, 1995: 232).   The play deftly illustrates the dual nature of the 
trajectory of the tragic mu=qoj, as it endeavours to engender the emotional sympathy of 
the audience for the dilemma of its prwtagwnisth/j, and then to turn the identity 
into difference in the kathartic experience.   Here, in terms of the pra=cij, Winston, 
who refuses to play a girl and who dismisses the drama of the Antigone, for which 
they are rehearsing, as “child‟s play,” is contrasted with the more idealistic John.   
However, when John receives information that his sentence of ten years has been 
reduced to three years, which leaves him with three months to serve, Winston now 
relates in some detail what John will do when released.   And central to John‟s 
relative „freedom‟ will be his forgetfulness: “You will laugh, you will drink, you will 
fuck and forget” (Scene 3).   Concomitantly, even inside the prison, the political 
causes which have led to their incarceration are receding, and Winston, reflecting on 
“old Harry, Cell Twenty-three, seventy years, serving Life! ... He‟s forgotten himself.   
He‟s forgotten everything ... why he‟s here, where he comes from,” realizes that the 
same is “happening to me, John.   I‟ve forgotten why I‟m here” (Scene 3).   The 
pra=cij of the Antigone by Sophocles, which coheres around the notions of the 
necessity of political power, about its influence and allure, and, more importantly, 
about its potential to isolate the ruler and pervert the responsibility of the ruler to the 
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ruled and impair the relationship between the two, is a pra=cij that Mandela (1994: 
540 – 541) aptly summarizes: 
 
At the outset [of the play], Creon is sincere and patriotic, and there is wisdom 
in his early speeches when he suggests that experience is the foundation of 
leadership and that obligations to the people take precedence over loyalty to an 
individual ... But ... Creon will not listen to Antigone, neither does he listen to 
anyone but his own inner demons. 
 
But that may be a pra=cij that may rest too heavily upon The Island.   Thus, in the 
opening scene of Fugard‟s The Island, with its endless digging and accumulating piles 
of sand, “lasting about ten painful minutes” (Wertheim, 2000: 89), Steiner (1984: 
144) sees “[b]eyond the blank desolation of the close of Sophocles‟ play” and 
perceives the “pure waste” of power, which ravages those in authority, but, one 
suggests, it is a “waste” that is implicit at the close of the Sophoclean drama.   More 
definitively, perhaps, the authors of The Island extend the reaches of the Antigone.   
The retention of the first names of the actors, John Kani and Winston Ntshona, as the 
names of the characters in the play, compels a transgression of the boundaries of „art‟ 
and „life;‟ and thus the pra=cij of The Island reaches beyond that of the Antigone by 
Sophocles in portraying both the oppressive serrations of the physical inscriptions of 
the apartheid regime (Wertheim, 2000: 98), and also the devastating ability of power 
to erase adversative inscriptions and cause the amnesia of subjection. 
  
Third, it is suggested that the pra=cij of Equus by Peter Shaffer (1973) employs 
amongst its “surfaces of emergence” a less enchanted world, or, perhaps more 
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strongly, an “enlightened” and “modern” worldview, which rejects seeing beyond the 
present (Act II, 35), as well as the sophisticated and restricted “grilles de 
spécification” (Foucault, 1969: 58) of the discipline of child psychiatry, child welfare, 
and, more precisely, the psychiatric diagnoses of mental illness (Act I, 1).   The 
pra=cij questions the judgements of normality and abnormality in mental health, and, 
more profoundly, the purpose and limitations of psychiatry itself.   As Dr Dysart 
begins to treat the deranged boy, Alan Strang, who has “blinded six horses with a 
metal spike” (Act I, 2) with hypnosis, he states: 
 
The Normal is the good smile in a child‟s eyes – all right.   It is also the dead 
stare in a million adults.   It both sustains and kills – like a God.   It is the 
ordinary made beautiful; it is also the Average made lethal.   The Normal is 
the indispensable, murderous God of Health, and I am his Priest (Act I, 19). 
 
Normalization, Dr Dysart avers, is to remove passion (Act II, 35) and a depth 
dimension to human personality that inspires beyond the modern, restricted, ordered 
and known secular world.   Dr Dysart sees himself as a 
 
finicky, critical husband looking through his art books on mythical Greece.   
What worship has he [Dr Dysart himself] ever known?   Real worship!   
Without worship you shrink, it‟s as brutal as that ... I shrank my own life (Act 
II, 25). 
 
Stated succinctly, the play reveals 
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the ultimate inadequacy of intellectual schemes in accounting for human 
experience, an inadequacy we recognize, if only secretly, an inadequacy 
symbolized in the mysterious unfathomable image of Alan‟s man-horse-god, 
Equus (Chaudhuri, 1984: 295). 
 
Fourth, and more briefly, it may be suggested that the central action of Shakespeare‟s 
King Lear concerns “suffering represented as a condition of the world as we inherit it 
or make it for ourselves” (Kermode, 2000: 184). 
 
These pra/ceij reside outside the mimetic world of the drama, and whilst their 
discovery often requires analytical and reflective skill, within a dramatic work, and 
not infrequently close to the a0nagnw/risij in a tragic drama, the viewer or reader of 
a play may reach 
 
the moment of interpretation, the discovery or choice of what, after Dilthey, 
might be called an “impression point.”   One may perceive in a life some 
moment that gives sense and structure to the whole ... it is part with a relation 
of particular privilege to the whole.   A work of art, he believed would have 
this same impression-point, around which the whole gestalt must be 
articulated (Kermode, 1979: 16).
113
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 An example from literature: in Dante‟s Commedia, Reynolds (2006: 168) locates the “impression 
point” in Canto 19 of the Inferno, in the third ditch of the eighth circle of Hell.   There Virgil and Dante 
see Pope Nicholas, who reigned from 1277 – 1280, and who was accused of nepotism and simony, and 
it is “[a]t this point, Dante reaches not only the climax of his inspired oration but the very core of the 
purpose of the Commedia: to proclaim the principles of justice by which the world should be 
governed.”   Temporal power had accrued to the Church in the West owing to the mediaeval document 
known as the Donation of Constantine, which was then thought to be a genuine fourth-century 
document, of which Dante, the pilgrim, states: 
Ah, Constantine, that was indeed a curse, 
not thy conversion, but thy dower which  
first filled with wealth the Holy Father‟s purse! (Inf. XIX, 115 – 117) 
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Drawing on the body-power of the classical, and the classically sacred, texts, which 
inscribe their various traditions of being human upon their body politic; appropriating 
the interpretive reading of the Poetics, which prioritizes the pra=cij of a tragedy, and 
viewing the beginning of dramatic Mark through its ending, this work, as a 
prolegomenon to reading, or viewing, the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy, 
and one that endeavours to highlight a contemporary significance to such a dramatic 
recasting of this briefest of gospels, reaches its own “impression point,” beyond which 
that recasting can be undertaken.   Thus, the pivotal questions enter and attend:   What 
is the pra/cij of tragic Mark; and, by extension, what is the pra=cij of a 
contemporary-ancient Aristotelian tragically dramatic Mark?    Chapter Three has 
established a reading of the Poetics which foregrounds the principles of an ancient 
tragedy – its serious and important subject, its mode of enactment, its appropriate 
tonal variety, its turn of events, its character fault-line and change of fortune, and its 
emotional identification – but what are the constituent features of a contemporary 
tragedy? 
 
The issue, the definition, even the possibility, of a modern, or, indeed, post-modern, 
tragedy generates aporiai – difficulties, perplexities, and interpretive lacunae.   
Dramatic works in the English-speaking world always have refused to employ the 
Aristotelian protocols,
114
 and European playwrights modified Aristotle‟s principles 
and restricted them.   Although in his Defense of Poesy (1595), Sir Philip Sidney, as 
noted, appealed to the locative and temporal neo-classical unities, where “[t]he stage 
... should always represent but one place, and the uttermost time presupposed in it 
should be, both by Aristotle‟s precept and common reason, but one day” (cited by 
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 Thus, for example, an essay question for students of English at Downing College, Cambridge: 
“Greek tragedy is very different from anything we mean by drama” (MacKillop, 1995: 162).  
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Steiner, 1961: 19; also 18 – 20; and see Carlson, 1984: 82 – 83), the eclectic and 
braided “origins of the English imagination,” in which “the beauties „of roughness 
and of sudden variation, joined to that of irregularity‟” are evident “were also the 
qualities originally associated with English drama ... [where] ... [t]he emphasis is upon 
fluidity rather than formality, upon the manifestations of organic process rather than 
of any fixed design” (Ackroyd, 2002: 70).   If, on the one hand, the principles of 
tragic drama were over-formalized in the European corpus – a lapidary economy of 
action in one site at one moment; and, on the other hand, definition was evaded by the 
English corpus, many twentieth-century theorists have resisted the very possibility of 
tragedy and 
 
[p]erhaps this is one reason why the world of Beckett, along with history after 
Auschwitz, have been seen as post-tragic.   There can be no more tragedy ... 
because a monstrous excess of the stuff has finally obliterated our sense of the 
value by which it might be measured.   We have supped too full of horrors, 
and even „tragedy‟ is a shallow signifier for events which beggar 
representation.   There can be no icons of such catastrophes, to which the only 
appropriate response would be screaming or silence” (Eagleton, 2003: 64). 
 
Such an anguished cry or stilled mutism imposes itself, because  
 
the case for a recognition of our age as most probably the blackest is strong.   
Statistics are vital, but they mock the imagination.   We cannot take in the 
figures.   Conservative estimates put at circa 75 million the total of men, 
women and children gunned, bombed, gassed, starved to death, slaughtered 
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during deportations, slave-labour and famines between 1914 and the close of 
the gulags ... Five British infantrymen died every fifty seconds during the first 
days on the Somme ... It is a matter of macabre semantics, offensive to reason, 
to try and determine, whether or not, and in what ways, the Shoah, the 
Holocaust is unique; whether or not it defines a singularity in the history of 
mankind” (Steiner, 1997: 105 – 106). 
 
The reaction persists when confronted by Rwanda, the Sudan, acts of terror and 
imposed „democracies‟ – the word transgresses semantic fields – and where “100 000 
men, women, children were buried alive – should one write, let alone try to attach 
meaning to such a sentence? – in the killing-fields of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge” 
(Steiner, 1997: 106 – 107).   Although Steiner has not moved from his 1961 thesis of 
„the death of tragedy‟ (see Walsh, 2008: 6), homo quaerens quaerens continues the 
search for a definition of the tragic, even if only in the stammer and stutter, in the 
gesture, of protest.   Indeed, various modes of articulating human creativity, and that 
primary mode, that of communicable speech, are themselves the purveyors of Paul 
Celan‟s “Black milk of daybreak” (“Deathfugue”) to the victims in the Nazi 
Concentration Camps (see Felstiner, 1995: 31 – 32; also Steiner, 1958: 117 – 132).   
Thus such markers of humanity and conduits of being human choke, crack, contract, 
and are condemned.   But, Adorno did relent from his prohibition on the possibility of 
„poetry after Auschwitz,‟ stating that “[p]erennial suffering has as much right to 
expression as the tortured have to scream” (cited in Felstiner, 1995: 232).    In this 
muzzled and tremulous stillness, central to the search for, at minimum, the 
adumbrations of the demarcating lineaments of a contemporary tragic genre is a 
vocalization of that impeded and muffled „tortured scream,‟ both by attaching value to 
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existence itself and to its human guest, and also by commissioning an ethics of 
virtuous responses to perceived contextual conflicts and crises.   Unsurprisingly, the 
reply of the virtuous receives attention, but this may lead to an exaltation of the 
prwtagwnisth/j and the transfer of the tragic into the realm of wish-fulfilment, 
where  
 
[t]ragedy, as classically conceived, belongs with an ethics of crisis and 
confrontation – of revelations, momentous turning-points, dramatic 
disclosures and existential moments of truth, all of which turn their face 
aloofly from anything as drearily prosaic as everyday virtue.   Yet if Aristotle 
is the theorist of tragedy, he is also the founder of so-called virtue ethics, for 
which moral values are embedded in habitual ways of life (Eagleton, 2003: 74 
– 75; see also, Frye, 1957: 210).    
 
Indeed, the tragic is political in that it concerns a po/lij, a community bounded to 
some degree by their habits of life, and, within that milieu, tragedy emerges as a 
resistance to a form of writing, the writing of the codes of behavioural restriction 
upon the body, in the attempt to create a specifically tamed and marked, branded 
„political anatomy.‟   And if its protest is at all transformative; nevertheless, it 
confronts the imposed politically sanctioned and institutional violence with a practical 
morality – a morality about mores – the morals and modes of human well-being.   The 
tragic individual is driven less by inner conviction than by social pressures and 




Søren Kierkegaard thought that the difference between ancient and modern 
tragedy lay in the fatal hypertrophy of subjective consciousness in modern 
times ... The post-classical hero is responsible for his downfall with a sense of 
individual agency we never see in Greek tragedy; modern tragedy leaves 
behind a clarified despair, ancient an open sorrow: “Our age has lost the 
substantial categories of family, state and race.” 
 
Classical tragedy, as argued earlier, does not foreground the tragic protagonist at the 
expense of the action and its outworking in the plot, nor does it focus upon the 
individual subjective conscience of the primary character in the tragedy, whether that 
modern, alienated, self-ruminating mystic, or the self-styled revolutionary or activist 
driven by an inner conviction.   When dissent arises, or more purposeful defiance, it is 
less through an inner vision than through a realization – sometimes more thoroughly 
understood by the characters than at other times – engendered by the material, 
political, and social reality.   The plague on Thebes (Oedipus Tyrannos), the 
impending demise of humanity without the means of survival (Prometheus Bound), 
the ritual practices for the dead (Antigone), generate conflict and confrontation.   And 
it is around the issue of this conflictual engagement that authorial intention resides.    
 
In the Antigone, a play by Sophocles, and one of perceptible alliances that comport 
with the Gospel of Mark, since it relates the adherence by the eponymous heroine to 
the sacred over the secular, 
 
[t]he fundamental question is not whether Thebes can contain both Creon and 
Antigone or whether it would be a just and stable city if it housed only 
 212 
Antigone or only Creon ... The final, inescapable question is whether it can, 
whether it should, contain either.   But if the answer is No, how, then, is man 
to test the bounds ... of his condition?   And how, then, is he to be host to the 
gods? (Steiner, 1984: 262 – 263) 
 
The answer, rather, is “Yes.”   The po/lij is to contain both a Creon and an Antigone, 
both the imposition of law and the act of civil disobedience.   The tragic, one asserts, 
resides in this challenging confrontation – in the inscriptions that the city writes upon 
the individual and in the resistance to a prescribed enlanguaged anatomy within a 
fateful arena.   When the codes are broken, when the boundaries are transgressed, 
even the „blind-sided‟ Oedipus must submit to exile, because the residual content in 
any and every challenge by the tragic „hero,‟ or the conflict in which he or she is 
ensnared, is propriate u3brij.   Thus, informing classical tragedies, and, arguably, 
even their modern or post-modern counterparts – with their interminable waiting, 
silences, and sealed rooms – are forms of resistance which resistance cannot 
overcome.   These fail because, finally, they are challenges against a universe of 
imposed rule.   Leaning upon the extremity of tragedy, where an inexorably 
enshrouding darkness does not subvert the a0po/fasij of the gods, 
 
[a]bsolute tragedy is so exceedingly rare a form precisely because it negates 
the up-beat, the pendulum-swing towards hope which seems to be ingrained in 
human sensibility.   Absolute tragedy, which comprises a handful of Greek 
tragedies, Marlowe‟s Faustus, Shakespeare‟s Timon of Athens (there are 
ambiguities of compensation at the close of Lear), Racine‟s theatre of 
Jansenist retribution, tests the reflex of Capaneus, the blasphemer among the 
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Seven Against Thebes, who, even in Dante‟s Inferno, scorns salvation.
115
   
Tragedy perceives the world as does Ivan Karamazov when he sends back to 
God his „ticket of admission.‟   It extends to Act V the logic of damnation.   In 
very rare instances – and it is these which human imagining finds close to 
unbearable – tragedy confronts the possibility of nothingness ... (Steiner, 1984: 
280 – 281). 
 
It is this „nothingness that the women told to nobody‟ at the end of the Gospel of 
Mark that invites this gospel to be included amongst those “absolute tragedies;” that 
impending and evident muteness that is perceptible in its own fragmentation, its 
disintegrating stammer: ga/r ... (Mark 16: 8).   But the presence of the young man 
whom the women find in the tomb draws dramatic Mark away from the terminus ad 
quem of the tragic genre, from the edge of the utter a0pori/a of being human.   The 
kataphatic language of so much of this Gospel – the kerygmatic proclamations, the 
healing of the ill, the feeding of the hungry, even the forthright challenges to the 
Jewish leaders – is accompanied by the apophatic denials, hesitations, 
misunderstandings, and attempts to change an inexorable fate.   In the a0po/fasij of 
the women and the kata/fasij of the neani/skoj, in Mark 16: 1 – 8, is the suggested 
“impression point” that discloses the pra=cij of this gospel, or, in this instance, of 
tragic and dramatic Mark.
116
   In this gospel, the human condition is revealed as an 
i1xnoj that traces the “devenir-espace du temps ou devenir-temps de l‟espace” 
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 Dante divides the seventh circle of the Inferno into three, the third includes those who blaspheme 
against God: “The only blasphemer named in Capaneus, one of the seven kings who took part in the 
siege of Thebes and who while scaling the city wall boasted that not even Jove could stop him and who 
in his damnation still defied God” (Reynolds, 2006: 146). 
116
 It has been repeatedly stated that readings of classic texts always are partial, and others will adopt 
“impression points” or central actions through which to view the Gospel of Mark.   For Wright (1992; 
1993: 393), the „little apocalypse‟ in the Gospel of Mark performs this function: “Mark 13 is not 
simply about something other than the life trial and death of Jesus; it is the lens through which those 
earth-shattering events (let the reader understand) must be viewed.” 
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(Derrida, 1972a: 14) – a spacing temporalization of perennial movement between the 
realization of human limitation and of hope, which, quite probably, is embedded in 
our enlanguaged selves, in our capacity to employ counter-factual worlds and futures 
unknown, and which are portrayed in the speech possibilities of the subjunctive and 
optative moods and the future tense.   And these language and imaginative capacities 
of being human are as evident in music, in liturgy, and in art, as they are in socio-
political and economic ideologies, and, quite possibly, underpin the more immediate 
rationales of frontier scientific and medical research.   In the tension between human 
power, which is constrained by an imposed divine or cosmic restriction, and the 
human faculty of imaginative transcendence, which invokes futurity, lodges the 
advent and the departure of being human.   Thus it was suggested that to read the 
Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy with a pra=cij true to its genre engenders a 
mise en scène that places its ending in analepsis at the beginning.    
 
Tragic Mark is kataphatic and apophatic, both affirming and qualifying human 
agency.   But in its modern, or, perhaps more appositely, post-modern form, it 
appropriates an „ichnotic‟ existence (not unlike, and yet surpassing, a kenotic one, cf. 
Phil. 2: 6 – 11), where the i1xnoj, the trace “est l‟effacement de soi, de sa propre 
presénce, elle est constituée par la menace ou l‟angoisse de sa disparition 
irrémédiable, de la disparition de sa disparition” (Derrida, 1967a: 339).   Where this 
self is in an anguished state, threatened by its own incurable erasure, 
 
On a huge hill,  
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will  
Reach her, about must, and about must go; 
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And what the hill‟s suddenness resists, win so;  
Yet strive so, that before age, death‟s twilight, 
Thy soul rest, for none can work in that night,  
To will, implies delay, therefore now do. 
(John Donne, Satire 3: “Kind pity chokes my spleen,” ll. 79 – 85). 
 
In the „now doing,‟ aware that, unlike Donne, one may no longer „win so,‟ but, rather 
perpetually „about must, and about must go,‟ another „inaugural‟ thinker, the mystic, 
Denys the Areopagite of the late fifth and early sixth centuries, also „goes about,‟ and 
in his inner journeying, reaches beyond the kataphatic affirmation and its apophatic 
denial.   To know the unknowingness of God, who, in a variety of formulae, 
approximates to „dark light‟ and „light darkness,‟ and „silent music‟ and „musical 
silence,‟ is to employ, what Turner (1995: 21 – 22) has called, the “„self-subverting‟ 
utterance,” which is 
  
the natural medium of a theological language which is subjected to the twin 
pressures of affirmation and negation, of the cataphatic and the apophatic.   
We must both affirm and deny all things of God; and then we must negate the 
contradiction between the affirmed and the denied.   That is why we must say 
affirmatively that God is „light,‟ and then say, denying this, that God is 
„darkness;‟ and finally, we must „negate the negation‟ between darkness and 
light, which we do by saying: „God is a brilliant darkness.‟   For the negation 
of the negation is not a third utterance, additional to the affirmative and the 
negative, in good linguistic order; it is not some intelligible synthesis of 
affirmation and negation; it is rather the collapse of our affirmation and 
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denials into disorder, which we can only express, a fortiori, in bits of 
collapsed, disordered language ... (Turner, 1995: 22; original emphases).                
 
It is such as these anarchic and confounding expressions that both agitate and disperse 
the characters in the final scene of tragic Mark.   Located in a réseau of 
unknowingness, one of deranged despair and frantic hope, the text fractures.   And it 
is at this moment, arguably, that contemporary ka/qarsij is experienced. 
 
The message that is refracted through the classic text of the Gospel of Mark informs 
of a central character with the gods, or God, on his side.   But none can claim the 
singular sanction of the divine will; and those who engender conflict and 
confrontation, those of a tragic vision and disposition, confront their own enslavement 
both to their own creatureliness as well as to the visions and dispositions of others in 
their human sphere.   The eponymous Antigone draws close to the modern tragic hero 
or heroine, for whilst 
  
a civic order of religiosity ... [and] ... the encompassing of worship in the 
general politics of decency, are a positive element in the Sophoclean vision of 
rightness ... [in the Antigone] ... [w]e are worlds away from any Homeric or 
Aeschylean stress on the imminent substantiality of the preternatural.   
Antigone draws about herself an ethical solitude, a lucid dryness which seems 
to prefigure the stringencies of Kant.   She is abstemious in respect of the 
transcendent.   This, too, is part of her implacable discretion (Steiner, 1984: 
270 – 271). 
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It is this isolation, this sense of self-determined or personally convicted verity, that 
portrays the modern tragic character as both challenger to, and victim of, the secular 
powers, following the final and irrevocable recusance of the gods.   Fists may be 
shaken against a silent sky, but it avails nothing.   Once again, it is possible that the 
Antigone breaks loose from its fated bondage and adumbrates the despairing moments 
in the gospels, and also predicts the later tragic forms of alienation,
117
 because when, 
finally,  
 
[p]ossessing, possessed by so graphic a vision of her impending fate, Antigone 
is no longer in trusting touch with the springs of her action.   Her closing 
speech, spiralling upon, darting against itself, has the wild truth of 
contradiction.   At the same time, it belongs to the topos of a last flinching 
before a willed, accepted self-sacrifice.   Similar movements occur in the 
Gospel narratives of the agony in the Garden ... (Steiner, 1984: 279). 
 
Indeed, the isolation of Jesus, with respect to his family, disciples, wider community, 
and even his God evokes both the modern tragic character and that ancient 
Sophoclean forbear, because in  
 
[a]bandoning her sister, destroying the prospects of a future family, acting on 
behalf of Polyneices the individual, and estranged from her betrothed, 
Antigone is a solitary figure with little understanding of her connections with 
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 Steiner (1984: 210): “After Ismene‟s initial refusal to help bury Polyneices, Antigone will not again 
resort to any dual forms.”   The power of Antigone‟s challenge to Creon‟s male order has been 
appropriated by many feminist thinkers; however, Walsh (2008: 5 – 6) foregrounds the disturbing 
notion that Antigone, when rejecting Ismene, simultaneously rejects female solidarity and opts for a 
model of male heroism.    
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the community of people that surrounds her ... although she gestures towards a 
communal understanding of the self ... (Walker, 2008: 212 – 213). 
   
It is this self-will, this inner self-professed, declared, and enacted purpose – perhaps 
„prejudice‟ better signifies its self-reflexive doctrinaire quality – that is the mark of 
the modern tragic figure, whose conviction remains unshakable, and who, like that 
divine forebear, Prometheus, resists to the end, but in an act of revolt that will invoke 
no divine assistance.   The devastation left in the wake of political ambition – indeed, 
u3brij – during the twentieth century has been adverted to above, and the portrayal of 
its consequences, notably prior to the dysphoria with words which followed the 
Shoah, engendered a  
 
dramatic Expressionism ... [which] ... had its beginnings in Germany in the 
turbulent and traumatic years during and after World War I.   Germany had 
more than two million War dead and over four million injured.   The country 
was defeated and its economy devastated … The German expressionist play is 
typically written from the internal perspective of the protagonist (the Ich, the I, 
the soul).   The central figure often appears in an agony or ecstasy of protest or 
alienation or rebellion and his or her most characteristic expression is the 
famous schrei or cry (often compared to Edvard Munch‟s painting “The 
Scream” of 1893).   The protagonist‟s cry is the ultimate expression within the 
play of the schrei to which the whole mise-en-scène is directed (Cotsell, 2005: 
84).  
   
And, redolent both of Antigone and of the Jesus in the Gospel of Mark,  
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What separates the central characters (or the central idealism) from those 
around them (external or inner), other than their agony, is that they search for 
meaning and change.   They may do this as alienated individuals, as poets, as 
lovers, as visionaries or as political rebels.   For them the world is in a crisis.   
They are the questers and the Cassandras, the scapegoats and the martyrs, the 




But, the pra=cij of the dramatic tragedy of Mark exceeds the cry of the modern 
prwtagwnisth/j, who, rejected and despised, vilified by those in positions of power 
and influence, retreats into a world of isolated self-righteousness and sullen muteness; 
and neither does it evince a blighted Oedipus shuffling off into exile, a victim of his 
own u3brij, but a fortiori cornered by, and trapped in, a fate that toujours déjà had 
indicted him, nor does it ostend the resigned but intransigent Antigone,
119
 who, when 
led away to her death, states: 
 
w] gh=j qh/bhj a1stu patrw=ion 
kai\ qeoi\ progenei=j, 
a1gomai dh\  0gw\ kou0ke/ti me/llw. 
leu/ssete, qh/bhj oi9 koirani/dai, 
th\n basileidw=n mou/nhn loiph/n, 
oi[a pro\j oi3wn a0ndrw=n pa/sxw, 
  th\n eu0sebi/an sebi/sasa (ll. 937 – 943). 
                                                 
118
 Steiner (1984: 19), concerned with the continuing fascination with the Antigone by Sophocles, asks: 
“What intention attaches to the repeated hints (in de Quincey, in Kierkegaard, they are more than hints) 
that Antigone is to be understood as a counterpart to Christ, as God‟s child and messenger before 
Revelation?” 
119
 Griffith (1999: 282) comments on the lines cited (ll. 937 – 943): “Ant[tigone]‟s indignation 
continues unabated to the end, and her words recall those of Prometheus (A. Prom. 93 i1desqe/ m‟ oi[a 
pro\j qew=n pa/sxw qeo/j, and esp. 1093 e0sora=ij m‟ w9j e1kdika pa/sxw), as she calls on witnesses 
(940. leu/ssete) to her undeserved sufferings.” 
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But, in fact, over the shoulder of the indignant and monadic agitator of later tragedy, 
stands not Antigone but the Antigone.   The pra=cij of this play appears to lie – again, 
the double entendre – close to the dual-sided pra=cij of tragic Mark.   In the same 
manner in which this prolegomenon to an Aristotelian reading of the Gospel of Mark 
suggests revisiting, analysing, recasting, and creatively reinterpreting this classic and 
sacred story as a dramatic tragedy with contemporary import, so the Antigone is a 
play that has undergone similar editorial recensions.   Perhaps its cause resides with 
both Antigone and Creon, who, when conflated, almost exemplify both the u3brij and 
the inexorable defeat in death of being human as a single character, because one 
submits that its politics is not without contention: 
 
Jean Anouilh wrote his version of Antigone during the Second World War in 
Paris, and it was produced under Nazi occupation.   The Nazi censors found 
Creon‟s arguments convincing and were happy to give permission for its 
performance – while the French audience revelled in Antigone‟s resistance.   
So the story goes: in fact, the politics were far more complicated.   Not only 
was Antigone also seen as a dangerously suicidal self-interested martyr, but in 
a production shortly after the war the French audience even cheered Creon‟s 
words about social order (Goldhill, 2007: 135). 
 
The complexities abound, for not only did Nelson Mandela played Creon in a 
performance of the Antigone on Robben Island (Brink, 1997: 166; Goldhill, 2007: 
135), but Fugard‟s The Island (1995), as noted above, recalls that mise en scène, and 
tells of two inmates, John [Kani] and Winston [Ntshona], preparing for a production 
of this play (Brink, 1997: 166; Steiner, 1984: 143 – 144).   On the one hand, the 
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boldly foregrounded pra=cij of the resistant struggle against state power is evident in 
Antigone‟s action; on the other hand, after Winston has taken on the role of Creon, 
that pra=cij receives a more subtle aspect, when John has his prison term commuted 
into a life sentence.   Now he is baited and vexed by Winston, and the idealistic notion 
of principles and resistance begins to crumble, in a more textured and “complex 
portrayal of the attractions and corruptions of power, and the inevitability of 
domination in human social relations” (Goldhill, 2007: 139; emphasis added).   That 
inscriptive dominance returns as a society‟s prevailing “regime of truth, its „general 
politics‟ of truth – that is, the types of discourse it accepts and makes function as true” 
(Foucault, 2000b: 131).     
 
Framing this chapter are two paintings.   The first is The Crucifixion, painted by 
Graham Sutherland for St Matthew‟s Church in Northampton, and completed in 1946.   
The date is not insignificant, since one of the two primary informing authorities for 
this work was a series of photographs of the emaciated victims and ravaged corpses of 
the Nazi Concentration Camps.   Unsurprisingly, the second primary influence was 
the central panel of the Isenheim Altarpiece of Matthias Grünewald
120
 (c. 1515), of a 
crucified Christ covered by blistering sores, which symbolized his identification with 
the victims of the plague, who were housed in the Monastery of St Anthony for which 
the work was painted.   The Jesus in the Gospel of Mark stands both prior to, and 
consonant with, the starving, the dying, the dead.   The endeavour to change the 
course of history in a radical way, to challenge the authorities, to refuse to submit to 
the prevailing brand of society and rather to rewrite it, is evidence of a lacerating 
a9marti/a, which hopes where hope will be mangled and crushed, and which also 
                                                 
120
 The identity of the artist is somewhat disputed, see Gombrich (1972; 1989: 268ff.). 
 222 
demonstrates u3brij, even if now no longer pro\j ta\ pneumatika\ th=j ponhri/aj e0n 
toi=j e0pourani/oij but only pro\j tou\j kosmokra/toraj tou= sko/touj tou/tou 
(Eph: 6: 12).   But that is only one side of the pra=cij of dramatic Mark.   In the 
second painting, that by Caspar David Friedrich, entitled, Easter Morning (1833), 
which hangs in the Museo Thyssen-Bornemisza in Madrid, the hopeless hope of being 
human engenders both the perplexity of the women, who visit the tomb of Jesus 
(Mark 16: 1 – 2), and the confidence of the neani/skoj (Mark 16: 6 – 7), to blend and 
mingle in a faint and barely conspicuous anticipation.   Here, it is li/an prwi6 (Mark 
16: 2), the moon remains visible, although now the light appears from the impending 
dawn beyond it.   If the vegetation adumbrates a dimly perceptible spring emerging 
out of the bare winter, the figures stand in the pose of a resigned silence.
121
   In their 
sta/sij resides the knowledge of what they will find at the cemetery;122 in the 
contrast between the fading moonlight and the encroaching sunlight resides the 
sta/sij that witnesses to the du/namij of life.   Tragedy is about the power and the 
cost of being human, whether in relation to God, the gods, nature, and/or to men and 
women, or, in Hodgson‟s (1992: 219) wider purview of the dramatic works “from 
Ibsen to Fugard”: “The dramatic form from Aeschylus to Brecht has also provided a 
model of the way events relate and people interact, in processes of chance, fate and 
choice.”                            
      
Tragic protagonists threaten and fracture worldviews, whether unknowingly, like 
Oedipus, or, more often, knowingly, like Antigone and Jesus.   Their accosting 
challenges and conflicts entreat eschata, endings for the sake of new beginnings.   
                                                 
121
 Thomas (1979: 146): “There is a sublimated religiosity in Caspar David Friedrich, whose 
melancholy landscapes epitomize the German romantic spirit.”    
122
 Bilezikian (1977: 96) observes in the women “their complete lack of anticipation of anything 
unusual.” 
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But, in the tragic genre, those endings are thwarted both by the limitations of being 
human, and also by the socio-economic and political, religious, familial, and cultural 
scripts that dictate, define, and attempt to constrict the only speeches that subjects can 
utter.   Thus, the Gospel of Mark is “dark” and “strenuous” (Barton, 1992: 63 & 65), 
and if “[w]ithin the New Testament as a whole Mark sounds a fairly solitary note” 
(Schillebeeckx, 1979: 422), here it is the singular sound of the tragic that is 
insinuated.   F.R.Leavis, one of “the great academic critics of the earlier twentieth 
century” (Mullan, 2006: 3), and who dominated the English studies at Cambridge 
University during that period, in his ratiocination on the tragic reached for the notion 
of “impersonality,” asserting that tragedy evokes  
 
impersonality in which experience matters, not because it is mine – because it 
is to me it belongs or happens, or because it subserves, or issues in, purpose or 
will, but because it is what it is, the „mine‟ mattering only in so far as the 
individual sentience is the indispensable focus of experience (cited by 
MacKillop, 1995: 249; emphasis added). 
 
Leavis would quote Yeats‟s gnomic utterance: “I saw plainly what should have been 
plain from the first line I had written, that tragedy must always be a drowning, a 
breaking of the dykes that separate man from man,” and MacKillop (1995: 250) 
summarizes these notions with the aphorism: “Literature shows, as it were, where the 
self stops.”   Indeed, literature, or, perhaps more exactly, tragedy, reflects human 
limitation, and ostends in performance the conflictual nexus between the fetters and 
the desired freedom of being human.   It is suggested that this paradox is evident in 
the Gospel of Mark, and thus is proposed as the pra=cij of tragic Mark, since, not 
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only is it faithful to the tragic genre, but it evinces the genre itself, proffering an 
answer to the Gospel of Mark of “the hiddenness of God, and, at the end, Jesus‟ 
mysterious absence” (Barton, 1992: 39).  As a compendium of this tragic action, 
Schweitzer (1954: 368 – 369) compels adducement:  
 
The Baptist appears, and cries: “Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at 
hand.”   Soon after that comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the 
coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on 
that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close.   It refuses 
to turn, and He throws Himself upon it.   Then it does turn; and crushes Him.   
Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them.    
The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great 
Man, who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of 
mankind and to bend history to His purpose, is hanging upon it still.   That is 
His victory and His reign.” 
 
Purpose and cause; fate and history.   Tragedy is enacted in this arena, where the 
purposes and causes of the protagonists are subjected to fate and to history.   And 
whilst tragedy often exemplifies noble causes – tragw|di/a mi/mhsij pra/cewj 
spoudai/aj kai\ telei/aj me/geqoj e0xou/shj (Poetics 1449b 24 – 25) – and involves 
an action that coheres around charismatic central characters, the best tragedies show 
that the protagonists fall e0c eu0tuxi/aj ei0j dustuxi/an mh\ dia\ moxqhri/an a0lla\ di‟ 
a9marti/an mega/lhn (Poetics 1453a 15 – 16).   It is the „impersonality‟ of that 
a9marti/a for which Aristotle argues: it is not an act of moxqhri/a, whether it is the 
fated deeds of Oedipus or the civil disobedience of Antigone.   With apposite 
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dramatic heightening, Anouilh (1951: 34 – 35) places a suitably proximate 
understanding of tragedy, and its vital kathartic dimension, in the words spoken by the 
Chorus of his Antigone:   “Tragedy is clean, it is restful ... It has nothing to do with 
melodrama ... Death, in a melodrama, is really horrible because it is never inevitable 
... In a tragedy, nothing is in doubt and everyone‟s destiny is known.   That makes for 
tranquillity.”    
 
KA/QARSIS KAI\  9AMARTI/A 
 
Whilst the differences between classical and neo-classical tragedies and those of 
Shakespeare have been emphasized above, for Leavis “Macbeth was his prototype of 
a Shakespearean tragedy, a play „comparatively simple‟ but in which the cosmic and 
the day-to-day knitted „wonderfully‟ together” (MacKillop, 1995: 175).   The Neo-
classical dramatic principles of the three unities: unity of action – that is, a consistent 
and coherent outworking of a single theme, message, or purpose, without 
irrelevancies; unity of place – that is, a limitation of where the events within the 
unfolding mu=qoj occur; and, unity of time – that is, a severe restriction on the period 
over which the events take place, and where the latter two serve the former, enhance 
an economic concision that exclude the extraneous and focus upon the essential, 
rendering a “„comparatively simple‟” structure and ordering, and, at its best, result in 
a tragedy that exhibits an Attic elegance.   The conflictual nature of tragedy has been 
emphasized, in which the  
 
[d]rama embodies the struggle against material and impersonal forces, which 
can destroy both from without and within.   In tragedy and comedy, in 
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different ways, the kinship which develops between an audience and the 
character who struggles asserts the existence of a common humanity 
(Hodgson, 1992: 220). 
 
Here those universal and the quotidian dimensions are related – the “cosmic and the 
day-to-day” – and, in tragedy, it results in a ka/qarsij, which is the product of 
differential identification.   Writing of Patrick White‟s Voss, Larsen (2007: 369) 
draws on this notion and, helpfully, links the a9marti/a to the ka/qarsij:  
 
The genre of tragedy, by its form, was supposed to release a shared cathartic 
effect in spite of the individual and extraordinary fate of the characters, 
because the conditions that caused the tragic event to happen, hamartia, is the 
fate of everyone. 
 
Tragedy delivers katharsis when the spectator identifies with the events on the stage, 
with the plight of the characters, with the cause of the protagonists, in a mixture of 
fearful pity and identification, and the resultant differential restoration of equilibrium.   
The dramatic beginning of the Gospel of Mark with “an exultant announcement of the 
subject, then the splendidly wrought narrative of John the Baptist ... [and the] ... 
irruption of a hero full grown and ready for action” (Kermode, 1979: 69) calls forth, 
at least, an interest in what subsequently may occur, but 
 
Mark, it appears, could not maintain this decisiveness, this directness.   He 
grows awkward and reticent ... The story moves erratically ... the whole thing 
ends with the greatest awkwardness of all, or the greatest reticence: the empty 
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tomb and the terrified women going away.   The climactic miracle is greeted 
not with rejoicing, but with a silence ... (Kermode, 1979: 69). 
 
But this is the “silence” of the ordinary (cf. Rokem, 2006: 261; Leavis in MacKillop, 
1995: 175), the return of equilibrium, the ka/qarsij that results from the tragic.   The 
identification called for is too high a price for the audience to pay and the portrayal of 
that cost too graphic, too painfully inscriptive. 
 
Tragedy, one has argued, is „played out‟ in the space between identification and 
difference – identification with the causes and the characters with a concomitant 
evocation of the passions, but difference from them in the ka/qarsij which is 
embedded in the central action: „Yes‟ to Antigone, but „No‟ to her fate; „Yes‟ to 
Prometheus, but „No‟ to his torture; even „Yes‟ to Oedipus, who symbolizes the 
fateful lot of humanity, but „No‟ to his act of self-punishment; „Yes‟ to Jesus, but 
„No‟ to his wounds.   Ka/qarsij resides in the sympathy for the cause, pity for the 
protagonist, fear for the self, and the subsequent transition from spectator in the 
theatre to actor in the world.   Ka/qarsij, engendered by a “possible world,” is 
suffered (pa/sxw), is undergone, in the “real world,” where the experience of being 
human, that a0nqrw/peia poi/hsij, that act of „making human,‟ is undertaken.   Like 
the tragic action, it finds meaning outside “such stuff/ As dreams are made on” 
(Shakespeare, Tempest, IV. 1). 
 
It is the pra=cij and the ka/qarsij that, in a particular sense, frame the drama – on 
the one hand, the intent, the purpose, the message of the dramatic work; on the other 
hand, the experience of sameness and difference, of the resigned pose of Casper 
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David Friedrich‟s women, who know what they will find and yet who are shocked 
and disturbed by what they find. 
 
The ka/qarsij is related to the a9marti/a as the identification with the faultless fault 
of Oedipus, or, equally, with the faultless fault of the human endeavour to strive 
beyond the imposed limitations of being human and being a subject.   Recognition 
that human existence is both a bounded apportionment and a transgression of 
boundaries fuses and secures the auditor to the fateful lot and the endemic protest of 
those subjected to the dramatic world. 
 
Embedded in that protest is hubristic over-reaching, and the Gospel of Mark is not 
without a protagonist who arrives to a claim of superiority over the Baptist, to whom 
the people were flocking (Mark 1: 7), and then he immediately receives a deus ex 
machina-like sanction (Mark 1: 10 – 11).   The call of “follow me” (Mark 1: 17 & 
20), whatever the intent, sets Jesus at the centre of a cause, and his authoritative 
teaching is set over against that of the scribes (Mark 1: 22).   Its divisive nature is 
recognized eu0qu/j by an a1nqrwpoj ... e0n th=| sunagwgh=| who a0ne/kracen (Mark 1: 
23) – the „lifting of the voice‟ and „crying out,‟ which comes “immediately” at the 
beginning of the events – asking the question that foregrounds the adversative, 
conflictual nature of the tragic cause of the protagonist: h]lqej a0pole/sai h9ma=j; 
(Mark 1: 24).   Indeed, „destruction‟ will ensue, but, germane to the tragic genre, it is 
the fall of the central character and the cause to which he or she is bound 
(Prometheus, Antigone, Jesus), or the fate to which they are subjected (Oedipus), 
since they are the actors in their own dramas.   From operative engagement in healing, 
teaching, in dispute and debate, an a0nagnw/risij and peripe/teia follow, and the 
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meta/basij from resolute ferment to quiescent passivity occurs in the para/dosij, 
that transition from attempting to introduce neologistic inscriptions to the Foucauldian 
submission and subjection to the preterite lore: 
 
From being so active, the Jesus of Mark becomes passive, acted upon.   The 
verb [paradi/dwmi] is central to the second and third of the three passion 
predictions (9: 31; 10: 33); it comes three times in the passion prediction for 
the community (13: 9, 11, 12); and then ten times in the passion narrative 
proper (14: 10, 11, 18, 21, 41, 42, 44; 15: 1, 10, 15).   So we may fairly say 
that the Passion involves Jesus being at the receiving end of the actions of 
others, being „handed over,‟ powerless, even forsaken (15: 34) (Barton, 1992: 
62 – 63). 
 
Here, Foucault (1975: 9) returns in that dramatic opening to Surveiller et Punir with 
the account of the brutal retribution metered out to the regicidal “Damiens [qui] avait 
été condamné, le 2 mars 1757, à „faire amende honorable ...‟”   He was branded, 
flayed, and, where the integument was removed, burned with scalding oil, liquefied 
resin and lead, after which the vestige of his human body was drawn and quartered, 
and, ultimately, consigned to a pyre.   Foucault‟s (1975) work observes the changes in 
regimes of discipline and punishment, from the external, public, theatrical display of 
victimization and punition – the pitiless implementation coram populo of the sentence 
pronounced upon Damiens – to the retention of its purpose in the seclusion of its 
victims and the masking of its methods, by focusing on “une technologie politique du 
corps où pourrait se lire une histoire commune des rapports de pouvoir et des relations 
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d‟objet” (Foucault, 1975: 28).   This shared history of the effects of power relations 
occur in  
 
une certain „économie politique‟ du corps ... dans un champ politique; les 
rapports de pouvoir opèrent sur lui une prise immédiate; ils l‟investissent, le 
marquent, le dressent, le supplicient, l‟astreignent à des travaux, l‟obligent à 
des cérémonies, exigent de lui des signes ... [et] ... ces relations descendent 
loin dans l‟épaisseur de la société ... [mais] ... elles ne sont pas univoques; 
elles definissent des points innombrables d‟affrontement, des foyers 
d‟instabilité dont chacun comporte ses risques de conflit, de luttes, et 
d‟inversion au moins transitoire des rapports de forces (Foucault, 1975: 30 – 
32). 
 
In this conflict, even if it is only momentary, partial, and marginal, the resistant, 
ordered, controlled, inscribed, and, in consequence, prescribed “political anatomy,” 
which endeavours to rewrite those inscriptions to some degree or another, effects its 
performance in “les effets qu‟il induit sur tout le réseau où il est pris” (Foucault, 1975: 
32).   Here, the discipline and punishment available to the prevailing powers resist 
that resistance, which attempts to alter that network of control in which it is located, 
and the degree of the latter determines the former.  
 
The clash of discord, the antagonism, the counteraction of the upstart, of the neoteric 
thinker or the revolutionary activist, “this timelessness of necessary and insoluble 
conflict, as Greek tragedy enacts it ... invites us to assimilate the condition of man 
[sic] on this earth to that of tragic” (Steiner, 1984: 276 – 277).   In the extremity of 
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Sutherland‟s graphic „Crucifixion,‟ the protesting body is tamed into a portrait of 
defeated docility and the fractured brokenness of the Markan ending.   For the 
opponents of Jesus, his discursive actions were the equivalent of the regicide of 
Damiens, because it entailed the redrafting of the para/dosij of divine teaching and 
its inscriptive power, sequestered domestic care, and public expression. 
 
How to portray this act of „discipline and punishment,‟ given Aristotle‟s reticence 
about spectacle (Poetics 1450b 16 – 18), will form part of the dramaturgical-
analytical debate about performance – arguably, a minimalist presentation of the 
classical deposit of known events may be more compelling – but the emotional power 
of the o1yij, which Aristotle also recognizes (Poetics 1450b 16 – 17; 1453b 1 – 2), 
evokes the pity and fear that is central to the ka/qarsij that tragedy offers its 
audience. 
 
Foucault (1975), as he traces the development of techniques of punishment from the 
supplice public to the “ingéniosité architecturale ... du principe panoptique” (Foucault, 
1975: 218), adverts to the festive aspects of the days of public execution, which were 
holidays, when the cities filled and the taverns traded, since the people must witness 
the punishment, must see the spectacle – it was a vicarious act of disciplining them, of 
reinforcing the codes which made them docile and encoded bodies.   But  
 
[l]e condamné se trouvait héroïsé par l‟ampleur de ses crimes largement étalés 
... Contre la loi, contre les riches, les puissants, les magistrats, la maréchaussée 
ou le guet, contre la ferme et ses agents, il apparaissait avoir mené un combat 
dans lequel on se reconnaissait facilement.   Les crimes proclamés amplifiaient 
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jusqu‟à l‟épopée des luttes minuscules que l‟ombre protégeait tous les jours 
(Foucault, 1975: 70; emphasis added). 
 
In the majuscule eristic stance of the condemned, the populace perceived their „daily, 
minuscule struggles.‟   Somewhere on this spectrum of woes, their pity was roused – 
an emotion that Gregory of Nazianzus (1987: 34, l. 269) calls “the tenderest of all 
emotions” – but that exposed sympathy, in turn, was made fearful in the face of 
“[l‟]éxcès même des violences exercées ... c‟est le cérémonial même de la justice se 
manifestant dans sa force” (Foucault, 1975: 38).   The victim submits and is written 
upon, and “in and through touching that power becomes reality, not only as something 
to be seen but as ultimate signifier ... feeding itself off its own routines, creating 
commonplaces, bringing about a world of signification” (Mbembe, 2001: 167) always 
attempting to form a ubiquitous network of control, so that its “justice poursuit le 
corps au-delà de toute souffrance possible” (Foucault, 1975: 39).    But that „outside,‟ 
that sphere of exclusion defines the „inside,‟ the inclusive zone.   It is a „beyond‟ that 
repeatedly returns to the midst; a farmako/j, who is reared within and, whatever the 
degree of adversative striving and resistant stasis, bears the a9marti/a of all – since it 
is the adversative resistance of being human – to the place of the skull beyond the city 
walls, but is the one who is reared and nurtured within (Derrida, 1972b: 152 – 153) 
and, thus, identified with, pitied for its efforts, feared for its consequences, and yet, in 
this synaptic function, trails ka/qarsij in its transgressing of the borders both of 







In Chapter Three, the economic dictates of Aristotle concerning the xoro/j have been 
stated – kai\ to\n xoro\n de\ e3na dei= u9polamba/nein tw=n u9pokritw=n, kai\ mo/rion 
ei]nai tou= o3lou kai\ sunagwni/zesqai mh\ w3sper Eu0ripi/dh| a0ll‟ w3sper Sofoklei= 
(Poetics, 1456a 25 – 27) – and the scholarly conjecture for such brevity has been 
noted.   Is there a role for a chorus in a recasting of the Gospel of Mark as an 
Aristotelian tragedy?    
 
Locating two of the characters who appear at the conclusion of the Gospel of Mark at 
the beginning of tragic Mark, and opening the drama with characters that witness to, 
and embody, the pra=cij, as it has been suggested above, engenders, one proposes, 
the possibility of electing a choral function for them in a performative recasting of this 
Gospel.   Quite probably, as noted earlier, sections of the Gospel of Mark were 
enacted in various locations with few additional resources of costume or stage props, 
and the stories of teaching and healing may have included improvisation, even some 
editing and embroidering.   Perhaps something of a minimalist or pared-down 
ostension ought to be entertained, with the curtailment of the xoro/j to these two 
characters, who point, narrate, discuss, and show the significance of the events on the 
stage – a significance now not simply of negotiating and mapping the path of the 
maqhth/j, but also of demonstrating the responses of those characters in conflictual 
and agonistic relation to the prwtagwnisth/j and his cause.   Whilst such a choral 
recasting does not follow early tragedy with its twelve member chorus, or, from 
Sophocles onwards, an increase to fifteen dancers, many modern productions of the 
Greek tragedies reduce the chorus, and a number do so without being subjected to 
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financial constraints, but rather because they “take their starting point from the 
extreme passions of Greek tragedy and seek to follow the bitter familial and political 
arguments as human stories within a Western realistic tradition” (Goldhill, 2007: 
63).
123
  Battezzato (2005) has been cited above as noting that the choral voice was 
neither uniform nor singular in its view, and the two-figure choral presence in tragic 
Mark could perform the opposing roles of those in conflict with the primary character, 
and ensure that “[o]ne of the structuring principles of tragedy ... the tension between 
the collective chorus and the individual hero” (Goldhill, 2007: 47) is upheld.   The 
cause of the prwtagwnisth/j is contrasted to the other voices, and those voices may 
be noted either by choral gesture or, perhaps, by appropriating character roles in a 
radically restricted performance; and, if the latter, it will not be unnoticed that such 
concision will reduce the cast to „three actors.‟ 
 
GODS AND GOD 
 
Staging the presence of a god, gods, or the divine, presents severe challenges to a mise 
en scène that endeavours to invoke a contemporary relevance.   Goldhill (2007: 207) 
argues that central to the popularity of the Antigone since the nineteenth century is the 
absence of gods in the play: 
 
This absence is integral to the effect of the drama: it is a play about humans in 
conflict, each of whom can appeal to the (silent) gods in different and 
selectively polemical ways.   The lack of a god‟s authoritative voice is central 
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 The first English production of Jean Anouilh‟s rewriting of Antigone (1951) was performed in 
February 1949 with one actor playing the Chorus, notably, Sir Laurence Olivier.      
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to this play‟s refusal to allow its audience a simple route through its moral 
conflicts. 
 
Whilst one is attempting to forge a tragedy of contemporary import, one needs to ask 
whether there is a similarity, in this respect, between the Antigone and the Gospel of 
Mark.   The answer, possibly, is both „Yes‟ and „No.‟   „No,‟ because the reception of 
the latter text is already located within the reaches of divine activity, and there are 
moments of divine interpolation (Mark 1: 11; 9: 7).   But „Yes‟ in the sense that at 
crucial moments of diverting the tragic course of events (Mark 14: 36), or in 
overturning death for life at the end, divine action is absent.   However, needless to 
say, the Antigone, like the Gospel of Mark, does not refuse divine contact, nor repel 
the influence of the gods.   Teiresias, the divine seer, is present, and Antigone bases 
her own „treacherous‟ action upon the law of the gods with regard to burial.   For 
when, in the light of her civil disobedience, Creon asks: 
 




ou0de\ sqe/nein tosou=ton w0io/mhn ta\ sa\ 
khru/gmaq‟ w3st‟ a1grapta ka0sfalh= qew=n 
no/mima du/nasqai qnhto\n o1nq‟ u9perdramei=n (ll. 453 – 455). 
  
Both present and palpable is the divine, and the cause of the conflict between Creon 
and Antigone is undertaken in the name of a god.   But, tragic Mark, owing both to its 
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ending, and the part that u3brij plays in it, can, in a contemporary sense, restrict the 




A dramaturgical approach to the Gospel of Mark, which attempts to remain faithful to 
the Aristotelian principles of tragedy, and yet be exploratory, innovative, and of 
current import, requires a translation that retains the directness and pungency of this 
shortest of the gospels, but also endeavours to render meaning into meaning both in a 
dramatic and, in fidelity to the lineaments of the classical tragedy, in a poetic manner.   
This is a matter of some import, and whilst it will demand a person or persons with 
knowledge of the Greek Text of the New Testament, it will not be insensitive to the 
input of the company and its players who will perform the roles.   The act of 
translating, editing, and inserting didascalies must cohere with the decided approach 
to the work as a drama with its own emphases, and ensure that it foregrounds the 
pra=cij that has been appropriated, in order to enhance the necessary ka/qarsij. 
 
There is a tradition of rendering the classical tragedies into modern translations – 
some for purposes of an accurate reading, with greater literal fidelity to the original 
text; others for purposes of performance, most often in vastly different venues than 
those for which the original texts were written – and even of translating and adapting 
Homeric epic for radio and stage (those of Simon Armitage for BBC Radio 4 and 
Derek Walcott for the stage, Review Saturday Guardian, 20
th
 May, 2006).    
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Significantly, the translations by modern poets often have been amongst the chosen 
translations for the stage, influenced, quite possibly, by the voice of Aristotle, since 
foundational to their te/xnh is metaphor, polu\ de\ me/giston attribute, which mo/non 
ga\r tou=to ou1te par‟ a1llou e1sti labei=n eu0fui5aj te shmei=o/n e0sti (Poetics, 1459a 
5 – 7).   These later versions have not shied away from including a contemporary 
relevance and viewpoint, similar to that aggiornamento which one is attempting to 
lend here to a dramatic recension of the Gospel of Mark: Seamus Heaney‟s Antigone 
(2004), unsurprisingly, invokes Irish idioms and images, since the contemporaneity of 
the pra=cij and the events of that play are not without certain contextual affiliations 
with the recent history of Ireland, and Ted Hughes‟s Oresteia (1999) incorporates a 
pacifist aspect, and also retains a „readerly,‟ or here, a performative openness (see 
Goldhill, 2007: 153 – 187).   Recasting the images employed in the teaching of Jesus 
towards more contemporary evocations may be entertained, although classic texts 
often demand the retention of their known metaphors, which have become part of the 
tradition. 
 
Palpable in modern performative recensions is a sensitivity to the classical metrical 
forms and rhyme, and, when rendering the Gospel of Mark into an Aristotelian tragic 
Mark, attention to rhythm and rhyming possibilities ought, at least, to be entertained.   
Indeed, adhering to the dialogic and monologic structure of the Greek tragic genre and 
its rhythmic patterning may enrich tragic Mark, so that the conflict is emphasised by 
the adversative and concise stichomythia, the declamation of teaching in undertaken 
in the rhesis, and the collective responses – often two opposing views employing the 
regular antiphonal structure of strophe and antistrophe – rendered in metrical and 
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rhyming choral odes, and, perhaps, although this would invite additional skills, 
undertaken with musical accompaniment. 
 
MU=QOS,  0ANAGNW/RISIS, PERIPE/TEIA 
 
States (1985: 49 – 50), acknowledging Aristotle‟s ka/qarsij, appropriates it as 
purgation for his own purposes, and asserts that  
 
catharsis is our best word for what takes place at large in the theatre.   It is 
precisely a purging: what is purged, at least on the level that concerns me here, 
is time – the menace of successiveness, of all life falling haphazardly through 
time into accident and repetition ... a play plucks human experience from time 
and offers an aesthetic completion to a process we know to be endless.   The 
play imitates the timely in order to remove it from time, to give time shape. 
 
A succession of events – whether historical, quasi-historical, or purely imaginative – 
requires a re-casting, an ordering (even when that order seems to be random or 
absent), so as to present them as drama, and that causal chain, that organization of 
plot, that shifting and aligning of characters and events, that recension, and 
embellishment of a foundational story or occurrence, must be unfolded in a mu=qoj, 
which is subservient to a pra=cij.   In the tragic genre, as noted, the best tragedy will 
incorporate an a9marti/a, which is palpable in a series of events that leads to a 
necessary a0nagrw/risij and peripe/teia, and which, in turn, will produce a fearful 
and pitiful identification; and the ka/qarsij both inherent in the theatrical experience, 
when time is „purged‟ of its successiveness in “the two hours‟ traffic of our stage” 
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(Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet: Prologue), also extends beyond the theatrically 
coded „world.‟ 
 
The approach to recasting the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy, and with an 
impact that may not be without a contemporary message, has caused the 
foregrounding of a particular action, and, via a dramaturgical analysis, has engendered 
a proleptic trajectory to the drama, one that is perceived through the eyes and 
experiences of the final characters.   Embarking upon such a project with this intent 
established, permits the company to generate a plot that is faithful to this purpose, and 
ensures that this particular pra=cij is appropriated and ostended. 
 
It has been noted that 
 
[t]ragedy is a genre of conflict: not only conflict between people or between 
ideas, but also conflict about what words mean.   Characters repeatedly use the 
same words in different senses.   They argue over what words to use, and they 
use them as weapons against each other (Goldhill, 2007: 96 – 97). 
 
Thus, conflict, as it is palpable in the Gospel of Mark, is central to tragic Mark, and as 
the prwtagwnisth/j reinterprets his own tradition and forges his own cause, so a 
series of agonistic encounters follow, leading to one final confrontation, when the 
degree of refusal to submit to be an inscriptive subject extends beyond the boundaries 
proscribed by the „authorities of delimitation‟ (Foucault, 1969). 
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A dramaturgical-analytical approach to the Gospel of Mark, which adheres to the 
above pra=cij, would foreground the a0gw/n, even when it is suppressed, and, rather, 
repress the miraculous events of healing and feeding, or only employ them as 
(possibly, silent choral or balletic) illustrations of the disjunction between the cause of 
Jesus and the opposition of his adversaries.   Therefore, the healing of the paralysed 
man (Mark 2: 1 – 12) is a claim of authority; the meal with the outcasts (Mark 2: 13 – 
17) is a challenge to prevailing customs; and the lack of fasting by the followers of 
Jesus (Mark 2: 18 – 22) and that poiou=sin toi=j sa/bbasin o4 ou0k e1cestin (Mark 2: 
24), are all contrary practices to those of other teachers and their disciples.    
 
But, both in these moments of conflict, as well as in the proclamation by Jesus of o9 
kairo/j (Mark 1: 15) and the summary call to others to follow him (Mark 1: 16 – 20), 
evidence of an a9marti/a, in which there is a perceptible u3brij, emerges: that 
„reaching beyond‟ the levels of resistance tolerated by society, and that „over-
reaching‟ of the limitation of being human.   Thus, in this singular generation of a 
mise en scène, the a0nagnw/risij in Mark 8: 27 – 30 and its „confirmation‟ in Mark 9: 
2 – 9, includes the injunction that mhdeni\ le/gwsin peri\ au0tou= (Mark 8: 30) and 
mhdeni\ a4 ei]don dihgh/swntai (Mark 9: 9), and, at least theatrically, associated with 
these statements is the reaction of the women at the end of the Gospel, who ou0deni\ 
ou0de\n ei]pan (Mark 16: 8).   In the tradition of commentary upon the Gospel of Mark, 
 
there is one point of practically unanimous agreement, which is that the 
Marcan narrative has a major climax right in the middle, at 8: 27.   It is the 
recognition by Peter of Jesus‟ messiahship ... Here, then, right in the middle of 
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the book, is the great moment of recognition (Kermode, 1979: 138 – 139; 
emphasis added), 
 
which, for our purposes, is the Aristotelian a0nagnw/risij.   “But,” and how aptly 
Kermode (1979: 139) states it,  
 
nobody subsequently behaves as if he had benefited by it; and indeed its 
pleasures and promises are instantly disappointed ... Later his [Mark‟s] Jesus 
will declare himself the Christ, for the one and only time, at the moment when 
Peter denies him. 
 
Indeed, here is the ironizing realization that to exalt the status of Jesus and to serve his 
cause is news that is not necessarily „good news,‟ but, rather, news that is all too 
human, and news that results in a theatrical ka/qarsij.124   Following this moment of 
a0nagnw/risij, to which is enjoined the muteness of proleptic knowledge, which, in 
this meta/basij and aggiornamento of the Gospel of Mark into tragic dramatic Mark, 
is the very silence of the knowledge of Jesus, of his followers, and of his wider 
audience, both within the mimetic world and beyond it; an awareness that the 
threshold of being human has been transgressed and the claims bruited are too great.   
Inexorably, the peripe/teia ensues, when the degree of conflict is heightened and the 
stakes are raised, and the consequent „discipline and punishment‟ is inevitable – its 
degree and severity imposed, in order to restrain and restrict the u3brij which emerges 
out of the shared a9marti/a of humanness, that ubiquitous fault line endemic to the 
human condition.    
                                                 
124
 In this context, Bilezikian (1977: 146) extends the Aristotelian ka/qarsij and interprets it in terms 
of the Resurrection of Jesus and the imminent Parousia.  
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This universal story writ large engenders the Aristotelian ka/qarsij, which has been 
explored above, a katharsis evident in the pose of the resigned and yet resilient 
women in the illustration below, who do not relinquish their duty to go to the tomb, 
and who, through their following of Jesus – or, in the production envisaged, through 
the tracking of Jesus by the young man and Mary Magdalene – have been 
transformed, as, indeed, is the one who continues to be inscribed by, and to enact, this 
story in ritual, ethical, familial, and personal life, both trapped in the present tense and 
yet also liberated in speaking and imagining futures, one perennially “Knowing 
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Appropriating both the deeply inscriptive embodiment of classic and, particularly, 
sacred texts, and also the Aristotelian features of a dramatic tragedy, this 
prolegomenon to the Gospel of Mark as drama confronted the to/poj of its beginning 
and ending, which is precisely the point at which the challenges of known inceptive 
moments and authorized dénouements assert themselves most pressingly on the 
creative dramatist.   Highlighting issues of contest, within both the tragic genre and 
the wider hermeneutic arena, as much of this work has done, of unceasing 
corrigibility and ever-elusive closural openings, of dialogic, even multi-logic, 
instability in sacred texts, no less so than in other upostatic writings and their 
interpretations, a play, lauded by Aristotle, namely, the Oedipus Tyrannos,
125
 was 
employed both as text and as performance, in order to suggest an approach to render 
the Gospel of Mark as a tragic dramatic work.   This method of approaching an 
incipient dramatic Mark and of locating the Gospel of Mark in this arena, has 
informed the pursuit of the Aristotelian protocols of a successful tragedy, as they were 
identified in Chapter Three, but also, in this very undertaking, has suggested an 
informing pra=cij of dramatic Mark that is faithful to the genre of the tragic, both in 
its contestable ancient and modern forms. 
 
                                                 
125
 In this respect, of the Oedipus Tyrannos Bowra (1967:44) states: “Admired by Aristotle as the 
perfect tragedy, it keeps all its original power, and whether we consider its plot or its style or its 
characterization or its poetry, it remains unchallenged.”  
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The option of rewriting the Gospel of Mark as a dramatic tragedy rather than as a 
comedy (Hatton, 2001), or, perhaps, more aptly, as a tragi-comedy, partly has been 
circumscribed by the „anxiety of influence‟ (Bloom, 1973; 1994) of the „founder‟ of 
dramatic theory whose lectures on tragedy are our only possession, and partly has 
been urged by the sense of estrangement that the genre brings.   Unlike the classical 
comedy, tragedy 
 
is enacted elsewhere.   Nearly all our [classical Greek] tragedies take place in 
cities other than Athens ... Nor are the characters of tragedy like the audience.   
Tragedy focuses on kings, heroes, monsters, women – all of which are 
conceived to be other to the male, enfranchised adults of the democratic 
citizen body.   Tragedy, that is, unlike comedy, is set in other places, at other 
times, and involves other people.   Tragedy is staged at the scene of the other 
(Goldhill, 2007: 124 – 125). 
 
That otherness engenders the Verfremdungseffekt, which encourages the seriousness 
of reflection, that self-reflexive act of perceiving the glancing and angled view in a 
distant mirror, a perspective that gives rise to the realization that, at the level of the 
pra=cij, “[t]ragedy may be set at the scene of the other, but it turns out to be about us 
... What look like stories about others, prove to go to the heart of the self.   Indeed, it 
is because tragedy takes this strange detour that it can be so powerful” (Goldhill, 
2007: 126).   Such a seemingly circuitous, yet, paradoxically, precise and penetrating, 
route back home, back to the self, is presented by the classics in their various forms of 
poih/mata, which, through their action of „making,‟ relate the human story by 
inscribing it upon the lives of men and women, and, consequently, by informing 
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human behaviour in the practice, the a1skhsij, of human living in the present, and by 
shaping those human futures.   Not only are these classics toujours déjà the enacted 
drama – “such stuff” – of human living, but they also offer themselves to a more 
formal coding by the te/xnh of the literary, visual, and musical arts – in poems, 
fiction, and dramatic works; in art forms; in dance; in programmatic music; in opera, 
and in oratorio.   But these codifications demand a recension, revision, and recasting, 
which will quarry the futurities that are embedded in the classics of the tradition, and, 
when doing so, will present them with current accentuations, whilst, simultaneously, 
altering the past for the future through these present inflexions. 
 
As an informing classic, the Gospel of Mark, with “its reservoir of signs [that] is 
inexhaustible” (Spivak, 2007: 162), presents within itself the possibility of submission 
to such meta/stasij and modulation.   But one suggests that the attempt to read the 
Gospel of Mark in its extant state as a tragedy or a comedy or an epic is to ossify it.   
It is to appropriate the classics and turn them “into frozen monuments of Greatness in 
which our „cultural‟ heritage‟ is embodied” (Scholes, 1989: 125), an action which not 
only is questionable hermeneutically, but also one which silences the classics, and 
changes their contributing and informing inscriptions into their own circumscribed 
and hermetic epitaphs.    
 
Classics write themselves upon the lives and bodies of human beings, who, then, as 
subjects of those classics, „live‟ those classics into the future, which is evidence of the 
manner in which the classics are perennial dramatic performances.   But, when the 
classic is entertained more formally as dramatic tragedy or comedy, it requires 
submission to the principles of that genre, which themselves need to be stated.   Here, 
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the choice is tragedy, and the protocols are those of Aristotle, which themselves, as 
explored above, are not without their own contested interpretations and orderings, 
when the Poetics coheres as a discourse both as a contemporary and also as a future 
text.   And that detailed Foucauldian exploration of the formation of the discourse of 
the Poetics, and its continuing annotative tradition, is not without its parallels in the 
formation of the discourse of the Gospel of Mark from its own agonistic environment, 
where its events are “not merely a set of happenings in the public world but the focal 
point of a variety of human intentionalities” (Wright, 1992; 1993: 94).   Thus, 
likewise, the formation of the „discursive regularity‟ of the Gospel of Mark constructs 
and reconstructs its own terms of delimitation and conditions of admission, during 
which conjectural marginalia and adversaria are revisited, and even some possible 
exploratory dramatic innovations are revived, and which, concomitantly in the 
tradition of commentary, open and re-open a variety of interpretive possibilities and 
yield to the extraction of their promise for the present and the future.   Not only is this 
an exegetical task, which is subject to its own perpetually corrigible definitional 
principles, and during the course of which a vocation may respond to the call to 
follow an emancipating journey, through which certain paths will be taken and other 
rejected, certain options appropriated and others jettisoned; but it is also a poetical 
task – the te/xnh of „making,‟ of „creating‟ – a charge that may be liberating in its 
dramatic earnest.    
 
Notwithstanding the vibrant forms of Christianity, not least upon the continent of 
Africa, with their serious and comedic celebration of joyful hope, the choice here has 
been that of tragedy, and for which this prolegomenon suggests the lineaments of the 
production of the Gospel of Mark as an Aristotelian tragedy with, at least, one hopes, 
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a measure of contemporary significance.   The tragic is chosen, first, because it 
constitutes the genre subjected to the most exacting scrutiny in the Theory of Drama; 
second, because it haunts our savagely brutal and dusty twilight as a literary form 
worthy of continued examination; and, third, and more precisely, because  
 
[t]ragedy‟s repeated concentration on the violence that emerges from the 
pursuit of justice, on the corruption of power in the pursuit of war, on the 
humiliations and misplaced confidence of the aftermath of military victory, on 
the battleground of gender within social order, seems to speak directly to the 
most pressing and dismaying of contemporary concerns (Goldhill, 2007: 120). 
 
And it is therein that resides the productive possibility of tragic imaginative worlds 
that enact various dominant strands of the human story, and for which these proposals 
are tabled: to appropriate a physically inscriptive story of restrained secrecy and 
fractured meaning, and to read it from an angled and glancing perspective, permitting 
the fear, pity, and hope of its ending to inform its enactment, engendering in the 
viewer an experience of mute kathartic identification and restoration in the realization 
of being human – the a0nagnw/risij both of one gifted to speak of imaginable futures 
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